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morally.
I show not only that it is incumbent on us to cultivate morally beneficial emotions, but also how we can do it.
Building on Kant's vague hints about what the process involves, I argue that cultivating a given feeling
requires, above all, sharpening one's judgment about it, one's sensitivity to its nature and to the shape it takes
in one's own character in order to make responsible decisions about whether to act on the feeling and when
one does choose to act on it, to express it in a way which harmonizes with one's sense of moral integrity.
I begin with an argument showing that on Kant's mature moral theory, it is our duty to cultivate feelings which
help us form a virtuous disposition. I then discuss particular feelings which are especially important in this
regard. I begin with the feeling of respect for the moral law and show that it constitutes the motive of duty.
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ABSTRACT
When we strive to better ourselves morally, what 
aspects of our humanity do we bring into play? In my 
dissertation, I consider Kant's answer to this question.
The fact that Kant held moral obligation to be reason-based, 
moral action to be rational and voluntary, and feelings to 
be largely irrational and beyond our control does not entail 
that he denied feelings a role in the moral life. Against 
common misconceptions of Kant as a philosopher who neglects 
the emotional aspects of moral life, I show that he actually 
considers our emotional dispositions to be valuable tools 
for perfecting ourselves morally, i.e., for fulfilling all 
our duties and striving to do so from respect for the moral 
law. Feelings such as love, respect, and pride can help us 
increase our moral perfection because they make us less 
prone to act in morally unacceptable ways and more prepared 
to carry out our various duties. Because such feelings help 
us carry out our duties, it is our duty to cultivate them.
I show not only that it is incumbent on us to cultivate 
morally beneficial emotions, but also how we can do it. 
Building on Kant's vague hints about what the process 
involves, I argue that cultivating a given feeling requires, 
above all, sharpening one's judgment about it, one's 
sensitivity to its nature and to the shape it takes in one's 
own character. This enables one to make responsible 
decisions about whether to act on the feeling and, when one
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does choose to act on it, to express it in a way which is 
dignified and which harmonizes with one's sense of moral 
integrity. Cultivating morally beneficial feelings also 
involves refining the feelings themselves through 
participating in society and in culture--shaping emotional 
bonds through friendship and engaging in art, sports, and 
the like as creator as well as consumer.
I begin with an argument showing that on Kant's mature 
moral theory, it is our duty to cultivate feelings which 
help us form a virtuous disposition. I then discuss 
particular feelings which are especially important in this 
regard. I begin with the feeling of respect for the moral 
law and show that it constitutes the motive of duty. Kant's 
"pure” moral motive— the motive of duty— is thus actually a 
feeling which is grounded in a rational grasp of the moral 
law. I then consider feelings associated with our duties 
toward ourselves (e.g., pride and courage) and with our 
duties toward others (e.g., love and respect) and raise the 
question of how cultivated feelings figure in the virtuous 
character and also in relation to good willing and to 
morally worthy action. I show that certain "moral" feelings 
(feelings with a rational basis, e.g., "proper" pride and 
love of man) can become part of the motive of duty itself 
and so can serve as motives to morally worthy action.
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INTRODUCTION
When we strive to better ourselves morally, what are we 
doing? What aspects of our humanity do we bring into play?
I will here consider Kant's answer to these questions.
At first glance, Kant's picture of morally-engaged 
humanity looks bleak and over-lntellectualized. He seems to 
admit only our purely rational side into the arena of moral 
assessment and activity: moral willing and acting are based 
on our rational grasp of the moral law and its requirements. 
The emotions seem barred from playing any motivating role in 
moral life--even from being proper objects of moral 
assessment--because, as Kant so often says, they are not 
only irrational (unable to judge the rightness of actions) 
but also, to a great extent, beyond our control.x Since
xIn this work, I use the terms "feeling" and "emotion" (as 
well as their plurals) interchangeably to refer not only to 
episodic feelings but also to our dispositions to feel them and 
to the attitudes and habits of thought which underlie those 
dispositions, all of which are part of a person's character. 
These terms, together with the apt but unfortunately outdated 
term, "sentiment," cover the broad range of feelings I take to be 
covered by Kant's use of "Gefuhl." That I use the terms 
interchangeably might strike some readers as misleading given 
their sometimes disparate meanings. The reader might, for 
instance, think I'm going to show that strong emotions such as 
rage and lust play a key part in moral life, for Kant, and might 
then be disappointed to find that a substantial part of my 
discussion focuses on a comparatively pallid class of "reason- 
based" feelings (the "moral" feelings) which might even strike 
some as mere arid caricatures of natural emotions. To forestall 
disappointment, I assure the reader that I will show that all our 
feelings--including those which are nature-based (some of which 
might even underlie our vices)--can be brought to bear on our 
moral improvement, but that only the "moral" feelings can 
motivate us in morally worthy action because they alone stem from
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moral praise and blame attach only to voluntary actions, and 
since moral actions must spring from the good will which 
acts from the reason-based motive of duty, the emotions 
appear to be neither morally valuable nor morally relevant, 
on Kant's view.
I hope to show that such an intellectualistic rendering 
of the Kantian virtuous character, while containing a kernel 
of truth, is incomplete and crude in its conception of 
feeling. The kernel of truth is that morality JLa. reason- 
based rather than nature-based, for Kant. Natural feelings, 
such as the sympathy which might move me to help somebody 
who has fallen on the street, are neither lasting enough nor 
evenly enough distributed to provide a universally 
accessible foundation for morality. In order to be
accessible to every human being and safe from the
misfortunes of circumstance and the inequity of natural 
endowments, the moral motive must be grounded in something 
so essential to humanity that everbody can be expected to 
have it. That common element is reason.
By locating the moral lav in common human reason, Kant 
gives morality--and in particular, moral motivation--the 
stable foundation it needs. Since the moral motive (respect 
for the moral lav, or the motive of duty in its most basic
form) is always available for us to act on in virtue of our
an awareness of the moral lav or of its specific obligations. 
This sense of duty, however, can join with natural feelings in 
several ways, illustrated in Chapters 3-5.
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reason, Kant makes morality a matter of choice rather than 
of luck. Only by acting from the motive of duty do we show 
a direct concern for the rightness and/or moral 
permissibility of our actions. Because it embodies a direct 
concern for (and, when engaged, awareness of) the rightness 
of our actions, respect for the moral law--unlike feelings 
such as sympathy--can't "misfire" by sometimes leading us to 
wrong action.* And in the absence of a fully worked-out 
moral theory which is feeling-based— say, a theory showing 
how love can, without the assistance of reason, not only 
give rise to obligations but also be intrinsically 
principle-guided and hence not blind--we have to take Kant's 
word on the inadequacies and real dangers of feeling-based 
ethical theories.
The kernel of truth— that morality is based on pure 
reason, for Kant--has led philosophers to criticize him for 
having an alienated and skeletal conception of the morally 
engaged self. The common core of the criticism is that he 
fails to give sufficient moral credit to the sensible, 
nature-based aspects of humanity. If to be morally good is 
to know what duty demands and to act from that sense of 
duty, and to have a sense of duty is just to be aware of the 
moral law, then morality, for Kant, reduces to being
*Barbara Herman gives the example of being led by one's 
sympathy to help some art thieves load their getaway car (Herman, 
"On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty," The Practice of 
Moral Judgment, pp.4-5).
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responsive to principle. But responsiveness to principle is 
not all there is to being a virtuous person. Feeling the 
right emotions in the right sorts of circumstances is an 
aspect of good moral character that Kant seems to ignore.
Schiller began the critical trend, arguing that respect 
for the moral lav is not in fact the highest moral ideal 
because it can only arise from a sense of mastery over, 
rather than cooperation with, the inclinations. Instead of 
the dutiful soul, Schiller suggests, the beautiful soul 
should be our moral ideal--the soul which "feels able to 
trust to the impulse of desire without running the risk of 
offending morality."3
Bernard Williams is a prominent thinker to join the 
trend of late, launching a multi-fronted attack against 
Kant's apparent devaluation of the emotions. Williams 
argues that far from playing any minor role in the moral 
life, the emotions are actually what give sense to moral 
practices: it is only by seeing a person's actions as 
expressive of an underlying emotion, e.g., compassion, that 
we can make sense of her actions at all.* On Williams' 
view, the emotions are central aspects of an individual's 
moral character— a position that Kant with his principle- 
based ethics cannot possibly seem to share.
3Schiller, "On Loveliness and Dignity," Schiller's Completed
*91KS, p.4 73.
“•"Morality and the Emotions," Problems of The Self. p. 222.
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But the fact that Kantian morality is reason-based does 
not entail that the emotions have no place in it. Only if 
we think of emotions as natural events which take place in 
us entirely independently of our choices do we need to 
exclude them from the realm of morality, the realm of the 
voluntary. I wish to suggest that Kant did not think of all 
feelings as nature-based. On Kant's view, there is a 
privileged class of feelings which is reason-based. This 
class includes feelings such as respect, the workings of 
conscience, proper pride, and the love of mankind. These 
feelings are not mere impulses: they follow upon rational 
judgments--in particular, upon a proper grasp of the moral 
law and the realization that we ourselves are the authors of 
its duties. Since wfi. control our reflection on the moral 
law and our attentiveness to the ways in which its 
requirements are specific to our finite nature and manifest 
themselves in particular circumstances, the cultivation of 
feelings based on such reflection also lies within our 
power. This special class of emotions can therefore be 
admitted into the moral arena from the very outset.
What I wish in particular to consider with regard to 
these "moral" feelings is what their relation is to the 
broader range of natural feelings and what they can do to 
bring the latter in line with the requirements of reason.
I will give a catalogue of the three main types of moral 
feeling in Kant's theory, showing, for each one, what its
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role is in morality and how it can be cultivated. I will 
also discuss the cultivation of feelings which are not 
strictly "moral" in that they are not preceded by 
consciousness of the moral law, but which are still 
instrumental to morality in ways yet to be specified.
The project is thus to show the importance of the 
emotions in Kant's conception of the moral life. I argue 
that respect, in particular, has a certain primacy in Kant's 
theory because it makes us heed others' (as well as our own) 
dignity. It also tempers feelings such as love, which when 
left unchecked can become morally harmful.
In Chapter 1, I give the argument that there is room 
for the emotions in Kant's mature, reason-based system. I 
begin by considering Kant's seemingly inconsistent remarks 
about the relation between anthropology (the empirical study 
of human beings) and a metaphysics of morals (an a priori 
body of moral principles). I argue that anthropological 
knowledge is the material to which Kant applies the moral 
law in order to yield the specific duties confronting us. I 
then turn to the question of how moral worth, the highest 
value in Kant's system of ethics, can attach to emotionally 
motivated actions. Morally worthy actions, according to 
Kant, are those which are motivated by respect for the moral 
lav. I argue that feelings which have been cultivated with 
an eye to moral ends contain within themselves a kernel of 
respect for the moral lav, and so, can serve as morally
worthy motives. I conclude with a catalogue of the three 
main types of morally beneficial feelings--duty-feelings/ 
dignity-feelings, and helping feelings— which I discuss in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters.
In Chapter 3, I focus on the feeling of respect for the 
moral law and explain why it constitutes the only morally 
worthy motive, in Kant's eyes. Against "formalist" 
commentators, who see respect as a purely intellectual grasp 
of the moral law, I argue that respect is a reason-based 
feeling, differing from other emotions in that it follows a 
proper reflection on the law. I also argue that the moral 
lav must be grasped in the right sort of way— as embodying 
the concept of duty— in order for us to feel respect for it. 
In order to grasp the lav in this way, we must consider it 
from an appropriate standpoint, namely, an awareness that we 
are finite rational beings, not pure intellects. Only then 
can we feel the humility which constitutes the "negative" 
side of respect. The importance of a proper self-conception 
in our reflection on the moral lav is often neglected in 
discussions of Kant's conception of respect. I seek to 
remedy that situation and at the same time to show why 
reflection on our finite rational identity does not threaten 
the autonomy of morality by introducing incentives 
"extraneous" to the moral law itself.
In Chapter 3, I consider the feelings which stem from a 
recognition of our unconditional worth. These "dignity-
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feelings"--pride, courage, love of honor, and the workings 
of conscience— serve primarily, though not exclusively, to 
help us carry out our duties toward ourselves. Heeding our 
sense of dignity and cultivating related emotions, I argue, 
is a main avenue toward shaping a distinctive character. 
where "character" is to be understood not only in the moral 
sense of the good character who lives up to the principles 
of morality, but also in a more individualized sense, as the 
character who has a sense of her own individuality and is 
able to trust and enjoy her emotions because she has unified 
them in accordance with the idea of her dignity. By 
considering specific character types with different 
strengths and weaknesses--that is, different needs for moral 
improvement--I show that cultivating character in both of 
these senses is morally incumbent on us, for Kant.
I also consider the moral feelings associated with good 
or bad conscience: self-respect and guilt, respectively. 
There is a danger, in Kant's duty-oriented theory, of 
acquiring what he calls a "tyrannical" conscience which 
blames one for having failed to do one's duty even where one 
has done everything one could rationally be expected to do. 
Even though supererogation is not a problem for Kant in the 
way it is for utilitarians, the ever-present possibility of 
being tempted to violate our duties can lead to a tyrannical 
conscience. Although Kant himself proposes no solution for 
how to avoid such a conscience, I give my own solution by
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shoving how to weaken morally harmful inclinations without 
compromising one's own individuality.
In Chapter 4, I consider feelings which help us carry 
out our duties toward others--notably sympathy, love and 
respect for others. Like the "dignity-feelings" discussed 
in Chapter 3, these feelings must be cultivated in 
accordance with moral principles and ends in order to 
receive proper expression. But they differ from dignity- 
feelings in that they are essentially sociable (not self­
directed) in character.
The central feeling here is the love of mankind. While 
Kant says that it cannot be a duty to have this feeling, 
since love cannot be felt out of the constraint inherent in 
the thought of duty, it is still a duty to cultivate it by 
practicing beneficence (DV:401-2). Kant's assumption here 
is that by doing good to others, we will come to love them 
(DV:402, 457). Although this is a tenuous assumption, I try 
to make it more plausible by considering concrete situations 
in which we do help other people. I argue that the social 
graces are an especially fruitful ground for cultivating our 
love of man.
I also show, however, that love of man, interpreted as 
a direct concern for the well-being of others, must be 
understood pas part and parcel of the motive of duty itself 
as it manifests itself in the morally mature agent.
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In Chapter 5, I focus on the type of love manifested in 
interpersonal relations such as friendship, rather than on 
the more broadly directed love of mankind (though these are 
related). Against critics such as Williams, who argues that 
Kant is wrong to make duty rather than affection the proper 
motive even in such intimate relations such as that between 
man and wife, I argue that interpersonal relations do, and 
should, involve obligations, and that Kant rightly sees 
this. This does not preclude them from manifesting love. 
Love, for Kant, is conditioned by principles and tempered by 
respect. Only by respecting the loved one can the lover 
heed the loved one's wants rather than imposing her own 
conception of happiness on him. Respect towards others is 
thus needed for us to be able to fulfil our duties of love, 
a prominent one being our duty to promote others' happiness.
I hope, in the end, to suggest that morality and 
happiness are actually closer in Kant's system than he leads 
us to think. Morality requires unifying one's emotions in 
accordance with moral principles. But a unified self is 
precisely what happiness consists in, according to Kant. I 
suggest that the moral emotions provide a "middle realm" 
between reason and inclination, which the inclinations can 
see as an "ally" and which reason approves of morally. 
Through the cultivation of moral feeling, the inclinations 
are at least partly satisfied in a morally acceptable 
manner. The cultivation of moral feeling is therefore one
10
of the ways of realizing highest good in the world: 
happiness in proportion to virtue.
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Cftaptec Ll Mfl-iaL Relevance aJ. Emotion
Kant is commonly taken to hold an inadequate if not 
downright crude view of the emotions and their place in the 
moral life.1 This assumption is made not only by his 
critics but also by some of his commentators. At first 
glance, the assumption seems well-founded. Even if one 
recognizes that Kant does give certain feelings a role in 
the moral life, one can legitimately complain that his 
catalogue is incomplete: his discussion focuses primarily on 
love and respect (the latter of which many hold not even to 
be a genuine feeling, for Kant), but surely feelings such as 
fear, pride and envy have morally important functions which 
warrant discussion.
There are three central ideas in Kant's moral system 
which seem to support the conclusion that Kant did not take 
the emotions seriously. The first is that since feelings 
cannot serve as a basis for moral obligation, the moral law 
is rooted in pure reason and not in natural feelings 
(DV:376-8)* The second claim is that our actions are 
morally worthy only when we are motivated by the thought of 
duty, ie., the self-constraint we experience when we reflect
1I henceforth use "emotion" and "feeling" interchangeably, 
except when one of them is more appropriate to the context. See 
footnote 1 of the Introduction for a discussion of my use of 
these terms and their relation to the more outdated (though 
popular in the 18th Century) term, "sentiment."
*1 discuss this claim in greater detail in Chapter 2.
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on the moral law (DV:379-80). We experience the moral law 
as constraining because it sets a limiting condition on the 
principles or maxims (subjective principles of reason; 
G:422n) on which we propose to act: it tells us to act only 
on those maxims which could at the same time serve as 
universal laws (MM:214). Since we are finite rational 
beings, we will always have (or will at least always be 
prone to develop) inclinations which tempt us to adopt non- 
universalizable or immoral maxims. Even if our inclinations 
are such that they by and large harmonize with moral 
requirements, we will always experience some constraint in 
the thought of duty, given that inclinations are changeable 
and we cannot count on them always harmonizing with the 
moral law.*
Before considering the third claim, it may be helpful 
to understand why it is only actions motivated by duty (the 
feeling of obligation which stems from our awareness of the 
moral law) which have moral worth. When we allow ourselves 
to be so motivated, we are acting out of a direct concern 
for the morality of the action.* Kant maintains that when
*Because we are finite, we are also vulnerable to the 
fluctuations of circumstance. We are never fully in control of 
our emotions; and given a time of weakness and a sufficiently 
hateful individual, even the most virtuous individual may one day 
find herself tempted to murder.
*In interpreting the motive of duty this way, I am following 
Barbara Herman in "On Acting from the Motive of Duty," The 
Practice Moral Judgment, Chapter 1. Herman interprets Kant as 
claiming that only action from obligatory maxims can have moral 
worth. This certainly harmonizes with Kant's account at MM:222-
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we act in this way/ our will embodies the valuable state of
autonomy, or "inner freedom."
That autonomy is a state of freedom is easy to see if 
we compare it to its opposite, heteronomy. Heteronomy is 
the state of will in which we allow ourselves to be 
motivated by idiosyncratic desires, and so, share no common 
vantage point with others. Autonomy, by contrast, is a 
condition in which we know that our reasons for acting are 
universally acceptable, since we have tested them against 
the moral law.® Since, as practically rational beings, j££. 
are the authors of the law and of the duties it imposes on
3. However, Kant sometimes also suggests that action from 
permissible maxims can also have moral worth. He says, for 
instance, that all that we need to do to have a good will--that 
is, for our actions to have moral worth--is to be concerned with 
the morality of our actions, and we express this concern by 
testing our maxim against the categorical imperative (G:403). 
Since permissible maxims also satisfy the requirements of the 
categorical imperative, this suggests that they, like obligatory 
maxims, can be acted on from the motive of duty. I believe this 
commits Kant to the possibility of permissible actions having 
moral worth, even though it is hard to see exactly what the 
motivational structure would be in such cases. The thought of 
duty (in the form of "I am not violating duty") would probably 
cooperate with the inclination which originally gave rise to the 
permissible maxim.
*Jay Wallace claims that the value of autonomy lies in this 
freedom from countervailing reasons. When we act autonomously, 
that is, when our principle of action is the moral law, we ensure 
that we are acting on a maxim to which anv other rational agent 
could in principle consent. We are thus acting in a way which is 
independent of personal differences in desires or inclinations. 
Since no reasons can be offered against autonomous actions, they 
have a freedom which heteronomous actions lack--namely, a freedom 
from countervailing reasons ("Kant on Moral Worth and Moral 
Luck," unpublished manuscript, pp.10-11, 20). I believe that 
this is part of Kant's thought, but that the ultimate value of 
autonomy lies in the fact that it embodies a universal yet self- 
imposed obligation.
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us (CPrR:31, 87; MM:227; G:431), acting from duty is the 
same as acting from a self-imposed yet universal obligation. 
This amounts to the positive freedom of governing oneself by 
reasons which are universally valid.
In acting from the thought of duty, we realize autonomy 
or "inner freedom." Since the thought of duty depends on an 
awareness of the moral law, autonomy is equivalent to 
governing oneself by pure reason. In light of these two 
claims, it is easy to understand Kant's third, rather stern- 
sounding claim that:
Since virtue is based on inner freedom, it contains a 
positive command to man, namely to bring all his 
capacities and inclinations under his (reason's) 
control and so to rule over himself, which goes beyond 
forbidding him to let himself be governed by his 
feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy): for 
unless reason holds the reins of government in its own 
hands, man's feelings and inclinations play the master 
over him (DV:408).
Emotions and inclinations must be checked by reason because 
otherwise they become our dominant motives and produce a 
heteronomous state of will. Since autonomy is so central to 
the moral life, and autonomy seems incompatible with being 
governed by emotions, the emotions do not seem to play any 
significant role in the moral life for Kant. The three 
aforementioned claims convey the impression that the moral
15
life is one in which reason must suppress the emotions so as 
to have s.ole reign over the moral subject.
I want to show that this impression is mistaken. Kant 
says that the moral life is a life in which reason should 
govern the emotions and inclinations; he does not say that 
reason should play the tyrant. Not all inclinations are 
hostile to reason's moral ends; thus, not all inclinations 
must be fought or suppressed.- Only those dispositions 
which are opposed to our adoption of moral ends must be 
fought. In man's struggle for virtue, "the vices. the brood 
of dispositions opposing the law, are the monsters he has to 
fight" (DV:405, my emphasis). Those inclinations and 
emotions favorable to the adoption of moral ends are not, in 
and of themselves, bad (though irrational use of them can 
become vicious); quite on the contrary, Kant considers them 
good (R:51). Thus, we have no reason to fight them; indeed, 
fighting them can be harmful. Rather than claiming that the 
emotions cannot enter into the moral life, Kant even argues 
that we have a duty to cultivate emotions which help shape a 
moral disposition. Far from doing the job of morality 
single-handedly, reason enlists certain emotions to help us 
cultivate a morally good disposition.
•This has been convincingly shown by Michael Seidler in his 
helpful article, "Kant and the Stoics on the Emotions," 
Philosophical Research Archives. Volume VII, 1981, e d . Robert 
Turnbull (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling 
Green State University), Microfiches XII-XIII.
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My claim that certain emotions play a vital role in the 
moral life, as Kant conceives of it, raises several 
difficult questions. Perhaps the most obvious one concerns 
Kant's sharp distinction between "the moral order” and "the 
order of nature" (DV:377-8) and his claim that "feeling, 
whatever may arouse it, always belongs to the order of 
nature" (DV:377). If feelings belong to the order of
nature, how can they ever become part of the moral order?
In order to answer this question, we need to begin with a 
general inquiry into the relation of anthropology (which 
investigates the natural order, as found in human beings) to 
a metaphysics of morals (which defines the moral order).
The question about the moral status of feeling is bound 
up with another problem, namely, how moral worth, the 
unconditional value in Kant's moral system, can attach to 
acting from cultivated feelings. For even if the emotions 
can serve as means which help us act in accordance with 
duty, and so are instrumental to the fulfillment of our 
duties in this sense, it is far from clear that they help us 
act from the motive of duty, the latter being the only 
morally worthy motive. How, in other words, is the
cultivation of the emotions conducive to a good will? Here,
it needs to be shown both that feelings can help us adopt 
moral ends from the right attitude and that moral worth 
attaches to actions which are undertaken from feelings which 
have been cultivated with moral ends in mind.
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Accordingly, I begin, in Part I, with an architectonic 
investigation into the relation of anthropology to a 
metaphysics of morals. In Part II, I consider how moral 
worth can attach to the cultivation of feelings conducive to 
a good will, that is, how feeling can become part of a 
"moral order" at all. In Part III, I give a catalogue of 
the four main roles that feelings play in the moral life, to 
be filled out in subsequent chapters.
i-L. The. Rgle oi. AnthCQgOlttaY In a. Metaphysics Morals
A metaphysics of morals contains the system of duties 
derived from the moral lav, and so, consists of principles 
prescribing how we ought to act rather than principles which 
describe how we actually do act. Nov, since anthropology 
"is based on empirical principles” describing how people 
actually do act, it "is clearly distinguished" from "the 
moral doctrine of ends" (DV:385), that is, the Doctrine of 
Virtue. which constitutes the moral, as opposed to legal, 
part of the metaphysics of morals. A moral doctrine of 
ends, which prescribes ends which we ought to adopt and seek 
to realize, cannot be based on generalization from 
experience, since experience tells us only how people do act 
and not how they ought to act. A moral doctrine of ends 
must rather be based on pure reason, for "reason commands 
how men are to act even though no example of this could be 
found, and it takes no account of the advantages we can
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thereby gain, which only experience could teach us”
( MM: 216 ) ..
Nevertheless, Kant goes on to emphasize that it does 
not detract from the purity of the moral law if we apply it 
to objects of experience. Indeed, we need anthropological 
knowledge in order to apply the moral law at all. He says: 
But just as there must be principles in a metaphysics 
of nature for applying those highest principles of 
nature in general to objects of experience, a 
metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles 
of application, and we shall often have to take as our 
object the particular nature of man, which is known 
only by experience, in order to show in [human nature] 
what can be inferred from universal moral principles. 
But this will in no way detract from the purity of 
these principles or cast doubt on their a priori 
source. That is to say, in effect, that a metaphysics 
of morals cannot be based on anthropology but can still 
be applied to it. (MM:216-217)
Anthropology, then, has a distinct relevance to a 
metaphysics of morals, namely, "to show in [human nature] 
what can be inferred from universal moral principles.” This 
can mean at least two things. It can mean either (a) 
introducing facts about man in order to derive from the 
moral lav the actual duties which constitute the metaphysics 
of morals, or (b) deriving those duties a priori and then
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considering them in relation to certain empirical facts in 
order to determine what they require of us in specific 
situations. I believe that Kant has both in mind. (b) is 
covered under the heading of "casuistry,” the practice of 
applying the moral law to specific situations. Casuistry is 
appended to a metaphysics of morals and describes morally 
challenging circumstances designed to train the art of 
judgment (DV:411).7 But how can Kant also intend (a)?
The problem in showing how Kant can intend (a) is to 
show how the duties in the Doctrlne of virtue can be derived 
from the moral law in combination with select empirical 
elements and still be binding, i.e., oblige and motivate us 
with a necessity that can only be found a priori. If we 
presuppose empirical facts about man in our derivation of 
duties from the moral lav, do we not threaten to reduce 
these "duties" to mere empirical generalizations lacking the 
obligatory force of commands?
That depends on where in the derivation we introduce 
the empirical elements. If we allow them to precede the 
moral law, we involve ourselves in the contradiction of 
trying to preserve obligation while at the same time doing 
away with it. It is contradictory to take, for example, 
man's desire for happiness (an empirical datum) as basic, 
and argue that man can best find happiness by acting from
^For a helpful discussion of the relation of casuistry to 
the metaphysics of morals, see Mary Gregor, The Laws of Freedom, 
pp.14-17.
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duty. For on such an account, moral "duties'* are mere 
counsels .of prudence on which we act not from the motive of 
duty, but from that of happiness. So if we subordinate the 
moral law to facts about what man actually desires, we do 
away with obligation altogether--a mistake with which Kant 
charges the eudaemonists, who take the satisfaction of our 
preferences as primary, and so end up with merely 
hypothetical, not categorical, imperatives (DV:377-8).
If, however, we begin with the moral lav and then ask 
what features of human agency ve need to be aware of in 
order to act morally, we preserve the binding force of the 
law while also being able to introduce facts about man to 
derive the duties relevant to human agents. For the duties
confronting us &a have a special character. The duties of a
metaphysics of morals pertaining to a different species of 
rational beings would look quite different. For instance,
if there existed rational beings who were finite (had
inclinations which can oppose the law) but immortal, they 
would have no duty to refrain from committing suicide, since 
that is not possible for them." Nov, it would seem 
plausible to assume that whatever differences exist between
"Onora O'Neill makes a similar point in "Universal Lavs and 
Ends in Themselves," Construct ions af. Reason (CR), p.137. In 
general, she is very sensitive to the special shape that our 
duties take because of the fact that we are finite rational 
beings. See CR, pp.101, 114-15, 118, 125, 140-1. Mary Gregor,
in The Laws of Freedom. p.5, gives the capacity for suicide as an 
example of an empirical fact about human beings that is needed to 
derive the specific duties of the Metaphvsics aL Morals.
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duties confronting us and duties confronting other 
(imaginable) rational beings are due to empirical 
differences alone, and that the principles of reason itself 
are the same for all species of rational beings. This, 
however, is not the case. The moral law confronts human 
reason in a special way, taking on formulations specific to 
human agency. Reason, in other words, is sensitive to the 
fact that when it subsists in finite agents, its commands 
must take a special form.
In order to determine the relation of anthropology to a 
metaphysics of morals, we need to establish which aspects of 
the special character of our duties come from reason, and 
which come from empirical information. How, then, does our 
finite rational agency affect the way the moral law itself 
confronts us? The first feature to note is a formal one. 
Human reason, fully aware that it subsists in beings who do 
not by nature act on the moral lav (G:413), presents the 
moral law to us not as a description of the way we sip. act 
(as it does to God), but rather as a command for how we 
should act— a categorical imperative: "So act that the maxim 
of your action could become a universal law" (DV:389,
G:421). Thus, reason presents its requirements to us as 
duties.-
In addition to this purely formal feature, the 
categorical imperative contains a reference to agency. 
Practical reason is by nature concerned with agency; that is
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why it is practical reason. Now, Onora O'Neill points out 
that it i_s a "fundamental requirement of practical reason" 
that agents "should not have ruled out all action."* This 
means not only that it be d o s s ible (consistent) to will the 
maxim of the proposed action10--i.e ., that agency be 
preserved--but also that agency be promoted through the 
furtherance of the ability of ourselves and others to set 
and realize ends. The Formula of Universal Law quoted above 
does not explicitly contain this reference to promoting 
agency, but the second formulation of the categorical 
imperative, the Formula of the End-in-Itself, does: "Act in 
such a way that you always treat humanity whether in you own 
person or in the person of another, never simply as a means,
•Onora O'Neill, Constructions a£ Reason, p.99.
1DIn order for it to be possible to will a maxim, the maxim 
must be consistent with its universalized typified counterpart 
(UTC), i.e., with the universalized maxim as it would appear in 
this world, along with the conditions necessary to realize it in 
this world. The negation of a maxim instantiating a perfect duty 
contradicts its UTC in the sense that it would be impossible to 
carry out the maxim in a world reflecting the UTC. For instance,
I could not make a false promise in a world in which everyone
knows promises to be false, since no one would believe me
(G:422). The negation of a maxim instantiating an imperfect duty 
contradicts not its UTC as such, but the means necessary for 
carrying out the maxim. For instance, I cannot will a maxim of 
non-beneficence because I am not self-sufficient, and will 
therefore need the help of others to carry out some of my ends 
(the fulfillment of which I necessarily will, as an agent). In
the UTC of maxim of non-beneficence, the means toward the
fulfillment of some of my ends would thus be unavailable. For a 
helpful discussion of these examples and, in general, of the 
nature of universalizability in Kant, see Onora O'Neill (then 
Onora Nell), Acting on Principle. Chapter 5. For Kant's own 
characterization of the difference between permissible, 
obligatory and forbidden maxims, see MM:221-8.
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but always at the same time as an end” (G: 429 ).13- 
Humanity,_ Kant explains, is equivalent to agency, the 
ability to set ends and to realize them (DV:395). To treat 
humanity "never simply as a means, but always at the same 
time as an end” is not only to refrain from interfering with 
the agency of others, but also to help "further the ends of 
others” (G:430, my emphasis). For human agency is fragile: 
it can be undermined in ways in which the agency of 
omnipotent or self-sufficient beings cannot. We need minds 
and bodies to act, and minds and bodies can be destroyed 
through suicide, excess, and allowing one's talents to rust; 
we are able to undermine the agency of others by failing to 
help and encourage them, emotionally and intellectually as 
well as physically, to realize their ends, and so forth.
This is why practical reason requires of us that we preserve 
as well as further human agency.13
lxHow the Formula of Universal Law can be equivalent to the 
Formula of the End-in-Itself even though the former does not 
explicitly contain a reference to promoting agency is a puzzle 
that has troubled man Kant commentators. In "Universal Laws and 
Ends in Themselves," (CR, pp.126-44, esp. pp.131-40), Onora 
O'Neill does an admirable job of showing the equivalence of the 
two formulas. See also CR, pp.96-101 and pp.114-15.
iaWere we to come to interact with another species of 
rational beings, we would have to consider their specific nature 
in order to know what the moral law requires of us with respect 
to them. This will require knowledge of empirical facts about 
them. For instance, whether it will be a duty for us to promote, 
in addition to preserving, their agency will depend on whether 
they are self-sufficient or not. "The problem of organizing a 
state," says Kant, "can be solved even for a race of devils" 
("Perpetual Peace," p.366). Supposing devils are self-
sufficient, our only duties towards them will be those of non­
interference with their ends, these being the duties relevant to
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One could object that the facts about the fragility of 
human agency I just noted are empirical, and so, cannot 
derive from pure practical reason. If so, ve have already 
ventured into the anthropological part of the derivation of 
our duties, losing track of what reason itself contributes 
to them. Here, ve need to be sensitive to exactly vhat 
aspects of human agency reason takes into account. The 
actual formulations of the categorical imperative do not 
presuppose the facts I just noted. They only presuppose the 
fact of agency as such--that is, the capacity to set ends 
and to take pleasure in realizing them. These features 
belong to all rational agents, not just to human beings.1" 
From these two facts about rational agency, Kant derives the 
two ends which are also duties: one's own perfection and 
other people's happiness. Very roughly, he derives these 
obligatory ends as follows. One's perfection consists of 
one’s ability to set and to realize various ends. Moral
enacting a state. See Onora O'Neill, CR, pp.114-15.
l,Even God is able to take pleasure in realizing his ends. 
The book of Genesis if full of references to God's taking
pleasure in his creation. After each of the six days of 
creation, for instance, God sees that what he has created is
good. This suggests that God can take some sort of satisfaction-
-if only intellectual--in the attainment of his ends. Moreover, 
he creates the garden of Eden in such a way that man can take a 
sensual and aesthetic delight in its bounty--pleasures which he 
deems good. We might also speculate that if God could not take 
some form of pleasure in things--if only intellectual or
aesthetic de1ight--then man would possess some capacities for the 
good--and hence some capacities for perfeetion--which God did 
not. But this would violate the ontological requirement that God 
be the most perfect being.
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ends are of course the most important, since a good will is 
the only .thing in the world which has unconditional worth 
(G:393-4). But because humanity--the capacity to set any 
end whatsoever (DV:392)--is a condition of possibility of a 
good will, humanity is an end in itself and should therefore 
be cultivated (DV:391-3; G:437-8). The second end, other 
people's happiness (the realization of their ends), is 
derived as follows. As agents, we necessarily desire our 
own happiness, i.e., the realization of our ends. But since 
we are not self-sufficient, we are required to promote the 
happiness of others because we ourselves will eventually 
depend on the help of others to realize some of our ends 
(DV:387-8, 450-1; G:423, 430).
Now, it will certainly be objected that the end of 
other people's happiness can only be derived a posteriori, 
since it presupposes the fact that human beings are not 
self-sufficient. But reason is responsible for more in this 
end than meets the eye. For practical reason also requires 
that we take whatever steps are necessary toward realizing 
our ends, since willing the means is analytic to willing the 
end (G:417). In a world of beings who are self-sufficient, 
it is only a duty to promote one's own happiness and not 
that of others, since it is possible to universalize a maxim 
of non-beneficence in such a world: others are fully able to 
secure their own happiness; hence we need not seek to 
realize it for them. (But it would presumably still be a
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duty to wish the happiness of others in such a world (since 
wishing one's own happiness requires that one wish that of 
others, too), but not to will it, i.e., to seek to bring it 
about). We who are not self-sufficient, however, are 
required to promote the happiness of others because we 
ourselves will eventually depend on the help of others to 
realize some of our ends (DV:387-8, 450-1; G:423, 430). The 
duty to promote others' happiness, then, stems partly from 
an empirical fact about us— our finitude--but also from the 
rational requirement that we promote whatever means are 
necessary to realize our ends. Indeed, one can see the 
positive duty to promote the agency of others as a 
conditional principle of reason. Reason says: ''always 
respect the agency of others, and promote it if they cannot 
do so themselves." Whether it is necessary to promote the 
agency of others depends on empirical facts about the type 
of beings one happens to be surrounded by. But that does 
not preclude the duty from being inherent in reason itself, 
prior to empirical considerations.14
14In The Laws of Freedom. pp.4-5, Mary Gregor provides a 
different, but to my mind incomplete, solution to the problem of 
how the duties in the Doctrine of Virtue can admit empirical 
elements but still retain their binding force. Gregor claims, 
quite rightly, that there is an ambiguity in Kant's use of "a 
priori principle." Although Kant distinguishes between pure and 
a priori knowledge, he fails to observe that distinction in 
practice. Pure knowledge consists of judgments involving 
concepts independent of all sense-experience both as regards 
their content and their mode of connection. A priori knowledge, 
by contrast, consists of judgments involving concepts which may 
be derived from sense-experience, but the connect ion between them 
must lie ready in the mind (see CPR, B:3-5, B:48-9/A:32-3, A:187-
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Having established the sense in which pure practical 
reason is. sensitive to the finitude of human agents, I now 
turn to the way in which anthropology enters into Kant's 
derivation of duties in the Doctrine of Virtue. While the 
two ends which are also duties--one's own perfection and 
other people's happiness--can be seen as requirements of 
reason itself, we need empirical information about human 
beings in order to know how we are to realize these ends in 
the world in which we live. This information, plus the two 
obligatory ends, yield the specific duties which constitute 
the pggtcine Virtue.
8/B:230-l). "Pure" thus refers to the content and source of the 
concepts of judgments, while "a priori" refers to the mode of 
connection between subject and predicate. While Kant frequently 
characterizes the duties in the Doctrine of Virtue as "pure" 
principles, Gregor argues, they are in fact a priori: "We cannot 
learn from experience that men ought not arbitrarily to destroy 
their lives. But the concepts thus connected contain elements 
drawn from sensuous experience; it is from experience that we 
learn certain characteristics of men implied in this law: the
facts that they are mortal and that their lives can be shortened
artificially. Such moral laws are a. priori knowledge because the 
connection of subject- and predicate-concepts is made by reason 
independently of experience. They are not, however, pure 
knowledge because the matter of the concepts is, in part, given 
in sensuous experience" (Gregor, p.5). What Gregor fails to
explain, however, is how a connection between the sensuously 
derived concepts appearing in our duties can lie ready in the 
mind a priori. I find it more convincing to use the analysis of 
agency just given to establish an a priori connection between the 
concepts of ends and means, and then to claim that empirical
information is needed to realize the means toward an end. In 
this way, an a priori connection can be seen to hold between one 
rationally derived concept and one sensuously derived one.
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Since most duties in the Doctrine of Virtue are 
imperfect^3-* they prescribe the adoption of maxims rather 
than of particular courses of action--the latter being left 
to the judgment of the agent, as Is the case with all 
imperfect duties (DV:390). The ultimate intent of these 
duties is, of course, action from the state of will 
prescribed (see DV:441; LE:143, 200). But because moral 
worth attaches directly to one's motives and only indirectly 
to one's actions, it is the cultivation of a moral 
disposition--a good will--with which is Kant's highest 
concern in the Doctr ine of Virtue: "the highest
unconditional end of pure practical reason" is "that virtue 
be its own end and, despite the benefits it confers on other 
men, also its own reward" (DV:396). And it is only possible 
to realize this highest end if one tries with all one's 
might to cultivate a good will. Thus, in addition to 
requiring us to promote the two obligatory ends through our 
fulfillment of the specific duties of virtue
(Tuoenpflichten). morality also puts us under an "obligation
1BThe exception is, of course, the perfect duties to oneself 
of Book I of the Doctr ine of Virtue. It is difficult to explain 
in what sense these duties are perfect, since, in addition to 
prohibiting certain courses of action (e.g., suicide), they also 
prescribe certain attitudes appropriate to hold toward oneself 
(e.g., self-respect), and so, would seem closer to imperfect 
duties. Kant himself gives no explanation for the presence of 
perfect duties in the Doctr ine of Virtue. For a somewhat helpful 
discussion of this problem, see Mary Gregor, The Laws of Freedom. 
Chapters 7 and 8, esp. pp.115-127.
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of virtue" (Tuqendverpflichtung) requiring us to strive to 
fulfill tjie former duties from the motive of duty.
What sorts of psychological tendencies are relevant to 
Kant's derivation of duties in the Doctr ine of Virtue? What 
distinguishes the facts about man which are morally relevant 
from those which are not? Recall Kant's claim that in man's 
struggle for virtue, "the vices. the brood of dispositions 
opposing the law, are the monsters he has to fight" (DV:405, 
my emphasis). Vices include both the dispositions which 
oppose the cultivation of a good will and actions so opposed 
(duties against the latter prescribe acts of omission, and 
so, are classified as perfect duties; see DV, Book I). In 
both cases, knowledge of man's nature is needed to establish 
the ways in which we can act contrary to the moral law.
As far as sensible dispositions go, Kant distinguishes 
between affects and passions. An affect is a "rash" or 
"precipitate" feeling such as anger; it is a "tempest" which 
"quickly subsides" (DV:407-8). Because of its transitory 
nature, an affect can "coexist with the best will," 
reflected in the agent's maxims and settled emotional habits 
(DV:408). A passion, by contrast, "is a sensible desire 
that has become a lasting inclination (e.g., hatred, as 
opposed to anger)” (DV:407-8). A passion such as hatred is 
morally harmful because "the calm with which one gives 
oneself up to it permits reflection and allows the mind to 
form principles upon it and so, if inclination lights upon
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something contrary to the law, to brood on it, get it rooted 
deeply, and so to take up what is evil (as something 
premeditated) into its maxim. And the evil is then proper1v 
evil, that is, a true vice” (DV:408).
Dispositions opposed to a good will include our 
capacities for envy, greed, and malice; actions so opposed 
include suicide, gluttony and failure to cultivate our 
capacities of mind. When such natural dispositions are made 
a matter of principle--or in Kant's terms, taken up into 
one's maxim--they become vices, standing in opposition to 
the moral law either because they debase or even destroy our 
humanity (by undermining our capacity to set and realize 
various ends) or because they show a resolve to be 
indifferent to the ends of others or even to prevent them 
from attaining their morally permissible ends.
What distinguishes dispositions which are morally 
relevant from those which are not is thus that the former 
embody tendencies which, if made a matter of principle, are 
either virtuous or vicious: maxims based on them either have 
contradictory negations (in which case cultivating the 
underlying disposition is a matter of duty) or are 
themselves contradictory (in which case fightina the 
underlying disposition is a matter of duty). ''Mixed” 
dispositions--those which can be used for both good and 
evil— are all morally relevant since they contain capacities
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for the good which should be strengthened and capacities for 
evil which should be weakened.1*
We are now in a better position to understand Kant's 
claim that "a metaphysics of morals cannot be based on 
anthropology but can still be applied to it" (MM:217). 
Anthropology provides information about the subjective 
tendencies which can either help or hinder the cultivation 
of a good will, as well as tendencies which are instrumental 
to the execution of our duties. The moral law, when applied 
to such anthropological information, yields duties obliging 
us to cultivate dispositions favorable to our adoption of 
obligatory ends and to combat dispositions opposed to it. 
These are the specific duties of the Doctr ine of Virtue.
An architectonic difficulty remains, however. I have 
claimed that anthropology collaborates with principles of 
reason by providing information about subjective tendencies 
which either help or hinder the adoption of objective ends.
1*An example of a "mixed" disposition, which can either 
favor or oppose the adoption of moral ends depending on what use 
we make of it, is our "unsociable sociability.” Kant says that 
we are "unable to dfl. without associating peacefully, but also 
unable to avoid constantly offending one another" (A:183). We 
tend to take an exaggerated pride in our own achievements and to 
gloat at other people's failures. At the same time, we cannot do 
without each other's company (see also "Idea for a Universal 
History," 0H:15). For a general discussion of our unsocial 
sociability and a helpful summary of the sort of anthropological 
information that Kant takes to be relevant to his ethical 
project, see Allen Wood, "Unsociable Sociability: The
Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics." For further discussion 
of our unsociable sociability and its implications for Kant's 
ethical project, see Jerome B. Schneewind, "Kant and Natural Law 
Ethics," Ethics 104: 53-74.
32
But there is reason to believe that not even this type of 
information is allowed into a metaphysics of morals, but 
rather belongs to a distinct branch of practical philosophy, 
namely, moral anthropology, which is supposed to have qa. 
place in a metaphysics of morals at all. Kant considers 
moral anthropology to be "the counterpart of a metaphysics 
of morals," and characterizes it as a science dealing "only 
with the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder 
men or help them in fulfi11inq the laws of a metaphysics of 
morals" (MM:217). Now, this seems to describe exactly what 
I have just claimed that "normal" (as distinct from moral) 
anthropology does. If so, it seems that Qfl. form of 
anthropology can enter into collaboration with a metaphysics 
of morals. For Kant says the following about moral 
anthropology:
It cannot be dispensed with, but it must not precede a 
metaphysics of morals Qi &SL mixed with it: for one 
would then run the risk of bringing forth false or at 
least indulgent moral lavs, which would misrepresent as 
unattainable what has only not been attained just 
because the law has not been seen and presented in its 
purity (in which its strength consists) or because 
spurious or impure incentives were used for what is 
itself in conformity with duty and good. This would 
leave no certain moral principles, either to guide 
judgment or to discipline the mind in observance of
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duty, the precepts of which must be given a priori by 
pure reason alone. (MM:217, my emphasis)
If "normal" anthropology does the same thing as moral 
anthropology, then it would seem that "normal" anthropology 
has no place in a metaphysics of morals, since moral 
anthropology "cannot be mixed with" a metaphysics of morals. 
In order to claim, then, as I want, that anthropology has a 
legitimate function in a metaphysics of morals (namely, that 
a priori principles of reason can be "applied" to 
anthropological principles, as Kant claims is possible 
earlier at MM:217), I need to show the difference between 
moral anthropology and the morally relevant aspects of 
"normal" anthropology, the former being that branch of 
practical philosophy which cannot be mixed with a 
metaphysics of morals.
Kant says about moral anthropology that "it would deal 
with the development, spreading, and strengthening of moral 
principles (in education in schools and in popular 
instruction), and with other similar teachings and precepts 
based on experience" (MM:217). This suggests that moral 
anthropology deals primarily with the external conditions 
for morality rather than with the internal dispositions 
conducive to a good will. For instance, moral anthropology 
might deal with ways of improving public education in ways 
which promote (initially) external conformity to the moral 
law, with the indirect aim of also strengthening moral
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principles in. students. The main purpose of moral 
anthropology would be to encourage people to act in 
accordance with duty, and indirectly to strengthen a moral 
disposition in them. This emphasis on action rather than 
inner disposition would explain why Kant claims that moral 
anthropology is concerned "only with the subjective 
conditions in human nature that hinder men or help them in 
fulfi11ino the laws of a metaphysics of morals" (MM:217).
The morally relevant parts of "normal" anthropology, by 
contrast, are selected because they help promote a morally 
good disposition. The difference between moral anthropology 
and the morally relevant parts of "normal" anthropology, 
then, seems to be that the former is concerned with 
promoting the external conditions favorable to morality-- 
appropriate curricula, educational methods, and so on--while 
the latter is concerned with the psychological dispositions 
which help or hinder the cultivation of a good will.
This would at least explain why "normal" but not moral 
anthropology has a legitimate function in a doctrine of 
virtue. which is primarily concerned with strengthening the 
inner disposition to morality. It does not explain, 
however, why Kant thinks "normal," but not moral, 
anthropology is relevant to a metaphysics of morals as. a 
whole--including also the Doctrine o£ RightP which is 
concerned not with the cultivation of a good will, but only 
with external conformity to the moral law. The explanation
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for Kant's exclusion of moral anthropology even from a 
doctrine .of right seems to be this. Kant's description of 
moral anthropology suggests that it is concerned primarily 
with localized institutions, and not with circumstances 
obtaining throughout human nature. It might, for instance, 
consider specific curricula, e.g., those of American public 
schools, rather than curricula (presumably nonexistent) 
which are found in schools all over the world. By contrast, 
the morally relevant parts of "normal" anthropology deals 
with propensities that can be found in all human beings.
For if the specific duties of a metaphysics of morals are to 
be universally binding, they must be duties which everyone 
can act on simply in virtue of their human nature, and not 
in virtue of the specific circumstances they happen to find 
themselves in. (That is not to say that context is 
irrelevant to judging how one is to act in specific 
situations. That, however, requires the art of judgment, 
which casuistry, moral methodology and, to some extent, 
aesthetics are supposed to train.) The difference, then, 
between moral and "normal" anthropology is that the former 
treats of characteristics found throughout human nature, 
while the latter considers specific institutions and how to 
promote morality within them.
Still, it is important to note that both moral 
anthropology and the morally relevant aspects of "normal" 
anthropology are divisions of practical philosophy because
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they constitute a roorallv conditioned body of empirical 
knowledge--a body of empirical knowledge to which moral laws 
are applied. They thus become part of what Kant calls a 
"system of freedom" (MM:218). Here is how Kant conceives of 
a system of freedom, in contrast to a system of nature:
Anything that is practical and possible in accordance 
with laws of nature (the distinctive concern of art) 
depends for is precepts entirely upon the theory of 
nature: Only what is practical in accordance with laws 
of freedom can have principles that are independent of 
any theory; for there is no theory of what goes beyond 
the properties of nature. Hence, philosophy can 
understand by its practical part (as compared with its 
theoretical part) no technically practical doctrine but 
only a morally practical doctrine; and if the 
proficiency of choice in accordance with laws of 
freedom, in contrast to laws of nature, is also to be 
called art here, by this would have to be understood a 
kind of art that makes possible a system of freedom 
like a system of nature, truly a divine art were we in 
a position also to carry out fully, by means of it, 
what reason prescribes and put the Idea of it into 
effect. (M M :217-18)
A system of freedom is created according to a morally 
practical doctrine, while a system of nature encompasses, in 
addition to the laws of nature, that which is possible
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according to a technically practical doctrine. What 
distinguishes these types of doctrines is the type of 
concept according to which the will operates. A technically 
practical doctrine is one in which the will takes its rule 
from concepts describing how things are. The engineer who 
wants to build a bridge takes his rules from the laws of 
physics, chemistry, and engineering (see CJ:173 for some of 
Kant's examples of technically practical doctrines, 
including political economy, dietetics and chemistry). A 
morally practical doctrine, by contrast, is one in which the 
will works with natural materials (inclinations, 
institutions), but always takes its law not from nature, but 
from freedom--from pure reason itself (CJ:171-3)--and so, 
from how things should be. The internal process of 
strengthening the moral motive through the removal of 
opposing inclinations as well as the external process of 
improving moral education both take place according to moral 
laws, and thereby become part of a system of freedom.17
We are now in a position to consider the role of the 
emotions in Kant's moral theory. We have already seen that 
information about our emotional capacities, which 
anthropology supplies, has a legitimate role in a 
metaphysics of morals, namely, to yield the specific duties
17Kant's published introduction to the Critique of 
contains many references to the role of judgment in especially 
the first of these processes. See CJ:169-70, 176, 178, and 196- 
7 .
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which confront us as human beings--as beings who are not 
purely rational but have inclinations which sometimes tempt 
us to deviate from the moral law. We now need to consider 
more precisely what that role is, and how it affects Kant’s 
conception of virtue. I begin with the question of how 
cultivating and acting from certain emotions can have any 
moral value whatsover, or even be of any moral relevance at 
all (belong to "the moral order," as Kant puts it), given 
his claim that "feeling...always belongs to the order of 
nature" (DV:377). This will help us define the role which 
cultivating feeling plays in a virtuous character.
II; Virtue* Moral Worth* aad the Emotions
To get a more definite sense of what Kant takes to be 
the main features of a morally good character, it is helpful 
to begin by asking why he thinks that a good will is the 
only unconditionally (absolutely) valuable thing in the 
world. A good will, at its barest minimum, is defined as 
the will which intends to act as duty commands and to do so 
for the sake of duty. I'll return to why the concept of 
duty holds a special value, for Kant; here the question is 
why a good will is the most basic moral value.
A good will is the only thing in the world which is 
good without qualification. A good will is good 
unconditionally because unlike gifts of nature and of
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fortune (e.g., health and wealth) which, though they do have 
a certain value in themselves, are morally good only under 
certain qualifications (wealth is good only if put to a good 
use), a good will is morally good in itself because it wills 
the right thing for the right reasons (G:437; 393-94).
The value of the good will, I take it, is that it alone 
shows a direct concern for the moral rightness of its 
conduct. The good will manifests itself subjectivelv (in 
the Phenomenology of good willing) in a willingness to be 
truthful about one's condition as it relates to the moral 
sphere: a desire to know oneself while at the same time 
acknowledging one's limitations and one's moral fallibility. 
This can only stem from the awareness that one is bound bv 
the moral law and not spontaneously inclined to follow it. 
The latter feature also reveals what is valuable about the 
good will. In imposing on itself a universally valid 
obligation, the good will embodies the valuable state of 
autonomy, the condition of governing oneself according to 
reasons which are universally acceptable. Thus the good 
will cannot go wrong in its willing; its willing is good in 
itself. Having considered the nature of the good will, ve 
can now turn to the concept of morally worthy action (action 
from a good will) and how the emotions relate to it.
1BI take Kant's use of "good" in this section to refer to 
the morally good, since all the qualifications he makes are
qualifications which are relevant only when we are thinking in
moral terms. See also Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, Part I for some
remarks about the good will and its value.
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At first glance, it appears inconceivable, from the 
point of view of Kant's moral system, that moral worth 
should be able to attach to the cultivation of the emotions. 
The chaotic behavior of emotions seems antithetical to the 
rule-governed activity of the good will issuing forth 
morally worthy actions. In order to see how acting from 
cultivated emotions can take on moral worth, we need to 
understand Kant's conception of morally worthy action; we 
can then go on to ask how the cultivation of select emotions 
can have moral worth as well as whether acting from emotions 
which have been so cultivated can have moral worth.
A morally worthy action, Kant says, must be done not 
only in accordance with duty, but also from duty: the 
thought of the moral law, and the sense of constraint that 
its duties entail, must be the incentive of the action 
(MM:218-19). Morally worthy action is thus action done from 
the special feeling of constraint or obligation which the 
thought of duty imposes on us (DV:381-2, 389). This sets 
three requirements on the type of will— the good will 
{G:387-8, 439)--which produces morally worthy action:
(a) that we freelv adopt the end which we seek to
realize through the action,
(b) that the end be obligatory,1*
1*At G:403 and 437, Kant suggests that permissible maxims 
can also produce morally worthy actions, as long as they have 
been tested against the moral law. Presumably the motive of duty 
would here operate in conjunction with the (uncultivated) 
inclination which gave rise to the maxim before it was tested for
41
(c) that ve adopt the end not (solely) because ve 
desire it, that is, not (solely) on the basis of a 
natural inclination, but because it is our duty to 
adopt the end.
These conditions require some elaboration. I begin vith
(b), then move on to (c); and finally, to (a).
To adopt an end because it is our duty to do so 
requires, first of all, that the end fes. an end vhich it is 
also a duty to have. To determine vhether our end is 
obligatory, ve submit our maxim (our subjective principle of 
action; G:422n) "to the condition of its qualifying as 
universal lav" (MM:214). We here impose a formal condition 
on our maxim, namely, that it be a maxim to vhich every 
other rational agent could in principle consent. This 
condition, hovever, obtains both for permissible and for 
obligatory maxims. The difference betveen obligatory maxims 
(e.g., "I vill strive to cultivate my talents") and 
permissible maxims (e.g., "I vill alvays eat vhite rather 
than red meat") lies in the formal implications of their 
neoations. The negations of obligatory maxims yield 
contradictions when universalized; those of permissible 
maxims do not (see footnote 11 for a closer description of 
vhat universalization involves and vhat sort of 
contradiction is generated by impermissible maxims).
its permissibility against the moral lav.
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Acting in a morally worthy way requires not only that 
our maxim, have certain formal features, but also that we 
have a certain motive. The motive from which an action is 
performed can be thought of as a second-order component of a 
maxim, expressing the attitude with which we will the 
maxim.ao The attitudinal difference between willing 
permissible and obligatory maxims can be expressed as 
follows. When I hold a permissible maxim, I think of my end 
X as follows: "I want to bring about X, and I am permitted 
to do so because the moral law allows it.” When I hold an 
obligatory maxim, by contrast, I think: "I have to bring X 
about because the moral law requires it." Even if I should 
at the same time desire X, I cannot, in the latter case, 
hold the following attitude: "I want X, so I'm going to do 
what I can to bring it about; and X also happens to be my
aoA motive is not the (first-order) purposive clause of a 
maxim, as some Kant commentators think (see, e.g., Onora O'Neill 
(then Nell), Acting on Pr inciple. pp.84, 97ff), since the
purposive clause is reserved to reflect the end of the action and 
not the motive. which is something quite different. Ends 
(Zwecke ) cannot be equated with motives (Bestimmunasqrunde)--and 
it is important to notice that Kant himself never makes this 
equation--because one can will the same end from different 
motives. This is especially clear in the case of willing 
obligatory ends (ends which it is a duty to have, and so, which 
can be acted on in a morally worthy way). For I can will the 
end, say, of other people's happiness from the motive of duty, 
from warm fellow-feeling, from pity, from the aesthetic 
satisfaction I get when I see others enjoying themselves, from a 
thirst for popularity, and from a number of other motives. The 
actions I undertake to realize the end of other people's 
happiness can be the same in all cases, and the realization of my 
end is also the same, namely, that some of ends of the person 
whose happiness I will are furthered or realized. But I can act 
toward that end from a variety of motives, and that is why 
motives must not be identified with ends.
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duty." Rather, I must think: "X is my duty, and I am going 
to bring _it about for that reason. I also happen to desire 
X, but I know I would have to realize X even if I did not 
desire it--and it is always possible for such a situation to 
occur, because I am a finite being, and, as such, will 
a 1wavs have inclinations which can oppose the law" (see 
DV:397, 409, 441).21 Acting from the awareness of duty, 
then, requires that a certain thought process accompany 
one's willing--a thought process characterized by a feeling 
of constraint and an awareness of one's finitude. This is 
the attitudinal, or motivational, difference between willing 
permissible maxims and willing obligatory maxims.22
2iThe phrase, "I realize I would have to do X even if I did 
not desire it" should not be interpreted as a counterfactual 
clause indicating what an agent would &g in different 
circumstances. It should not be confused with a (misguided, 
because irrelevant) measure of a heroically strong will which 
would br i no about the action even in the face of the most 
gruelling obstacles (e.g., extreme pain resulting from torture). 
(For an illuminating discussion of why counter factual claims 
about what an agent would &g in different circumstances are 
irrelevant to the moral worth of her maxims, see Jay Wallace, 
"Kant on Moral Worth and Moral Luck" (unpublished), esp. pp.30- 
31.) The counterfactual clause in question does not indicate 
what an agent would £& under different circumstances, but 
expresses an attitude toward the moral law and our standing in 
relation to it: the awareness that it binds us regardless of what 
we happen to feel or desire. This thought--essentially the 
thought which Wallace, at p.20 in the aforementioned paper, 
describes as "an unconditional commitment to duty," a 
preparedness to act dutifully regardless of what one's 
inclinations are or will be in the future--must accompany every 
morally worthy action, and is captured by the sense of constraint 
we feel when we think of the law and the duties it imposes on us.
22I here differ from Onora O'Neill, who suggests that moral 
worth can attach also to the adoption of permissible maxims (see 
O'Neill, CR, p.141). Her reason for claiming this depends on 
Kant's thesis of the inscrutability of our motives: we can never
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Having clarified conditions (b) and (c), I now turn to 
condition (a).
Freedom of choice, says Kant, is the condition of 
possibility of any kind of willing, that is, of our setting 
any end whatsoever (DV:385, 389). Were we to lose our 
freedom of choice, we would not be wl11inq anything, but 
would only be responding to stimuli. This would reduce us 
to the level of the beasts, who are determined only by 
sensible stimuli (DV:392, 444-5, MM:213). Freedom of 
choice, then, is our "independence from being determined by 
sensible impulses," even though we are still affected by 
them (DV:213).** It is in virtue of our freedom of choice 
that we can be motivated by the formal considerations 
inherent in the moral law. Without freedom of choice, we 
would always need an object of desire in order to act, and
be sure of our underlying maxim or motive, but it is always our 
business to ensure that our action conforms outwardly with duty 
or is at least permissible. Our actual motive, which is always 
hidden from us, may even in the case of permissible action be 
that of duty. This is where I differ from O'Neill. I believe 
that Kant's inscrutability thesis is not as severe as O'Neill 
makes it sound, and that in fact there are several indicators of 
moral worth available to us— a significant one being the types of 
thought processes I just noted. It is fairly clear that the 
thought process accompanying the adoption of permissible ends is 
incompatible with the awareness of constraint essential to a 
sense of duty. Kant thinks we can measure this sense of 
constraint through the obstacles we are able to overcome in our 
willing. This gives us a rough, albeit merely subjective. 
measure of moral worth. I discuss this later in Part II.
23Kant characterizes freedom of choice as "negative" freedom 
in order to distinguish it from the "positive" or "inner" freedom 
which we realize only when we act from the motive of duty (see 
DV:213-14).
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would always be determined by our strongest desire. But 
because we have free choice, we do not need to act on our 
strongest desire, and can also be motivated by non-sensuous, 
rational considerations. It is because of our freedom of 
choice, then, that we can act on the moral law even when all 
our desires seem to oppose it.
We are now in a position to summarize Kant's conception 
of moral worth as well as the more basic notion of a good 
will. To have a good will is to freely set an obligatory 
end out of the awareness of constraint inherent in the 
thought of duty. Actions which are undertaken through such 
willing have moral worth. Having clarified Kant' conception 
of moral worth, I now turn to the difficulties of claiming 
that moral worth can attach both to the cultivation of 
morally beneficial emotions and even to acting from emotions 
which have been cultivated for moral ends.
Feelings possess features which seem to bar them from 
the moral realm, the realm of the voluntary, altogether. 
First of all, having feelings cannot be said to be an 
activity in any legitimate sense of the term. In order to 
act, one must set oneself an end, and this can only be done 
through free choice. Kant says the following about the 
conditions of possibility of action:
Every action...has its end; and since no one can have 
an end without himse1f making the object of his choice 
into an end, to have any end of action whatsoever is an
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act of freedom on the part of the acting subject, not 
an e.ffect of nature. (DV:384-5)
Since effects of nature are not brought about through free 
willing, they cannot be said to be act ions in any legitimate 
sense of the term. But feelings are effects of nature: 
"feeling," says Kant, "whatever may arouse it, always 
belongs to the order of nature" (DV:377). As natural 
events, feelings do not take place through free choice and 
in accordance with rational principles, but rather in 
accordance with laws of nature. We cannot choose to have a 
feeling, just as we cannot choose to change the laws of 
nature; we simply have a feeling, just as the laws of nature 
simply are. Having feelings therefore fails to meet the 
first requirement on morally worthy action: that they be 
freely willed.
This also explains why having feelings fails the second 
requirement. Since feelings are not actions, no end is 
involved in having a feeling. Thus, a. fortiori. feelings 
cannot be directed at obligatory ends. Similarly, since 
feelings are, by and large, beyond our control, there can be 
no duty to have a feeling. Take, for instance, the feeling 
of love:
Love is a matter of feeling, not of willing, and I 
cannot love because I will to, still less because I 
ought to (I cannot be constrained to love); so a duty 
to love is an absurdity. (DV:401; see also 402)
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Since having feelings cannot be made a matter of duty, 
feelings cannot be chosen from a sense of constraint. and 
so, fail also the third criterion for moral worth. How, 
then, can feelings ever become part of the moral order?
It is at this point that Kant makes the crucial 
distinction between having and cultivating a feeling.
Having a feeling cannot be a matter of duty, for the reasons 
just given, but cultivating feelings is a freely willed 
activity which is a matter of duty when the feelings in 
question are conducive to moral ends. Throughout the 
Doctrine Virtue, Kant distinguishes between having and 
cultivating feelings, and stresses that the latter is an 
activity which is indeed within our power and therefore can 
be made a matter of duty (see DV:399-402 for especially 
clear statements of this).3"* If Kant can show that 
certain feelings are conducive to our setting and 
realization of moral ends, then he can also hold that 
cultivating them is a matter of duty.
The sense in which feelings can be conducive to moral 
ends is by no means transparent. For it would seem that the 
two obligatory ends--one's own perfection and other people's 
happiness— are realized in a genuinely moral way only when 
they are brought about not just in accordance with the moral 
law, but also from a special motive, namely, respect for
2*For a useful discussion of the extent to which, in Kantian 
ethics, feelings can be cultivated through "the work of freedom," 
see Mary Gregor, Xhe. La VS. QlL Freedom, PP-74, 197-8.
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duty or a sense of the rightness of the action itself. And 
there is only one feeling which can be said to be 
constitutive of a sense of duty, namely, respect for the 
lav--a feeling which, phenoraenologically speaking, is 
characteristically unpleasant because it involves an 
awareness of the constraint which duty imposes on us (we are 
required to do our duty even when we don't feel like 
it).29 What, then, of the other feelings--say, love of 
man--that Kant claims can be conducive to moral ends? How 
do they help us act morally if such action is mora1ly worthy 
only when undertaken from respect for the law?
29I am here speaking of the basic phenomenology of respect 
for duty. As Kant points out in the Critique of Pract ical 
Reason, respect for duty also has an uplifting element, namely, 
an awareness of our own sublimity in being able to act on a law 
designed by pure reason (Cprr:86-87). But I think this passage 
has to be read as describing the value of acting from respect 
from the moral law (from a sense of duty) rather than the 
attitude from which we generally do so. Even though the passage 
is found in a chapter entitled "The Incentives of Pure Practical 
Reason," thus certainly suggesting that acting from respect for 
the law really amounts to a joyous awareness of living up to our 
sublimity as its authors, it should be noted that Kant's famous 
ode to duty (Cprr:86), as purple as it is, raises a philosophical 
question about its origin ("Duty!...what origin is there worthy 
of thee...?")--a question which Kant can proudly claim to be the 
first to have answered adequately (see Chapter 2). As regards 
the way in which the thought of duty strikes us, however, Kant 
did not claim any originality: "Who would want to introduce a new 
principle of morality and, as it were, be its inventor, as if the 
world has hitherto been ignorant of what duty is or had been 
thoroughly wrong about it?" (Cprr:8n). I take this to suggest 
that the thought of duty essentially involves the feeling of 
constraint which the world had hitherto always recognized to 
belonging to a sense of obligation. Kant's insight was that duty 
is a matter of self-constraint— not that the thought of duty, 
because of our autonomy, is not constraining (see DV:383).
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It is important here, I think, to appreciate the 
structural complexity of moral willing. To consistently 
will a moral end--and, for that matter, to consistently will 
any other end--it is not enough merely to wish it to come 
true; one must also intend to realize it through action (see 
DV:441; LE:143, 200).3* This is simply a requirement of 
rational intending, i.e., of willing. In order for a maxim 
to be fully universalizable, the means through which we 
intend to realize an end must be compatible with the end 
itself. Willing an end, then, imposes certain requirements 
on the means through which we intend to realize it. Onora 
O'Neill cites five "Principles of Rational Intending,"3,7 
implicit in Kant's account of practical reasoning, which set 
certain rational requirements on the means through which we 
intend to realize our ends:
1) That we intend not only all indispensable and 
necessary but also some sufficient means toward 
relizing our end. Otherwise, I could intend to eat an 
adequate diet but eat no food of any specific sort, on 
the grounds that no food of any specific sort is 
indispensable to an adequate diet.3*
3*This point is convincingly made by Onora O'Neill in CR, 
p p .90-1.
27See Onora O'Neill, CR, pp.91-2.
3*This sort of requirement can be gleaned from DV:391-2, 
where Kant says it is a duty for us "to make ourselves worthy of 
humanity and in general, by procuring or promoting the capacity 
to realize all sorts of possible ends." This section also
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2) That we not only intend all necessary and sufficient 
means toward the end, but also seek to bring them about 
when they are not available. Otherwise, I could intend 
to bring about a social revolution but do absolutely 
nothing, on the grounds that no revolutionary situation 
obtains. But then I would at best be wish ing and not 
wi11ino a revolution.**
3) That we intend not only the instrumental means 
toward what is intended, but also all necessary and 
some sufficient components of what is intended (these 
can also be seen as constitutive means towards our 
end). For instance, we must show kindness not only in 
deed but also in word and gesture.
4) That the various constitutive means toward our end 
be mutually consistent. Otherwise, I could coherently 
will to be generous to all my friends by giving each 
the exclusive use of my possessions.30
5) That the foreseeable results of our actions be 
consistent with the underlying end. Otherwise, I could
implies the second principle of rational intending.
**Kant explicitly states this requirement at DV:441 and 
L E :143, 200.
3°This sort of requirement is implicit in all the specific 
duties presented in the Doctrine of Virtue (see DV:453 for one 
example). Since I will make heavy use of this requirement in 
subsequent chapters, where I consider the role of the emotions in 
helping us fulfill the specific duties of the Doctr ine pi Virtue * 
I do not cite further examples here.
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intend the well-being of a child by protecting her from 
the _pain of a life-saving operation.31 
These principles demand that we be sensitive to the 
realities confronting us. When we rationally intend an end, 
we show a knowledge of what is required to realize our ends 
in this world. While O'Neill's examples focus primarily on 
the external conditions that we need to intend in order for 
our willing to be rational, I think the same principles can 
be applied to our internal disposition. Since we always 
have attitudes and inclinations which can oppose a moral 
cast of mind, the principles of rational intending call upon 
us continually to cultivate all dispositions compatible 
with, constitutive of, and conducive to our adoption of 
obligatory ends.
According to the principles of rational intending, the 
intention to cultivate such dispositions is part of the 
intention to cultivate a virtuous frame of mind--the highest 
end of the Doctr ine of Virtue (DV: 387, 392-3, 396 ). For if 
we are truly aware of our finitude, and so, have the sense 
of reality reflected in the principles of rational 
intending, we know that we will always have dispositions to 
oppose the law, and that these dispositions need continually 
to be fought. We will therefore realize that virtue is not
33-This sort of requirement is implicit in all of Kant's 
illustrations of the application of the categorical imperative at 
G:421-3 and 429-430. For a helpful discussion of this procedure, 
see Onora O'Neill (then Nell), Acting on Principle. pp.69-93.
52
something we can attain or keep without considerable effort, 
and that we need to use all means available to us in 
striving for it. (That is why Kant says that "Virtue is 
always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning" 
(DV:409; see also 397).)3a If certain emotions are
conducive to a moral frame of mind, it is therefore
imperative on us to cultivate them as part of our efforts to 
attain a virtuous disposition.
This gives us the key to how moral worth can attach to 
the cultivation of those emotions which help us shape a 
virtuous frame of mind. The cultivation of morality in us 
is one of the special duties belonging to the obligatory end 
of our own perfection (DV:392-3). If we adopt this end, 
then we must also intend to pursue the means necessary to
realize it, since rationality requires of us that we will
the means needed to realize our ends. If, moreover, we 
adopt, from a. sense of duty, the intention to cultivate a 
virtuous disposition, then we also, from a. sense of duty, 
intend the necessary, sufficient and constitutive means
32This claim, and the facts about our finite nature leading 
up to it, bears against Mary Gregor’s interpretation of the 
highest end of the Doctr ine of Virtue. She claims that this end 
is a state of "inner freedom," which she describes as "a 
condition in which our power of choice is free from the influence 
of sensuous inclination as such and open to that of pure 
practical reason with its motive of duty" (Gregor, The Laws of 
Freedom, p.27, my emphasis. See also p.67). But it should be 
clear by now that we are never free from the influence of 
sensuous inclination as such. We therefore need a different 
interpretation of virtue as "inner freedom," which I supply later 
in Part II.
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tovard realizing that end. Thus, the activity of 
cultivating the emotions conducive to a virtuous frame of 
mind is itself a manifestation of a good will, and our 
efforts to cultivate such emotions have moral worth.
While respect is prominent among those dispositions of 
feeling which are either conducive to or presupposed by our 
acting from a sense of duty, it is by no means the only one. 
In Part IV, I will catalogue the four main groups of feeling 
which Kant recognizes to be helpful to adopting and 
fulfilling obligatory ends, and will also briefly describe 
the specific ways in which each type of feeling is conducive 
to, and in some cases even presupposed by, acting from the 
motive of duty. In subsequent chapters, I will address the 
issue of how not only cultivating but also acting from 
emotions which have been cultivated out of a sense of duty 
can have moral worth. The account will be supplemented by a 
detailed discussion of specific feelings and the process 
through which we cultivate them.
It might seem that feelings other than respect for the
moral law can at best play an instrumental rather than a 
constitutive role in the virtuous dispositlon--that is, that 
cultivating various emotions can at best make us more likely 
to adopt and realize moral ends, but that, in order to be
morally worthy, the actual adoption and realization of those
ends must be done solely from respect for the law. Since I 
want to make the stronger claim that cultivating not just
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respect, but many other emotions as well, is actually 
const i tutive of a virtuous frame of mind--albeit from a 
subjective point of viev--I need to show how the cultivation 
of morally beneficial feelings fits into Kant's broader 
conception of virtue.
Ill • T.VQ Conceptions o£ Virtue
In the Doctr ine Virtue. Kant gives two definitions 
of virtue the equivalence of which is not immediately 
apparent. The first is the following: "Man's greatest moral 
perfection is to do his duty from duty (for the law to be 
not only the rule but also the incentive of his actions)" 
(DV:392). Since I have already clarified this conception of 
virtue, I will not so again here. Suffice it to say that 
this is the conception of virtue which is traditionally 
attributed to Kant and for which he is most warmly lauded by 
friends and most hotly criticized by enemies. The merits of 
this conception of virtue, in the eyes of Kant's friends, 
are that it confirms our nature as free and rational beings 
and makes virtue accessible to everyone as a result. It is 
possible for everyone to be virtuous, on this definition, 
since we all have access to the moral law and have the 
freedom of choice to be motivated by it even when all of our 
inclinations oppose it.
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This also happens to be what strikes Kant's critics as 
reprehens.ible. Virtue, in their eyes, is a settled 
disposition which needs to be cultivated, and not a power we 
have in virtue of some mysterious free will. Aristotelian 
critics say that the process of cultivation takes place 
through habituation, which brings our sensible side in 
harmony with our rational side. In their eyes, it is 
impossible to act morally if all our inclinations oppose 
reason; hence Kant's definition strikes them as unrealistic, 
if not absurd. Empiricist critics claim that since reason 
is inert, it is not reason but emotion which guides the 
virtuous disposition. Here, too, cultivation enters in 
because we need to allow ourselves to be motivated only by 
emotions which are morally appropriate, notably sympathy. 
While this takes place through a reflective process, it is 
nonetheless feeling itself, and not any reason-based moral 
law, which gives the motive for acting morally. The common 
gist of both criticisms is that virtue requires work on the 
emotions either through habituation or through reflection.
Ironically, Kant's second definition of virtue 
acknowledges precisely this requirement. "Virtue," says 
Kant, "signifies a moral strength of the will" (DV:405). 
Since "strength of any kind can be recognized only by the 
obstacles it can overcome, and in the case of virtue these 
obstacles are natural inclinations" (DV:394), virtue, on 
this definition, is "the strength of [man's] resolution in
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conflict with powerful opposing inclinations” (D:477). A 
virtuous person, on this definition, does not have a free 
will as much as a strong will, the power of which is 
measured by the obstacles it can overcome. Even though this 
conception of virtue is a far cry from the Aristotelian and 
empiricist conceptions in that it recognizes conflict and 
struggle as moral realities while the others see virtue as a 
harmonious state, it is still closer to them than the 
previous definition because it introduces the concept of 
strength pi will, which can be acquired only through 
cultivating inclinations favorable to the adoption of moral 
maxims and fighting those opposed to the same.
But precisely because the second definition is closer 
to the "enemy" conceptions, it seems to entail difficulties 
which Kant, well aware of his predecessors, avoids in his 
first definition. This is the reason why Kant scholars tend 
to underemphasize the second definition, thinking it a 
confusion on Kant's part. The problem with the second 
definition is that it seems to do away with freedom and 
rationality altogether, making choice a matter of being 
moved by one's strongest incentive rather than of endorsing 
a motive by freely incorporating it into one's maxim, 
regardless of its strength. On this picture of choice, 
competing incentives "battle it out" by exercising contrary 
psychic forces on the will, and the strongest one wins. 
Rather than acting on freely adopted principles, the agent
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becomes the passive locus of psychic battles. In order to 
"act" in a morally worthy way, on this view, one does not 
simply have and endorse the motive of duty; it must also be 
one's strongest motive, winning the battle against contrary 
incentives. This view has become known as the "battle 
citation model" of moral worth.3* A consequence of this 
view is that one can have a good will only if one has a 
strong will.*'* This makes virtue unavailable to those 
with a weak will, and so goes against the basic democratic 
intent of Kant's ethics.
There is, however, another way to interpret the 
definition of virtue as moral strength of will which not 
only makes it compatible with Kant's attribution of 
principle-guided freedom of choice to us but also explains 
how the cultivation of our emotions can be a measure of 
virtue itself--albeit only a subjective one, not to be 
confused with the objective condition of morality itself, 
inherent in our true, but hidden, disposition (DV:397).
When we cultivate morally favorable dispositions and weaken 
our dispositions to vice, we indicate that we have adopted
**Richard G. Henson coins this term in "What Kant Might Have 
Said: Moral Worth and the Overdeterraination of Dutiful Action," 
Philosophical Review 88 (1979), pp.365-82, and attributes a
"battle citation view of choice" to the Kant of the Groundwork. 
For a discussion of this view and its problems, see Henry 
Allison, Kant's Theory q± Freedom, pp.114-27.
**For a good explanation of why the good will cannot be 
equivalent to a strong will, see Jay Wallace, "Kant On Moral 
Worth and Moral Luck" (unpublished).
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the basic intention to cultivate morality in ourselves.39 
Our success at that activity is measured by the severity and 
magnitude of the vices ve are able to overcome, and success 
at that activity Is. virtue, as strength of will.
Kant's account of virtue as strength of will is 
compatible with his attribution of principle-guided freedom 
of choice to us because the cultivation of the emotions is 
itself a freely chosen task, reflected in the maxim: "I 
intend to use all means within my power as a finite rational 
being to cultivate a virtuous disposition." Acting on 
cultivated dispositions, Kant stresses, can never become a 
matter of habit f for then we would lose the freedom in the 
adoption of obligatory ends which is essential to morality 
(DV:409). But we can faci1itate our free choice of such 
ends by removing obstacles to such choices and cultivating 
dispositions which facilitate them. We always face 
competing incentives— this is a fact about our nature as 
finite rational beings (D V :397)--and we are always able to 
choose freely among them by incorporating them into various 
maxims. But we can make it easier to adopt the right maxims 
by changing our inclinations, and that process is itself
39See Mary Gregor's introduction to her translation of The 
Metaphvsics of Morals, p.25, for a discussion of how this process 
of cultivation is also commanded by the specific duties in The 
PQgtCjpe 2i. Virtue .
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"the work of freedom."1* This, of course, does not 
entail that the strongest incentive will be the one we 
adopt. We will only have made it more likely that we will 
act on the proper incentive by weakening those incentives 
which stand opposed to it.
It is in this sense--by reference to a long-term 
process and not a single moment of choice--that virtue is 
measured by the magnitude of obstacles it can overcome: a 
virtuous choice is the product not only of the momentary 
flash of a noumenal will (as Iris Murdoch would have it), 
but also of a long process of clearing our subjective 
disposition of obstacles which stand in the way of such a 
choice.37 Consider Kant's solution to the problem of how 
a man can be under duty to make himself good when he is
3*See Mary Gregor, The Laws Freedom. pp.197-8 for a
discussion of how cultivating emotions can be "the work of 
freedom."
17I therefore consider it oversimplified to argue, as 
Barbara Herman does in "On the Value of Acting from the Motive of 
Duty", The Practice at Moral Judgment, p.*** that struggle with 
recalcitrant inclination is no special mark of virtue. It is 
true that the moral worth of any particular action is not 
affected by the presence or absence of recalcitrant inclinations. 
But that does not entail that the long-term process of weakening 
recalcitrant inclinations does not have moral worth. Since Kant 
thinks we always have recalcitrant inclinations to contend with, 
due to our finite nature (DV:397), it is always imperative on us 
to fight them, and this struggle is. a mark of virtue. See
MM:228, 394, 397, 405; LE, 139-40; R:71 for especially clear
statements of this claim. For a helpful discussion of Kant's 
conception of virtue as the process of overcoming recalcitrant 
dispositions, see Christine Korsgaard, "Morality as Freedom," in 
Kant Practical Philosophy Reconsidered. 1989), pp. 23-48, esp. 
pp.44-5.
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"corrupt in the very ground of his maxims" and will, 
moreover,, always have inclinations which oppose the law:
But if a man is corrupt in the very ground of his 
maxims, how can he possibly bring about this revolution 
by his own powers and by himself become a good man?
Yet duty bids us do this, and duty demands nothing of 
us which we cannot do. There is no reconciliation 
possible here except by saying that man is under the 
necessity of, and is therefore capable of, a revolution 
in his cast of mind, but only of a. gradual reform in 
his sensuous nature (which places obstacles in the way 
of the former). That is, if a man reverses, by a 
single unchangeable decision, that highest ground of 
his maxims whereby he was an evil man (and thus puts on 
a new man), he is, so far as his principle and cast of 
mind are concerned, a subject susceptible of goodness, 
but only in continuous labor and growth jjg. he a good 
man (R:43, emphases mine).
What becomes clear here is that although good character may 
be indicated by the presence of the firm resolution to make 
oneself good (an intention signalled by a revolution in 
one's cast of mind), the actual realization of this 
intention--that is, the process of actually becoming good-- 
can only consist in a gradual reform of one's sensuous 
character. The "gradual" and "absolute" conceptions of
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moral improvement are thus not really at odds; they only 
show the difference between intention and action.
Striving for moral perfection, then, involves a gradual 
reform of our sensuous character. Since cultivating and 
acting on certain emotions is itself constitutive of a 
virtuous frame of mind, albeit from a subjective point of 
viev--that is, from our point of view as finite rational 
agents— striving to be virtuous is equivalent, from that 
point of view, to making it easier. more probable. that we 
act in morally worthy ways. So if we commit ourselves to 
making ourselves more sensitive to the call of duty as it 
presents itself in particular situations, then we have 
adopted the basic intention to be virtuous. And we do this 
precisely by resolving to battle our dispositions to vices 
and strengthen our dispositions to virtue. Far from 
entailing a "battle citation model of moral worth" (a 
picture of choice in which the strongest incentive always 
wins), Kant's conception of virtue as strength of will 
therefore presupposes the freedom of choice characteristic 
of his received view of agency."•
"•Because virtue always presupposes the existence of 
obstacles to be overcome (whether past or present), moral worth 
or merit will always be proportional to the magnitude of 
obstacles that have been overcome (see esp. MM:227-8). I thus 
disagree with Thomas Hill Jr.'s claim that virtue must be 
distinguished from merit because only the former presupposes a 
struggle against recalcitrant inclinations (see Hill, Dignity and 
Practical Reason. p.168). I also disagree with Barbara Herman's 
conception of moral worth for the same reason (see footnote 32), 
even though Kerman is right to point out that one can display a 
good will without performing meritorious acts— namely, by forming
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Kant's two definitions of virtue are therefore 
compatible. The difference between them is that the first 
captures the objective condition of morality, while the 
second describes morality as it manifests itself in the 
finite subject. That Kant recognizes the difference, but 
sees the two conceptions of virtue as complementary, is 
clear in the following passage:
It is also correct to say that man is under obligation 
to [acquire] virtue (as moral strength). For while the 
capacity (facultas) to overcome all opposing sensible 
impulses can and must simply be presupposed in man on 
account of his freedom, yet this capacity as strength 
(robur) is something he must acquire; and the way to 
acquire it is to enhance the moral incentive (the 
thought of the law), both by contemplating the dignity 
of the pure law in us (contemplatione) and by 
practicing virtue (executio ) (DV:397).
To acquire virtue as strength of will, it is necessary both 
to reflect on the moral law and what it entails about human 
beings (that they are ends in themselves and therefore 
possess dignity) and to cultivate those emotions favorable 
to a moral frame of mind--both through outer (if only legal) 
action and through the inner adoption of attitudes which 
help bring about those emotions. For instance, to feel
virtuous intentions (see Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," 
p .239)--although here, too, the intention must be formed from a 
sense of duty.
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proper humility before the moral law, we must not see 
ourselves, as possessing more worth than others, since 
everyone has the capacity for morality; to feel love, we 
must refrain from judging people and must take an interest 
in their ends, and so forth. Since the adoption of such 
attitudes--the thinking of such thoughts--is freely chosen 
(an inner act of the mind; see DV:393), and such acts of 
mind can help bring about morally appropriate emotions, it 
is always within our power to affect how ve feel. We can 
thus cultivate feelings either through thought or through 
external action.
This view of the emotions explains why Kant, only one 
page after having asserted that all feeling belongs to "the 
order of nature" (DV:377), can also claim that "pleasure 
that must be preceded by the law in order to be felt is in 
the moral order" (DV:378). Emotions which are cultivated 
because they help shape a moral frame of mind are products 
of moral intending--that is, intending according to the 
moral lav--and so, become part of the moral order. The 
moral order also includes emotions which are contrary to a 
moral frame of mind, but which have nevertheless been 
cultivated with that awareness (they belong, of course, to 
an evi1 disposition). The moral order, in short, includes 
everything that is open to moral evaluation; that is, all 
actions which are undertaken through an awareness— favorable 
or unfavorable--of the moral law as well as all feelinas and
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dispositions which have been cultivated through such an 
awareness.. 39
The multifarious activity of acquiring virtue as 
strength of will requires relentless self-scrutiny. For in 
order to know which inclinations are morally problematic and 
which are not, one must be perfectly honest with oneself 
about why one has them, what their significance is, and 
whether one should change them. This is why Kant makes 
self-knowledge "the first command of all duties to oneself" 
(DV:441), and so, indirectly, makes it the first command of 
all duties, since all duties are duties to oneself in the 
sense that virtue must spring from an attitude of mind 
conforming to the dignity of one's humanity.*0 The 
command, "Know yourself!" means:
3*What Kant means by "the moral order" is, of course, 
ambiguous, since it can mean either a) intentions and actions to 
realize moral ends which are made from a sense of duty, or b) 
those acts and products of acts--e.g., feelings--which do help 
realize moral ends but which are not necessarily willed from 
duty, as well as actions contrary to the moral law which are 
undertaken with that awareness. I think (b) is most plausible, 
not only because it includes all actions open to moral 
evaluation, but also because of Kant's claim that pleasure. which 
itself does not carry any moral worth, belongs to the moral order 
(DV:378). "The moral order" is thus roughly equivalent to what 
Kant meant by "the intelligible world" in the Groundwork: an 
interpretation of the sensible world according to moral laws.
*°Mary Gregor gives the following examples to illustrate how 
Kant conceives of all duties as indirectly duties to ourselves: 
"a duty of forgiving someone who has injured us is indirectly a 
duty to ourselves of not degrading our soul with hatred, and our 
duty to benevolence is indirectly a duty to ourselves of making 
ourselves the source of others' happiness" (Gregor, The Laws of 
Freedom, p.128, fn.l).
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Know your heart--whether it is good or evil, whether 
the .source of your actions is pure or impure, and what 
can be imputed to you as belonging originally to the 
substance of man or as derived {acquired or developed) 
and belonging to your moral condition. (DV:441)
It is significant that Kant here leaves room for actions 
based on inclinations which are morally irrelevant:. These 
belong to "the substance of man," i.e, to our natural 
constitution, and include such matters as whether we prefer 
fish to beef, blondes to brunettes, jogging to swimming, and 
so forth. These inclinations are irrelevant to evaluating 
one's moral standing; hence, we should not see it as a
matter of duty to change them. Indeed, if we did include
them in the moral order, we would commit the vice of 
"micrology," a "concern with petty details...which, were it 
admitted into the doctrine of virtue, would turn the 
government of virtue into tyranny" (DV:409). Since there 
are two possible sources of inclinations--nature and 
freedom--one must know whether a given inclination belongs 
to one's natural state or to one's moral condition.
Only in the latter case does the inclination reflect one's 
moral standing, since only then does it belong to "the moral
‘*1It is important to note that in the process of evaluating
those dispositions which belong to one's "moral condition," one 
must not only attend to one's present actions and motives, but 
also to one's past record. For inclinations are desires which 
require experience with the object of desire, and so, presuppose 
the past (see R:24, note). Inclinations thus include settled 
character traits.
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order," which alone is open to moral evaluation. Still, 
both sorts of inclinations can be cultivated through free 
choice (one can learn to like things one did not like in the 
past). The cultivation of inclinations belonging to our 
natural condition, though, is morally irrelevant.
We can now summarize the systematic import of feeling 
in the virtuous life, as Kant conceives of it. Virtue as 
strength of will, we saw, is bound up with the call to self- 
knowledge implicit in Kant's doctrine of the inscrutability 
of motives— a call to know ourselves as deeply as possible 
given our finite rational nature. Self-knowledge is 
important not because we are interested in knowing whether 
we are virtuous, but because it puts us on the road to 
virtue. Since we always have inclinations which are 
contrary to moral ends, but are also always aware of 
ourselves as subject to a law of duty (A:185) and so never 
sanction an evil inclination of which we are aware (A:159), 
knowledge of the existence of morally harmful inclinations 
puts us on the road to self-improvement. Cultivating those 
emotions favorable to the adoption of moral ends is a 
central aim of self-improvement because it marks the basic 
intention to strive for a virtuous disposition; and strivino 
for such a disposition is the highest end we can have as 
human beings, since our real motives are inscrutable to us. 
We are now in a position to turn to the specific ways in
which the cultivation of feeling helps shape a virtuous 
disposition.
EaJLjL IV-L TJlS SJB.ec.ifLg R e le s  a i. Feeling in. the Moral Life
What follows is a sketch of the main roles which 
feeling can play in the moral life. In subsequent chapters, 
the sketch will be filled out by a more detailed discussion 
of each type of feeling and its role in the moral life.
I have identified three basic types of feelings, 
distinguished by the role they play in the moral life as 
Kant conceives of it:
1. Duty-fee1ings: feelings which we need in order 
to recognize duty at all;
2. Dignity-feelings: feelings which help us shape 
a conception of ourselves which is in harmony 
with the dignity of our humanity (primarily 
associated with our duties toward ourselves);
3. Helping feelings: feelings which help us carry
out our duties toward others by shaping loving 
and respectful attitudes toward them,
including feelings which make virtue and its 
outward manifestations aesthetically appealing.
As we will see, there is often an overlap between these 
categories, since feelings found in one category can also 
have functions defined by another category. While I discuss
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each type of feeling in detail in following chapters, I give 
here a brief sketch of each, showing how it can be a matter 
of duty to cultivate feelings of that type. It is important 
to remember that each argument for a duty to cultivate 
feeling sets out from a conception of ourselves as finite 
rational beings--beings who, unlike God, do not 
spontaneously act on the moral law because of internal 
obstacles which we need to overcome.
Lu Duty-feelinos
At DV:399-403, Kant specifies four duty-feelings:
a) Moral feeling
b) Conscience
c) Love of man
d) Self-respect.
Their common feature, says Kant, is that "they lie at the 
basis of morality, as subjective conditions of receptiveness 
to the concept of duty, not as objective conditions of 
morality” (DV:399). To do our duty from duty is the 
objective condition of morality. These subjective 
predispositions do not constitute that condition, but are 
presupposed by it, since we need them in order to recognize 
and tig. responsive to duty, and so, to act morally at all.
As we will see, some form of at least one of these feelings 
is involved in the other categories of feeling enumerated 
above. The duty-feelings cover all the basic character
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traits of the virtuous individual, but these qualities 
receive further specification in the categories which 
follow.
In particular, I want to show that since even though 
the duty-feelings carry certain similarities to select 
natural feelings (love of man is similar, though not 
identical to, natural sympathy), the morally mature agent is 
able to judge whether a given feeling carries the husk of 
moral thinking around it or not (reflected in our attitude 
toward its objects). She can therefore also determine 
whether the motive of duty is present in or along with the 
feeling (present in it if the feeling is one of the moral 
feelings; along with it if the feeling is a morally 
beneficial natural feeling). The morally mature individual 
is therefore able to express her sense of duty in a more 
heartfelt way than the moral novice is able to.
The fact that some form of at least one of the duty- 
feelings is involved in each of the subsequent categories of 
morally beneficial feelings has some interesting results.
The notable one is that, since duty-feelings affect us 
simply in virtue of our awareness of the moral law, it is 
within the power of each individual, regardless of 
dispositional quirks or warmth v s . coldness of personality, 
to acquire the qualities which characterize virtue in its 
most full-blooded sense. Kant says that "every man has 
[duty-feelings], and it is by virtue of them that he can be
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put under obligation" (DV:399). If this is true, then each 
of us can use our duty-feelings as a basis for cultivating 
the more specific feelings defined in subsequent categories. 
And, vice versa, ve can refine our natural feelings in such 
a way that they make the motive of duty itself more 
heartfelt.
Since duty-feelings, however, weakly felt, are 
accessible to each individual in virtue of her awareness of 
the moral lav, Kant is immune to the common charge that he 
is forced to pay insufficient attention to emotions as a 
result of his twin claims that a) virtue must be accessible 
to each individual, and b) since we vary in our emotional 
make-up, emotion cannot be the basis of virtue. Critics 
(among them, Bernard Williams, whose criticisms of Kant on 
the emotions--including the one just mentioned--I will 
consider in detail in Chapter 5) have inferred from these 
two claims that up. state of the emotions— except perhaps the 
absence of emotion altogether--can be required in a virtuous 
Kantian character. But if moral action presupposes feelings 
(viz the aforementioned "duty-feelings") and if, moreover, 
it is possible for us to use these universally possessed 
predispositions to cultivate morally beneficial natural 
feelings (feelings which help us fulfill our duties but 
which, unlike the four "duty-feelings," are not grounded in 
a grasp of the moral lav), then Kant can clearly hold both
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that virtue is accessible to every individual and that at 
least some emotions play a crucial role in the moral life.
Since each of the four duty-feelings is involved in the 
other three categories of feeling, I will not discuss them 
separately, but rather in conjunction with the feelings of 
the other three categories. Moral feeling or reverence for 
the moral law, however, is an exception since it is basic to 
all categories: it is the ultimate precondition for 
recognizing and being responsive to the concept of duty. 
Accordingly, I begin by giving a brief characterization of 
moral feeling, to be filled out in Chapter 3.
What Kant in the Doctrine of Virtue calls "moral 
feeling" (DV:399-400), he elsewhere (in other works and at 
DV:387 and 467-8) calls "respect" or "reverence" (Achtuna) 
for the moral law: the feeling of constraint which we 
experience when we think of the moral law and the duties it 
imposes on us. This feeling of constraint is accompanied by 
an interest in acting on the moral law, since the law stems 
from our own rational nature, and so is elevating at the 
same time as it is constraining.
Even though respect has a dual nature, it is on the 
whole a positive attitude toward the moral law, a view of it 
as something worth following. Accordingly, when we 
undertake a course of action which is opposed to the moral 
law, we feel displeasure; and when our actions are 
consistent with the law, we feel pleasure (DV:399). In the
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Doctr ine af. Virtue. Kant takes the feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure which accompanies our actions to be part of the 
moral feeling, which also includes respect for the law. In 
the Cr itiaue o£ Practical Reason, however, he is careful to 
distinguish the feeling of pleasure or displeasure which 
follows our actions--which he defines as moral feeling--frora 
the moral motive of respect for the law on the grounds that 
pleasure and pain are only effects of our actions and cannot 
be seen as motives (Cprr:116-17). I shall take this 
distinction to be implicit in the Doctr ine of Virtue.
While each of us feels respect for the law, we still 
have a duty to strengthen that feeling "through wonder at 
its inscrutable source,” that is, by thinking about how the 
moral law differs from merely sensuous incentives and how 
that incentive "is induced most intensely in its purity by a 
merely rational representation" (DV:400). Reflecting on the 
fact that we can be motivated by something which has a 
purely rational origin makes the moral law a stronger 
incent ive.
li, BlqnULy-ts.e 1 inqs
The central feeling in this category is self-respect.
It is closely connected to moral feeling in that its object 
is the moral law; the difference is that self-respect is 
directed at the self as the subject of the moral law, while 
moral feeling is directed at the moral law and only
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indirectly at the self (cf. LE:126). The feeling of self- 
respect is akin to pride. Its main function is to remind us 
of our dignity as subjects of the moral law, a fact about us 
which imposes certain duties on how we should think about 
ourselves and how we should comport ourselves— namely, as 
subjects worthy of the humanity within us and of its highest 
end, morality. Self-respect, Kant says, "is the basis for 
certain duties, that is, of certain actions that are 
consistent with [man's] duty to himself" (DV:403, c f . 
LE:121)). Self-respect, then, is primarily connected with 
duties to oneself. It form the basis both of duties to act 
in certain ways and of duties to combat feelings opposed to 
the dignity of our humanity.
One feeling which self-respect is meant to counteract 
is false humility, i.e., servility. The only appropriate 
object of humility is the moral law itself (DV:436); any 
humility toward other men should be based only on the fact 
that they, too, are legislators of the moral law. Any other 
form of humility--"bowing and scraping" before men (DV:437), 
revering or flattering them--is false humility, since it 
"degrades one's personality" (DV:435-6; 467-8). It is even 
contrary to our duty towards other men because it displays 
"a [kind of] ambition" reflected in the belief that through 
such behavior, one will acquire a greater worth than they 
have (DV:436). To cultivate self-respect, it is necessary 
not only to reflect on oneself as subject of the moral law
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and to hold certain attitudes toward oneself, but also to 
act in ways that are appropriate to our elevated status.
For in doing so, we counteract the vice of servility and 
thereby strengthen our self-respect. This is an especially 
clear instance of how certain actions can bring about 
morally beneficial feelings.
From the foregoing, it is clear that self-respect makes 
us act in ways which underscore our role as legislators of 
duty, and so, helps us fulfill our duties in a proud rather 
than dejected or grudging way. But how does self-respect 
serve as a precondition for recognizing the concept of duty 
in the first place? In including self-respect among duty- 
feelings, Kant implies it must have such a role. I think 
the feature of duty to which self-respect makes us sensitive 
is the fact that every duty is indirectly a duty toward 
oneself (see LE:121, 223). As Mary Gregor points out, "a 
duty of forgiving someone who has injured us is indirectly a 
duty to ourselves of not degrading our soul with hatred, and 
our duty to benevolence is indirectly a duty to ourselves of 
making ourselves the source of others' happiness."«* All 
virtuous deeds must spring from a proud attitude--a state of 
mind conforming to the dignity of our humanity. This 
attitude is of course first adopted through thought and not 
through feeling, but it causes us to have a stronger feeling 
of self-respect. Thoughts or attitudes are thus included
42See Gregor, The Laws of Freedom, p.128, fn.l.
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among the actions (in this case, acts of mind) vhich help 
cultivate, morally beneficial feelings and, ultimately, a 
virtuous character.
I have already observed that the pride appropriate to 
our dignity is limited only by humility before the moral 
lav. This humility is bound up with another dignity-feeling 
relevant to our duties to ourselves, namely, conscience.
Kant defines conscience as "consciousness of an internal 
court in man {'before vhich his thoughts accuse or excuse 
one another')" (DV:438). Conscience is the pover of 
judgment applied to one's own actions, for vhich reason then 
gives the verdict "guilty" or "innocent." This activity is 
something ve cannot escape; ve can only bring ourselves (in 
conditions of extreme depravity) no longer to heed it 
(DV:438). Since conscience is inescapable, it inspires awe 
in us:
Every man has a conscience and finds himself observed, 
threatened, and, in general, kept in ave (respect 
coupled with fear) by an internal judge; and this 
authority watching over the law in him is not something 
that he himself (voluntarily) makes. but something 
incorporated into his beina. It follows him like a 
shadow when he plans to escape. (DV:438)
Conscience is thus not strictly a feeling. It is rather an 
activity of judgment bound up with the feeling of awe (fear 
coupled with respect). The judgments of conscience (or
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rather, of reason) are followed by either relief or pain, 
depending, on whether the verdict was "innocent" or "guilty" 
(DV:440). Since conscience is something we cannot escape 
but can only dull our senses to, we do not have a duty to 
acquire a conscience; we only have a duty to cultivate it.
We do this by heeding its verdicts, by sharpening our 
attentiveness to its voice, and by enlightening our 
understanding about what is and what is not our duty, which 
is the same as using "every means to obtain a hearing for 
[the voice of conscience]" (DV:401, my insert).
Kant does not explain why heeding one's conscience is a
duty to oneself (though he classifies it as a such a duty at 
DV:437), but I think it is plausible to see this duty-- 
characterized as a duty to "judge" oneself (DV:438)--as 
bound up with the duty to know oneself (which Kant at DV:441 
calls the "first command of all duties to oneself"). For 
conscience judges not only the legality of our actions, but 
also of their morality. We have a bad conscience if someone 
interprets our act as beneficent when in fact it was done 
from a selfish motive. Similarly, if we plan to act in a 
certain way, conscience judges the moral worth of the action
even before we have undertaken it (DV:438). This gives us
important information regarding our long-standing 
motivations. Heeding our conscience is thus an important 
aspect of self-knowledge.
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How, finally, does conscience help us recognize and be 
responsive to duty? It helps us recognize duty by holding 
before its court of justice each action we contemplate 
undertaking (DV:438). This makes us aware of the 
implications of acting contrary to duty, and so, reminds us 
of the severity of its commands and the necessity with which 
duty binds us. Conscience thus reminds us of the necessity 
of the moral law--of the fact that we cannot make ourselves 
an exception to it. Conscience helps us respond to duty 
because we know that we cannot escape the verdict of 
conscience. This is not a motive of fear; it is rather an 
awareness of the inevitability of practical reason within 
us. The awareness that practical reason will judge our 
actions whatever we may do provides a powerful incentive to 
conform to the commands of the moral law.
i n  t H?lP,inq Feelings
These feelings are connected primarily with our duties 
toward others. The central feeling here is the love of 
mankind. While Kant says that it cannot be a duty to have 
this feeling, since love cannot be felt out of the 
constraint inherent in the thought of duty, it is still a 
duty to cultivate it by practicing beneficence (DV:401- 
2).*3 Kant's assumption here is that by doing good to
■•"Kant's claim that beneficence produces a feeling of love 
(DV:402) can of course be interpreted not as a claim about our 
duties but as a claim about the effect of beneficence. That is,
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others, we will come to love them (DV:402, 457). This is, 
of course^ a tenuous assumption. But it becomes more 
plausible if we think of a concrete situation in which we 
help someone. Our interaction with the person gives us 
familiarity with her, and her sense of decency (assuming she 
has any!) will prompt her to show gratitude toward us. The 
experience will most likely be amiable, and so, will inspire 
in us an affection for her. This at least seems to be 
Kant's idea, and I intend to make it plausible in Chapter 4, 
the chapter devoted to helping feelings.
While the duty of beneficence gives us a latitude in 
deciding whom to help and when--the most likely recipients 
of our beneficence being, of course, our nearest and dearest 
(DV:452)--it is conjoined with the duty to friendship (a 
relationship characterized by mutual love and respect; 
DV:469), which imposes on us the ultimate aim of becoming a 
"friend of man," that is, someone who takes an active 
interest in the well-being not only of those who are near 
and dear, but also of those who are not, and does so with 
respect and not with the unwarranted pride of a benefactor 
(DV:472-3). Engaging in friendships also helps break down 
the reserve we feel toward those we do not know. Love
Kant might not be making it a duty to cultivate love, but only to 
practice beneficence. However, since he classifies love of man 
among the subjective predispositions to duty itself and, in his 
discussion of the other subjective predispositions, clearly makes 
it a duty to cultivate them (see DV:399-401), I think he also 
sees it as incumbent on us to cultivate love of man.
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toward particular individuals is thus meant to serve as a 
foundation for a more generalized love of mankind, mediated 
by the ease which particular friendships give us in opening
up to those whom we do not know (LE:206-7).
In what sense is love of mankind a subjective 
precondition for recognizing and responding to duty? This 
is difficult to establish, since love can be cultivated only
by recognizing duty in the first place--that is, by
practicing beneficence. Kant gives no explanation for why 
he includes love of man among the duty-feelings. It is 
plausible to assume, however, that the love of man, if not a 
necessary requirement for our recognition of duty, will 
render the universality-requirement of the moral law more 
concrete to us. If we take an active interest in the well­
being of others, we are better able to see the law not just 
as an abstract requirement of reason, but as a principle 
urging us to be concerned with the well-being and rights of 
individuals in specific situations. I submit, then, that 
the love of man helps us recognize duty by making its 
requirements more concrete to us.
The love of man also helps us respond more readily to 
the requirements of duty because as finite beings, we are 
morally fallible, and so, will not always act on the moral 
law simply because it is our duty to do so. Cultivating 
love of man is a way of spurring us along the right course 
of action even when duty is not a sufficient motive. This
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is why Kant says that sympathy is "one of the impulses that 
nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of 
duty alone could not accomplish" (DV:457). Given our finite 
rational nature, it is incumbent on us to use whatever means 
available to fulfill our obligatory ends. If duty cannot 
motivate us, we must use our natural sympathy to carry out 
the demands of duty. For action is, after all, the ultimate 
end of all duties--the end for the sake of which we 
cultivate all the morally appropriate dispositions and 
feelings (see DV:441; LE, 143, 200).««
There is also a class of feelings directed primarily at 
the aesthetic appeal of virtue. Love is the central feeling 
here. In the Critiaue q£ Judgmentf Kant draws a close 
connection between the sense of beauty and the feeling of 
love (CJ:267). This connection is exploited for moral ends 
in the Doctr ine of Virtue. Virtuous behavior has 
aesthetically appealing outward manifestations which make us 
take an interest in virtue, if not for its own sake, then at 
least for its aesthetic appeal (DV:473-4). Similarly, love 
of man is a "moral ornament" to the world, required to 
"represent the world as a beautiful moral whole in its 
complete perfection" (DV, 458). By helping us imagine the
•^Kant's claim that action is the ultimate goal of morality 
is somewhat difficult to reconcile with his claim that the duties 
of the Doctrine of Virtue prescribe primarily the cultivation of 
the inner disposition--the good wi11--required for morality 
(DV:392-3). In subsequent chapters, I hope to show how the 
cultivation of a moral disposition relates to the fulfillment of 
duty through action.
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world as it should be, as a "beautiful moral whole," the 
love of man gives us a concrete representation of the 
ultimate aim of reason. This is an especially clear 
instance of reason enlisting certain emotions for the 
fulfillment of its ends, given that human reason exists in 
beings who are imperfectly rational.
It may be objected that acting out of love of man is 
not morally required, since all that morality requires is 
striving to act out of sense of duty. But we have seen that 
we are required, as finite beings, to cultivate all the 
motives which help us realize the two obligatory ends. The 
aesthetic appeal of love of man gives us yet another 
incentive to cultivate it. An action will be more graceful 
if we do it not just out of duty, but also out of 
inclination--that is, if our desires are in harmony with the 
requirements of reason. Actions possessing this sort of 
harmony have no greater moral worth than actions performed 
from duty but against inclination (G:397-9). Nevertheless, 
they have an aesthetic value because they lend harmony and 
grace to the otherwise stern life of duty. Those emotions 
which help us fulfill moral ends can therefore be seen as 
fulfilling an aesthetic desideratum of harmony and balance.
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Conclusion
I hope that I have, by now, made clear the systematic 
import of feeling in the moral life, for Kant. We have a 
duty to cultivate feelings because we are not holy wills.
We will always have inclinations which oppose morality; 
hence we are under obligation to use every means within our 
power to shape within ourselves a morally good disposition. 
Even if we should succeed in fulfilling our duties from the 
motive of duties and so attain, from an objective point of 
view, a state of moral perfection, we. could never know, from 
our own subjective standpoint, that we had attained such a 
state because our motives are inscrutable to us. Because we 
can never assume that we have attained a morally perfect 
state and because of the ever-present possibility of 
temptation, we are obliged to continue the process of 
cultivating morally beneficial emotions throughout our moral 
lives. In subsequent chapters, I hope to explore in greater 
detail how cultivating and acting on morally beneficial 
emotions can actually be constitutive of a virtuous frame of 
mind in its most full-blooded sense.
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Chapter 3:
The Fee 1 ing of Respe c t for. the Moral Law
For Kant, the notion of moral obligation poses a 
special problem. Previous thinkers had conceived of 
obligation in essentially motivational terms. When they 
asked how moral standards obligate us, they were asking how 
they could motivate us to act on them. Because they 
characterized obligations in terms of antecedent deslres-- 
either sel£-directed (fear, self-love) or other-directed 
(sociability, benevolence, love of God)--these thinkers had 
no problem explaining how we come to act on an obligation: 
obligations are conditioned by natural feelings or desires 
and so follow upon the very motive for acting on them.
Kant breaks with this tradition. He argues that, since 
moral obligations bind us regardless of what we happen to 
desire, the concept of moral obligation cannot be defined in 
terms of antecedent desires; rather, it must be defined in 
terms of a categorical imperative which commands 
unconditionally. In defining moral obligation this way,
Kant severs the concept of obligation from the concept of 
sensuous motivation, for it is definitive of the categorical 
imperative that it binds us regardless of what we happen to 
des i re.
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Having made this move, Kant faces a problem. How is it 
possible for moral obligations to motivate us? How can we 
be moved to act on an unconditional command? Kant has to be 
able to answer this question if pure reason is to be able, 
without the help of empirical incentives, to determine the 
will--that is, if pure reason is to be practical. Kant's 
solution to the problem is the following. He holds that
pure reason is indeed practical because it generates its own
special motive, namely, a feeling of respect for the moral 
law. Moral obliaations, then, are capable of motivating us
through the feeling of respect which they evoke in us.
Kant's solution to the problem of moral motivation is 
by no means unambiguous, as is evidenced by the many 
divergent Interpretations of how the moral law comes to 
motivate us. Several commentators reject any involvement of 
respect in moral motivation. They see us as being motivated 
by pure reason and conceive of respect as the (pathological) 
effect of being so motivated.1 Others accept respect as 
the motive for acting on the moral law, but disagree about 
its nature: some see it as a process of glorying in the 
thought of our intelligible nature,3 while others portray
^Paul Guyer is a representative of this view (see Chapter 
10, Kant and the Experience of Freedom). There are also strands
of this view in Andrews Reath's account of the "sensible" side of 
respect (see "Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the 
Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination," esp. pp.289-90.
3A representative of this view is A. Murray MacBeath, "Kant 
on Moral Feeling," Kant-Studien 64 (1973), pp.283-314.
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it as the recognition of the moral law as a sufficient 
reason .to act3 or as a recognition of the formal 
consistency in acting on the moral law.- This divergence 
in the oresent understanding of Kant's views on moral 
motivation shows that we still need an account of how the 
moral law produces a motive for acting on it.
My aim in this paper is to put forth a reading of 
respect which fills this need. I align myself with the 
group that sees respect as the motive for acting on the 
moral law, but I disagree with most of their accounts of the 
nature of respect. These commentators uniformly shy away 
from the notion that respect, in its motivating capacity, is 
a full-blooded feellng. They see it instead as a rational 
insight, deemphasizing its "pathological" side.® In a
3Representatives of this view are Andrews Reath, "Kant's 
Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the 
Influence of Inclination," Kant-Studlen 80 (1989), pp.284-302;
Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1990 ) , p.127.
-A representative of this view is J. Schneewind, "Autonomy, 
Obligation, and Virtue," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant. ed. 
Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992), p.309-31, esp.
p p .326-29.
*1 am convinced that they do this because they think it will 
violate Kant's conception of agency to see moral motivation as 
anything but purely rational. They think that if the moral 
motive contains any non-rational admixture, we are somehow not 
tx.es. when we act on the moral law. Thus, in spite of his 
admirable construal of choice--lncluding patholodlcally affected 
choice--as the free incorporation of Incentives into our maxims 
(Reath, "Kant's Theory," pp.290-1), Andrews Reath feels compelled 
to believe that anything but a purely rational construal of the 
moral motive would violate the model of free choice he just put 
forth (Reath, "Kant’s Theory," p.295). In fact, na incentive can 
violate the model of free choice, since our freedom of choice is
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sense, they are justified in doinq so, for if respect is 
pathological, it seems contingent that it should occur 
alongside our rational recognition of the moral law; and if 
respect is contingent, it could not serve as the stable 
source of motivation that Kant wants it to be. I want to 
show that this type of worry is unfounded, since respect for 
the moral law is a qenuine feelinq (in a sense yet to be 
defined) which arises necessar1ly upon reflection on the 
moral law. Feeling is thus an essential aspect of the 
"pure" moral motive and thus of the motive of duty itself.
First, a few words on why I align myself with the group 
of commentators which thinks of respect as the motive to 
rather than the effect of moral wi11ing--that is, as a 
consequence of our recognition of the moral law but a 
presupposition for acting on it.
Eart I_l why respect preced.es rather than follows .moral
wi11i nq
On the face of it, the claim that respect precedes 
moral willing and must serve as the motive for moral action 
seems slnqularly un-Kantian. Kant repeatedly claims that in 
morally worthy actions, the moral law must determine the 
will directly and not through an intervening feelinq (CP:25,
preserved regardless of the nature of our choices.
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27, 38, 48, 71). This is a requirement we would expect from 
someone who wants to show that pure reason is practical. In 
order for pure reason to be practical, the moral law--the 
supreme law of pure reason— must be able to determine the 
will without the help of empirical Incentives, includinq 
feelings of various sorts (G:461). But this seems to 
suggest that the feeling of respect can have no role in 
moral motivation. Even though Kant describes respect as a 
feeling known a priori (CP:75, 76, 77, 81), it still remains 
a feeling. All that is known a priori about respect is 
that, as the consciousness of the determination of the will 
by the moral law, it involves the diminuition of the 
influence of sensuous inclination on the will (CP:75, 79, 
156). But that takes place on the sensuous plane, and so, 
seems to suggest that respect is itself sensuous in 
character. If its presence is needed to move us to act on a 
law of pure reason, it seems to obliterate Kant's 
requirement that pure reason must be sufficient of. itself to 
determine the will.®
*Beck notes the apparent inconsistency between claiming that 
the moral law directly determines the will and that it does so 
through a feeling of respect. But he does not resolve the
inconsistency, for he fails to distinguish subjective from 
objective determining grounds of the will--as do most other 
commentators. As a result, he takes the expression "the direct 
determination of the will by the moral law" to mean the actual 
choice to adhere to the moral law rather than, as I interpret it, 
the mere awareness of the moral law as a possible practical 
principle. See Beck, A Commentary on Kant1 s Cr.it igue. of 
PracticaJ, Reason (Chicaqo: The University of Chicaqo Press,
1960), pp.222-3, esp. fn.37.
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I believe, however, that Kant can consistently maintain 
that pure reason is sufficient of itself to determine the 
will and that it does so through the feelinq of respect. To 
see why, we need to consider the sense in which Kant intends 
respect to be a feelinq. If we think that by "feelinq" 
fGelQjil), Kant must mean something pathological, his claim 
that reason motivates us through a feeling does indeed seem 
paradoxical. For inclinations are at best in contingent 
conformity with the moral law, but the moral motive must be 
present whether or not our inclinations conform to it 
<G:425; CP:21-6); thus, the moral motive cannot be an 
inclination (that is why Kant repeatedly stresses that we 
cannot have a feeling for the moral law as such; see CP:38- 
9, 75). But if, instead, we think of feeling as a 
reflective process, which involves pathological elements but 
is primarily conditioned by a judgment o.£ reason. we qet a 
view of feeling which incorporates both a rational element 
(the recognition of the moral law as bindinq on us) and 
feelings of pleasure and pain. It is in this latter sense,
I suggest, that respect is a feeling. Respect can only 
arise is response to our recognition of the moral law as 
supremely authoritative for us. It thus qualifies as a 
unique type of feeling, generated in response to an a priori 
concept. Because of its a priori origin, respect is 
sufficiently permanent to motivate us in every situation.
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Does our judgment-laden view of respect help resolve 
the puzzle? It seems it does not. For there still appears 
to be an inconsistency in claiminq both that the moral law 
dirjejptly determines the will and that it does so only by 
means of the feelinq of respect--whether or not respect is a 
feelinq in the latter, judqment-laden sense.’7 To resolve 
this inconsistency, we need to recoqnize Kant's distinction 
between subjective and objective determining grounds of the 
will. This distinction is present already in the
determined "objectively" by the moral law and "subjectively" 
by "pure respect for this practical law" (G:400; also 460 
and CP:81). What does the distinction amount to?
An objective determining ground of the will is a 
rational principle. It is objective in the sense that it is 
informed by reason, though it need not be valid for every 
rational being. A maxim, for instance, is an objective 
determining qround of the will which is valid only for me 
(CP:19). A law, by constrast, is a principle which is valid 
not only for me, but for all rational beinqs, whether finite 
(such as ourselves) or infinite (such as God). It is an 
objective determining ground of the will which is also 
objectively valid. Such a principle, e.g., "Never makes 
false promises," belongs to reason as such: reason need not
7For now, I am flaqging the "judgment-laden" view of resDect 
and will return to it in Part IV, where I discuss the structure 
and character of respect.
where Kant characterizes the moral will as
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venture beyond itself into the realm of pathological desires 
in order to specify such a principle (CP:20-1). Amonq 
objectively valid principles of reason are also hypothetical 
imperatives, e.g., "If you desire an end, do what is in your 
power to attain it." Hypothetical imperatives, while 
objectively valid, are not laws because they require, for 
their formulation, material from the pathological realm. 
Because they are based on externally given desires, they do 
not "determine the will as will," but determine it "only in 
respect to a desired effect"--an effect whose occurrence is 
at best contingent because conditioned by a continqent 
choice or desire (CP:20). In this, they differ from laws, 
which determine the will "as will," and so, necessarily. (I 
will explain this sense of necessity in further detail in 
Part III.) So, within the category of objective determining 
grounds of the will, we have principles of reason which are 
either subjectively or objectively valid. Maxims belong to 
the former category; laws and imperatives to the latter (see 
G :4 OOn , 422n).
A subjective determining ground of the will is an 
incentive. Kant defines an Incentive as "a subjective 
determining ground of a will whose reason does not by its 
nature necessarily conform to the objective law" (CP:72; 
also 32).* Such beinqs--ourselves figurinq notoriously
■Beck defines an incentive (Trlebfeder) as "the dynamic or 
conative factor in willing." This conative factor is present 
only in finite rational belnqs (Beck, Commentary, pp.216-17.)
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amonq them--have an internal resistance toward actinq in a 
perfectly rational manner, and so must be "impelled" to act 
on principles of reason. In other words, they need 
incentives (CP:79).® The incentive to act on the 
hypothetical imperative, "If you want to be rich, call now," 
for example, is the desire to be rich: qiven that desire, it 
is easier for me to follow the principle (thouqh I can 
always adopt the end reqardless of whether I desire it). 
Similarly, we have an internal resistance to the moral law; 
thus, we need a moral incentive to motivate us. God, who 
acts on the moral law by nature, needs no incentive and so 
does not feel respect (CP:74, 76, 79-80, 82). Respect, as 
the moral incentive, thus applies only to finite rational 
beinqs such as ourselves (CP:79). To summarize, a 
subjective determininq qround of the will is a motive or 
feelinq, while an objective determininq qround of the will 
is a rational principle.10
•Unlike formalist commentators, I take Kant's use of the 
term "impelled" (anaetrieben ) quite seriously--not in the sense 
of implyinq physical determinism, which of course it does not, 
but in the sense of siqnifyinq the need to have a f eeling serve 
as the motive to morality. Only a feelinq is able to match the 
promise of pleasure implicit in the claims of the inclinations. 
It is just this promise which serves as an obstacle to moralitv; 
hence, we need to be "impelled" toward morality and away from the 
claims of the inclinations by a contrary incentive.
10It is because Andrews Reath falls to see that incentives 
are not principles but rather feelings that he has such trouble 
explaininq Kant's claim that "no Incentives can be attributed to 
the divine will" (CP:72). If he were to construe subjective
determininq grounds of the will as feelinqs rather than reasons 
capable of beinq objectively valid, he would see that they do not 
apply to a divine will (see Reath, "Kant's Theory," p.286, tn.6^.
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Kant does not always explicitly distinguish between 
subjective and objective determining qrounds of the will, 
but once we recoqnize the distinction, the apparent 
inconsistency noted above falls away. For while the moral 
law must directly determine the will obJejrJt i vely, it does 
not do so subjectively. Only throuqh respect, as the 
subjective determining ground of the will, can the moral law 
become an incentive for us. The moral law "furnishes the 
objective grounds" for respect, but respect is "the 
subjective effect that the law exercises upon the will,” and 
it is this effect which constitutes the moral interest and 
so furnishes the moral motive (G:460). Thus, while Kant 
says that "the moral law determines the will directly ami 
objectively in the judgment of reason" (CP:78, emphasis 
mine), he can also claim, on the next page, that the feelinq 
of respect is "a subjective ground of activity, as an 
incentive for obedience to the law" (CP:79). It is possible 
to act objectively according to the moral law but not 
subjectively. This happens when judge that the moral law is 
the right principle to act on and conform our actions to its 
requirements, but act from a non-moral motive (Kant calls 
this "legality": CP:81, 152). In order to have a moral 
disposition, we need not only to judqe that the moral law is 
the right principle to act on (an objective judgment), but 
also to act from r_es.pect for the law (a subjective feelinq).
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The distinction between subjective and objective 
determining grounds of the will clarifies an otherwise 
puzzling sentence in a footnote in the Groundwork. where 
Kant says that "Itlhe immediate determination of the will by 
the law, and the consciousness thereof, is called respect" 
(G:401n). The sentence is puzzling because it makes it 
appear as though "respect" is a mere label for the direct 
and purely rational choice to act on the moral law. This 
would make respect, as a feeling which precedes the choice 
to act on the moral law, motivationally idle, since it seems 
to suggest that we can be moved to act solely on the basis 
of pure reason. What Kant means to say, however, is that 
respect is the way in which the sheer consciousness of the 
moral law affects the feeling subject. Thus, the sentence 
continues, respect is "the effect of the law upon the 
subject." The thought of the moral law gives rise to a 
feeling of respect, which can then serve as a subjective 
determining ground of the choice to act on the moral law.
The phrase, "the effect of the law upon the subject" should 
not, then, be taken to refer to the effect of choosing the 
moral law as one's principle of action; it should rather be 
taken to refer to the effect of thinking the moral law as 
the supreme principle of action, regardless of whether or 
not one actually ends up obeying the law.11 Only thus can
i:LIn this, I differ from Paul Guyer, who denies that the 
feeling of respect plays any role in moral motivation (whether as 
an incentive to act or as the physical "propulsion" which moves
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we explain why Kant claims that even sinners--people who 
manifestly violate the moral law--feel respect for the law 
(C P :79-80; see also R:41-2, 44). For it is only if respect 
precedes actinq on the moral law (though follows recognition 
of it) that is it possible for someone to feel respect for 
the moral law but still fail to act on it.
Motivational purists, who want moral motivation to be a 
purely rational process, would object that my readinq 
iqnores Kant's explicit claim that respect i_& "Itlhe 
immediate determination of the will by the law" ("Die 
unmittelbare Bestlmmunq des Wlllens durchs Gesetz"; G:401n). 
This passage seems to suggest that respect just i.s a purely 
rational choice to adhere to the law, and so, that we do 
need not to invoke any mysterious feeling to motivate us.
On my reading, however, respect is not the immediate 
determination of the will by the law, but Is rather the 
consciousness of that determination. It is a feelinq 
arising from our recognition that the law alone is capable 
of objectively determininlng the will.
It is important to note that "the determination of the 
will by the law" does not signify an actual choice to adhere
us). Guyer maintaints that adoptlnq the moral law as our 
incentive is a purely rational decision which nevertheless has 
certain effects on our emotional set, the feelinq of respect 
beinq the most notable one (book manuscript, pp.486-9). He qoes 
on to argue that the decision to act on the moral law can have 
effects on one's entire characte, not just on one's capacity to 
el respect (pp.493-8). I agree with the latter claim, but see 
as compatible with taking respect to be the moral motive.
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to the moral law. It only signifies a poss.lb_i_l_ity of 
choice.. The decision to act on a qlven principle Is always 
a matter of free choice (see R:19). Similarly, the decision 
to act from a qiven motive is a matter of free choice, and 
is therefore independent on the permanence or even the 
strenqth of one's motive (R:19). One can therefore feel 
respect without adoptinq it as one's motive: feelinq respect 
does not entail that one will actually act fxojn respect.
Our capacity for free choice also affects the relation 
between our intentions and our actions. Even Intending to 
act from respect--that is, incorporating it into one's 
maxim--does not entail that one will actually act on that 
morally worthy maxim. As Kant puts it, "there is a great 
gap between the maxim and the deed" (R:42; also 43). It is 
possible, in other words, to adopt respect as one's motive 
yet fail to act accordingly.
For these reasons, I find Karl Ameriks' readinq of 
respect as a feeling which follows upon the moral choice and 
is needed to get us to "move to morality" dubious.12 On 
Ameriks' reading, respect is a feeling which arises 
necessarily upon the choice to act on the moral law. He 
thinks that we have to decide to adopt the moral law as our 
motive without the help of feeling--this choice must be a
12Karl Ameriks, "The Heqelian Critique of Kantian Morality," 
in New Essays on Kant, eds. Bernard den Ouden and Marcia Moen 
(New York and Bern: Peter Lanq, 1987), pp.178-212. Quote from 
p.186, emphasis mine.
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"noumenal acceptance of pure duty"--but that we then need 
the feelinq of respect as the "force" (Ameriks' term) which 
actually propels us to moral action.1* Ameriks' reading 
seems confirmed by Kant's reference to respect as a 
Triebfeder, a "sprinq" of action (CP:72), but I Interpret 
this term in a different way. On my readinq, respect as a 
Tr i ebfeder does not move us to morality in any physical 
sense at all; rather, it moves us in the sense of creatinq 
an interest in acting on the moral law. (Just how it does 
so is the topic of Parts III and IV.) Ameriks seems to be 
suggestinq that, in order to act, we need to be "propelled" 
to motion by some feeling. But this contradicts Kant's 
theory of free aqency, on which we are never propelled to 
act, by feeling or by anything else. On Kant's view, we act 
in a certain way because we have chosen so to act. Feelinq 
enters in as the basi s for our various choices and not as 
the "fuel" for implementing them.
My reasons for believing that respect is the motive to 
moral willing rather than the effect thereof should by now 
be clear. In Part II, I explain why it is necessary to view
^Ameriks, pp.186-7. Ameriks goes on to arque that respect, 
as the effect of the moral choice, can then temper other 
feelings, so as to allow a whole range of feelings to move us to 
action in this way (p.187). I aqree with Ameriks' claim that 
respect can inform and condition other feelings; indeed, that is 
part of my claim about the way in which respect is conducive to 
human flourishing. But I disagree with Ameriks' view of respect 
as following the choice to adhere to the moral law. On my view, 
respect precedes the moral choice in the sense of creating an 
interest in acting on the moral law.
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respect as a feeling rather than a purely rational insiqht.
I then .go on, In Parts III and IV, to specify the character 
of that feelinq.
Part IT: Why the moral motive Is a feelinq
If we are correctly to understand Kant's notion of 
moral interest, we must see it as bound up with respect for 
the moral law, where respect is understood as a full-blown 
feelinq, not just a rational insiqht. This emphasis on 
feeling seems to go against much of what Kant says both in 
the Groundwork and in the second Cr itlaue about the purely 
rational character of moral interest. In particular, it 
seems to contradict his claim that it is "reason's form, 
viz., the practical law of the universal validity of 
maxims," and so the idea of reason "in its relation to a 
pure intelliqible world as...a cause determining the will" 
(G:462) that gives rise to our interest in obeyinq the moral 
law. These considerations--of the form of universal law and 
our membership, as legislators of such law, in an 
intelligible world--are purely rational; and so, one would 
think, the moral interest which arises in response to them 
must itself be purely rational. It thus seems odd to claim 
that the moral interest is founded on a Reeling of respect 
which arises in response to these purely rational
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considerations. That, however, is just what Kant maintains. 
He claims that resDect is a feelinq which arises when we 
reflect on the moral law, and that this feelinq serves as an 
incentive for obeyinq the moral law. This feelinq, in turn, 
qives rise to a rational interest in obeyinq the law: 
respect "produces an interest in obedience to the law, and 
this we call moral interest" (CP:80; see also G:459-460).
Why does Kant think we need feelinq in order to take an 
interest in the moral law? Why can't the moral interest 
arise as a direct rational response to contemplatinq the 
moral law? The moral interest is Itself, after all, purely 
rational: it is "a pure nonsensuous interest of the 
practical reason alone" (CP:79). It seems stranqe, 
therefore, to claim, as Kant does, that the moral interest 
can only arise Ln. response to a feelinq of respect. How can 
a purely rational interest be qenerated out of a feelinq of 
respect, and why is respect needed at all in order to 
qenerate that interest? And further, why, if respect is 
already present as an incentive for obeying the law, do we 
need, in addition, a rational interest in doinq the same? 
There seems to be a motivational overdetermination here: we 
have both a feellnq-based incentive to obey the law and a 
rational interest in doinq the same. Surely it would 
suffice if one of them were present.
To appreciate the logic of this seeming redundancy, we 
need to make an architectonic excursion and remind ourselves
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of the standpoint from which Kant proceeds in his discussion 
of moral interests and incentives in the second Crdtique. 
This discussion takes place in Chapter 3, entitled "The 
Incentives of Pure Practical Reason." The standpoint from 
which Kant proceeds in this discussion is the standpoint not 
of pure practical reason, but of the fijii.tg raJLiojial 
3-Ubject. We are not concerned here with laying out the 
principles proper to a rational will; we are concerned with 
how a being who does not necessarily act on these principles 
comes to be motivated by them. (Recall that God, who 
necessarily acts on the moral law, needs neither interests 
nor incentives to move him to act morally; these concepts 
simply do not apply to him; see CP:79.) Laying out the 
principles and workings of a rational will was indeed the 
concern of Chapter 1 of the Analytic of Pure Practical 
Reason, and this could be done from the standpoint of pure 
practical reason (though human finitude had at times to be 
taken into account, as in the inclusion of Imperatives amonq 
the principles of reason; see CP:20). The topic of Chapter 
3, however, cannot be addressed from a purely rational 
standpoint. The task of this chapter is to show how the 
sensuously affected subject comes to be moved bv the purely 
rational principles laid out in Chapter l--to show, in other 
words, how the principles of reason apply "to the subject 
and its sensuous faculty" (CP:16, emphasis mine). Chapter 
3, then, deals with reason's impact on feelinq, where
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feelinq is construed as essentially motivatinq, as "a 
subjective qround of desire" (CP:90). The discussion thus 
demands a shift from the standpoint of pure practical reason 
to that of the sensuously affected yet rational subject.
It is this shift in standpoints which explains the 
apparent redundancy. Kant has introduced another dimension- 
-the sensuous--into his discussion, but he has not removed 
the rational dimension. Whatever will fill the place of the 
moral motive must, from this point of view, contain elements 
of bo£h reason and sensibility. Respect, that which fills 
this place, contains just these elements (I will describe 
these in detail shortly, but see CP:79-80). The solution to 
the apparent redundancy (respect as "sensuous" incentive as 
opposed to rational interest) is thus to realize that 
respect is both a "sensuous" Incentive and a rational 
interest. It is a rational interest in so far as the finite 
subject looks to its rational side; it is an incentive in so 
far as the subject looks to its finite side. The dual 
nature of respect explains Kant's claim that an interest 
"indicates an incentive of the will so far as it is 
presented by reason" (CP:79, emphasis mine): the rational 
incentive !ls> respect, as viewed from the point of view of 
reason. But this rational interest remains part of a 
fe.elJjig, i.e., a s_ubj^Gtlye ground of determining the will, 
and so, Kant can say that "the capacity for taking...an 
Interest in the moral law (or of having respect for the
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moral law itself) is reallv moral feeling" (CP:80). Our 
capacity to take an interest in the moral law is rational, 
but Kant Identifies this capacity with respect and calls it 
a moral feelinq because it is bound up with a subjective and 
irreduclbly aesthetic outlook (I say "aesthetic" rather than 
"sensuous" because, as we will see in Part IV, the 
"sensuous" side of respect is really not patholoqical; it is 
more akin to an aesthetic attitude.) Respect, then, is both 
the moral incentive and the moral interest. The apparent 
redundancy disappears.
Another architectonic puzzle remains. What does Kant's 
discussion of moral incentives in Chapter 3 add to his "Fact 
of Reason" discussion in Chapter 1? In Chapter 1, Kant 
observes that we recognize the moral law as supremely 
authoritative and immediately directive for us (an insiqht 
which he terms "The Fact of Reason"; see CPiSl1-4).
Because the moral law determines the will objectively in 
respect of its form alone, the will which recognizes it as 
bindinq must do so independently of any empirical object of 
desire. Such a will is "wholly independent of the natural 
law of appearances in their mutual relations," and so, is 
free (CP:29-30). The Fact of Reason thus discloses our
1'*There are actually several references to the Fact of 
Reason in the second Cr i tiaue. some of which appear incompatible. 
For an attempt to sort them out, see Beck, Commentary . pp.166-75; 
Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom Chapter 13; and Rawls's 
unpublished lectures, "The Fact of Reason," esp. Lecture 1. I am 
following Rawls in my formulation of The Fact of Reason (Rawls, 
"Themes," p.102).
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freedom to us. Now, this insight--that because we are bound 
by the .moral law, we are also afeJe to act on it--could 
arquably serve as sufficient evidence that reason can 
motivate us. But does not that render superfluous Kant's 
discussion of incentives in Chapter 3, which seems to fill 
the same purpose?
Not at all. In Chapter 1, Kant is showinq that the 
moral law is valid for us. In Chapter 3, by contrast, he is 
oivinq his moral psychology--explaininq how the moral law 
manifests itself in beings such as ourselves ("the 
phenomenoloqy of respect") and how we experience the call of 
duty within us. It is the effect of the moral law on the 
sensuous subject which Kant labels "feeling" (CP:90) and 
which is the province of Kant's moral psycholoqy. The 
phenomenology of respect as a feeling will thus differ from 
his own philosophical insight into the nature of the moral 
law and what it reveals about us. Such epistemic insiqhts 
are introduced in Chapter 1 for the purpose of justifying or 
authenticating the moral law.1* That discussion is
“ Strictly speakinq, the moral law can have no deduction, 
since it does not concern itself with properties of objects given 
to us. It does, however, admit of an authentication, i.e., a 
demonstration that it alone can fill a need of reason that is at 
the same time speculative and practical, namely, to demonstrate 
the objective reality of freedom (CP:46-8). For a helpful 
discussion of the Fact of Reason doctrine and its connection to 
the authentication of the moral law, see John Rawls’s "Themes in 
Kant's Moral Philosophy," (hereafter "Themes") in Kant's, 
Transcendental Deductions. ed. Eckart Fdrster (Stanford: Stanford 
UP, 1989), pp.81-113. This article draws on Rawls's unpublished 
lecture series, The Fact of Reason. from the NEH Institute of the 
summer of 1983, organized by Jerome Schneewlnd and David Hoy.
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intended to show that pure reason is objectively practical, 
i.e., that beinqs who recoqnize the principles of reason as 
bindinq on them are also able to act on these principles.
How reason actjjalJLy comes to motivate finite rational 
creatures, i.e., how reason becomes subjectively practical, 
is not yet at issue. It is first in Chapter 3 of Part I 
that Kant takes up this issue.
It is important to note, however, that it is not until 
Part II of the second Critique. in the slender "Methodoloqy 
of Pure Practical Reason," that Kant claims to be giving an 
account of "the way we can make the objectively practical 
reason also subjectively practical" (CP:151). This seems to 
suggest that there has been no prior account of how reason 
comes to be subjectively practical. Since I am clalminq 
that it is precisely the task of Part I, Chapter 3 to show 
how reason motivates us, we need to establish the connection 
between that chapter and the Methodology. Kant claims that 
the purpose of the Methodology is to provide a way to 
"secure the laws of pure practical reason access to the 
human mind and an influence on its maxims" (CP:151). It 
becomes clear, as one reads the chapter, that Kant means by 
this to provide a method for cultivating moral feelinq, 
i.e., for instilllnq and strengthening respect for the moral 
law. The purpose of the Methodoloqy is thus essentially 
pedagogical. The purpose of Part I, by contrast, is 
ohilosophical : to give a theoretical account of how
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practical reason operates, in both its truthful and illusorv 
aspects (the Analytic, where we find Chapter 3, qives 
reason's "rule of truth," while the dialectic exnoses and 
resolves reason's illusory judgments; CP:16). The purpose 
of Chapter 3 is thus to explain, in a purely theoretical 
way, how the principles of reason come to influence the 
subject, whereas the purpose of the Methodology is to show 
us how w^ can affect and strengthen this influence.
The connection between the theoretical and the 
pedagoqical discussion is nevertheless intimate, as is 
evidenced by Kant's incorporation of some of the material 
from Part I into the Methodology. This inclusion, I shall 
argue, is precisely what we should expect, given Kant's 
conception of self-knowledge (truthfulness about one's 
condition) as that which gives respect it3 moral worth. We 
respect the categorical imperative because it is appropriate 
for us to act on it: the categorical imperative reflects our 
station in the order of creation, mirroring our essence as 
finite rational creatures. It is because respect carries 
this insight into the human condition that it is the only 
truthful attitude, and it is only because respect is a 
truthful attitude that it qualifies as the moral motive. 
Truthfulness in the sense of knowing oneself, then, is what 
accounts for the mer1t in acting from respect rather than 
from some other motive. Because truthfulness is so central 
to Kant's account of respect, it is not surprising that the
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Methodology should draw on the scientific discussion of Part 
I. For it is precisely a knowledge of our finite nature 
andthat Is needed to cultivate the moral motive in such a 
way as to avoid moral fanaticism--the attitude which takes 
morality to be a matter of sponteneous compliance with the 
moral law through mere inclination (CP:162-3). The 
discussion of Part I thus has a pedagogical significance 
which dovetails nicely into the discussion in the 
Methodology.
I have attempted to show not only that the moral motive 
is a feeling, but also how complex a feeling it is. Respect 
cannot be understood as a mere inclination, since it is 
built on rational insights. But it would also be wronq to 
think of it as purely cognitive, since that ignores its 
identity as a feeling. its role as "a subjective ground of 
desire" (CP:90). In Part III, I will consider the types of 
rational insights respect is based on. In Part IV, I 
consider the "subjective" dimension of respect, i.e., what 
sort of feeling it is and what this reveals about its nature 
as a moral motive.
Part III: The ideas of reason underlying respect
I noted above that the moral knowledge of the Doctrine 
of Elements serves as a foundation for the cultivation of
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moral feeling in the Methodoloqy. Kant's moral 
epistemology, however, contains numerous rational insiqhts, 
only a few of which play a motivating role. In order to 
arrive at a proper conception of respect, we need therefore 
to determine which insiqhts have motivating potential and 
which do not.
Some commentators have taken Kant to hold that purely 
formal considerations supply the motive for acting on the 
moral law. They maintain that the recognition of formal 
consistency in maxims provides a motive for acting on the 
moral law: that, if one's maxim generates no contradiction 
between itself and its universalized counterpart, we have a 
motive to act on the moral law.3-* The idea here seems to 
be that contradiction is so painful to us that we abhor it 
and pursue consistency. As evidence, these commentators 
cite the following type of passage: "the legislative form, 
in so far as it is contained in the maxim, is the only thing 
which can constitute a determining ground of the [free} 
will" (CP:29; also G:460n). This type of passage is then 
taken to confirm a formalist view of motivation on which the 
avoidance of contradiction is the sole motivating force.
There are both textual and philosophical problems with 
this type of reading. The philosophical problem is that it 
seems to put the cart before the horse: in order to heed the
“ A representative of this view Is J. Schneewind, who says 
that it is the "bare lawfulness of the act" that moves us (p.326 
in Guyer, ed.).
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consistency-requirements implicit in the cateqorical 
imperative procedure, we must already have chosen to adhere 
to the moral law. Consistency, therefore, cannot supply the 
motive for choosinq the adhere to the moral law in the first 
place. This type of objection might be avoided by claiming 
that the desire to avoid contradiction is present even 
before we choose to adhere to the moral law, and so, can 
supply the motive for acting on the moral law. Textual 
considerations, however, show that the formalist view of 
motivation is not what Kant has in mind. As we saw in Part 
I, what Kant is discussing in the type of passage quoted 
above (CP:29) is the oJiiectivg. determining ground of the 
will, i.e., the principle from which the act was done.
Formal consistency in one's maxim can indeed characterize 
the principle on which one acts, but it can never be the 
subjective determining ground or motive from which one acts. 
This much becomes clear in the Methodology, where Kant 
insists that a sheer recognition of formal consistency in 
maxims does not provide a motive for acting on the moral 
law. Let us consider that discussion.
The task of the Methodoloqy, we recall, is to specify 
"the way we can make objectively practical reason also 
subjectively practical" (CP:151), i.e., to make reason 
capable not only of Judging moral action, but also of 
motivating us without the help of empirical incentives.
Kant divides the Methodology into two steps, the first
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describing the process of sharpening moral judgment; the
second, the process of strengthening moral feelinq (CP:159-
161). In the first step, the pupil learns to distinguish
between various duties and between the morality and leqality
of actions. This involves focusing on the maxim and judging
whether the act was done not only in accordance with but
also for the sake of the moral law (CP:159).17 Kant
stresses that while this process is pleasing because it
extends our reasoning powers, it does not itself give rise
to a motive tg act on the moral law:
But this occupation of the faculty of judgment, which 
makes us feel our powers of knowledge, is not yet 
Interest in actions and their morality itself. It only 
enables one to entertain himself with such judqing and 
gives virtue or a turn of mind based on moral laws a 
form of beauty which is admired but not yet sought 
("[Honesty] is praised and starves"). (CP:160)
The process of comparing actions with the moral law enables
us to appreciate the beauty of a character which heeds the
moral law, but it does not give rise to a moral Interest.
This is because the process Is carried out from a purely
formal point of view. Our pleasure here is akin to the
pleasure we take in a qeometric theorem which we admire for
its formal features rather than, say, for its utility. Just
as we look at the theorem as something to be contemplated
rather than applied, we look at virtue as something to be
17But a maxim is a subjective principle of jre.ason, and that 
is not the same as a subjective determining ground of the will. 
This becomes clear in the following passage: "on the concept of 
an incentive rests that of a maxim" (p.82), which indicates a 
maxim must be defined aftex the motive has been given.
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"admired but not yet souqht." I am not suqqestinq that 
morality must be seen as useful in order to move us; my 
point is only that something other than formal consistency 
is needed for the moral law to motivate. An additional 
insiqht, a deeper appreciation of what the formal 
requirements of the moral law reveal ajdout us, is needed to 
qenerate the feelinq of respect and the moral interest 
intrinsic to it.1*
The additional insiqht required to produce an interest 
in morality is the experience of the virtuous disposition as 
embodied in the pure will. How this insiqht awakens the 
moral interest is described in step two of the Methodoloqy. 
This exercise "lies in calling to notice the purity of will 
by a vivid exhibition of the moral disposition in examples" 
(CP:160). The role of examples here is not to encouraqe the 
pupil to imitate moral actions, but to allow the pupil to 
idejULLfy with the moral disposition and so to expexience it. 
only through experiencing the moral disposition by imaglnlnq 
oneself making a moral choice can one cultivate one’s
“ Similar problems arise for the other formalist readinqs of 
moral motivation, i.e., those of Andrews Reath, Paul Guyer, and 
Henry Allison. To respect the moral law, according to Henrv 
Allison, is "to have a sufficient reason (althouqh not a desire) 
to obey it" (Allison, p.127). But unless Allison explains the 
sense in which a sufficient reason is subjectively as well as 
objectively practical--whlch he has not done--he cannot identify 
the moral motive with a sufficient reason.
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respect.1* In his example, Kant describes the struqqle of 
deciding whether to confess to an injustice I have committed
against a person whom I otherwise dislike. I alone know of
my injustice, and several of my 1nclinations--"vanlty, 
selfishness, and an otherwise not illegitimate antipathy to 
the man whose rights I have impaired"--speak against 
confession. But "if I can set aside all these 
considerat1ons, there is a consciousness of an independence 
from inclinations and circumstances and of the doss 1bl11 tv 
of being suf ficient tQ mys.elf . . . " (CP: 161, my emphasis; see 
also CP:87, 152). This suggests that it is the possibility 
of beinq self-sufficient that supplies the incentive to 
morali ty.
Wherein does this possibility of self-sufficiency 
reside? in identifying with the moral agent, I discover 
that I can put aside considerations of vanity, selfishness, 
etc. and sJti1JL ag_£. The possibility of acting independently 
of and even contrary to my inclinations shows that I am free
in the following sense: I am able to act on a law that is
not conditioned by the forces of nature, a law which does
not determine the will "only in respect to its (desired)
effect and its sufficiency to bring this effect
“ The importance of the first-person point of view is
underscored by Kant's use of the pronoun "I" in his example,
facilitating the pupil's identif1cation with the agent. Note 
that the aqent can be imaqinary just as well as actual: the
important feature is the pupil's appreciation of the idea of the 
moral disposition, reqardless of whether or not there are any 
actual instances of morality in the world (see G:408).
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about"(C P :20)--a law which does not make me, as Christine 
Korsqaard puts it, "a mere conduit for natural forces."20 
I am able, in other words, to act on a law that determines 
the will "as will" rather than as Instrument of my desires. 
This law commands with a necessitv that is "completely 
independent of patholoqical conditions, i.e., conditions 
only contingently related to the will" (CP:20). It none 
other than the moral law: "So act that the maxim of your 
will could always hold at the same time as a principle 
establishing universal law" (CP:30).
Our ability to act on the moral law exemplifies self- 
sufficiency in the following way. The moral law is a law. 
i.e., a principle of reason that is universally valid. Now, 
the necessity of a universally valid principle depends on no 
pathological desire, this necessitv must oriqinate in my own 
reason. I myself, have legislated this law. Universally 
valid principles thus exemplify a self-sufficiency of 
reason: in legislating universal law, "reason need 
presuppose paly Itself" (CP:20-1, my emphasis). This self- 
sufficiency of reason is met with only in universally valid 
legislation. in any other type of legislation, reason must 
go beyond itself to external objects of desire in order to 
summon the binding force for its principle. For instance, 
the hypothetical imperative, "If you are hunqry, qet 
something to eat" is binding only because I am hungry: it
2°Korsqaar, "Morality as Freedom" p.32.
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binds with a necessity which depends on the phvsioloqical 
fact that I am hunqry. My hunqer is external to reason, 
since my reason cannot affect that desire. The hypothetical 
Imperative thus is not universally valid. Since the moral 
law is the only law which is universally valid, we are self- 
sufficient only when we act on the moral law. It is this 
recognition which underlies our respect for the moral law.
I have suqqested that governing ourselves throuqh 
reason exemplifies a self-sufficiency that constitutes the 
object of respect. But is acting on the moral law really 
the only way to attain this self-sufficiency? Since 
hypothetical imperatives are objectively valid (CP:20), they 
too miqht seem to exemplify the self-sufficiency I claim to 
be unique to the moral law. But Kant insists that although 
the hypothetical imperative is objectively valid, its 
necessity is not. A principle is objectively valid when it 
expresses the reasonable course of action--what ouqht to 
happen as opposed to what does happen. Now the hypothetical 
imperative is an objectively valid principle because it 
prescribes the reasonable means for attaining an end: "To 
avoid a parking ticket, put money in the meter." It is 
objectively valid because it is possible for us imperfectly 
rational ceatures to violate it (CP:20): we may fall to put 
money in the parking meter even though we know we risk 
gettinq a ticket. But even though reason prescribes the 
rule. its necessitv does not depend on reason. The
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hypothetical imperative is bindinq only relative to the 
existence of a contingently occurring desire (my desire to 
avoid qettinq a ticket). It stops bindinq me as soon as I 
give up this end. Its necessity, in other words, is 
"dependent only on subjective conditions, and one cannot 
assume it in equal measure in all men" (CP:20). Because 
reason must qo beyond itself to external objects of desire 
in order to summon the binding force for its principle, the 
hypothetical imperative is not universally valid, and so, we 
are not self-sufficient when we act on It. Only universally 
valid principles exemplify a self-sufficiency of reason: in 
legislating universal law, "reason need presuppose only 
Itself" (CP: 20-1, my emphas 1 s ) . a *■
21This, I think, is the only way of explaining the sense in 
which acting on the moral law is the supreme instance of self­
activity through reason. Governing our passive inclinations 
throuqh reason can take place in a number of ways, through 
categorical or hypothetical imperatives. But it is onlv when we 
act on the cateaorleal imperative that we are governed pyxeJy by 
reason and so are supremely self-active. It is for this reason 
that I believe Paul Guyer's account of the self-activity of 
reason as the source of value in Kant's ethical philosophy 
(manuscript. Chapter 10, pp.471-4) needs supplementation. Guver 
emphasizes that self-activity is important for Kant, but only 
explains it in terms of free choice according to sojnae rational 
Drinciple. This fails to explain how choosing to act on a 
hypothetical imperative— or, for that matter, an evil maxim--is 
any le_ss active than choosing to act on the moral law. The 
former types of choices, after all, are both free and principle- 
guided (and so, are governed by reason). Hence, they would seem 
to manifest self-activity just as well as moral choices. It is 
onlv when we see that the moral law requires nothing e_l_se than 
reason that we can explain why it entails self-sufficiency and 
self-activity. A similar problem arises for Christine
Korsgaard's claim that it is humanity, construed as the power of 
rational choice, which is the source of value for Kant. On 
Korsgaard's view, amy rational choice is value-conferrlnq 
("Kant's Formula of Humanity," Kant_-§t_Udlen 79 ( 1983), pp.196-7).
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The moral interest thus emerqes via the following 
series .of rational insiqhts. Throuqh reflecting on the 
obligation that the moral law imposes on me, I discover that 
I am free in the negative sense of belnq able to choose 
contrary to mv inclinations. This leads to a discovery that 
I am also free in a positive sense: I am autonomous because 
I am able to legislate universal law (CP:33; G:431, 435). 
This freedom carries with it a self-sufficiency that Is 
captured by no principle other than the moral law. The 
recognition that I can exemplify this self-sufficiency only 
bv acting on the moral law is what motivates me to act on 
it.
"Freedom," however, is a notoriously slippery term.
The reader has probably noticed the following ambiguity 
creeplnq into my discussion: freedom, on the one hand, can 
be our caGL.ae.ity for legislating universal law (autonomy); on 
the other, it can be the state of actually resolving to act. 
on the moral law and for the sake of duty (the qood will). 
The question then arises, are we always free or are we free 
only when we resolve to act on the moral law? Since we are 
always able to legislate universal law--even when we fail to 
act on it--we are always free in the sense of being
But this falls to account for the connection Kant is trying to 
draw between respect and the moral law. If reason as such is the 
object of respect, then any principle-quided choice would be an 
object of respect. But that goes against Kant's point in step 
two of the Methodoloqy: that the moral disposition is the proper 
object of resoect. Kant clearly wants to avoid the conclusion 
that any reason-guided choice is as good as a moral choice.
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autonomous (see G:439, where Kant identifies autonomy with 
"the pjqsaiblfi legislation of universal law by means of the 
maxims of the will"). But we are not always free in the 
sense of havina a qood will. It is crucial, therefore, to 
establish which of these conceptions of freedom is the 
object of respect, for it Is only when we understand the 
object of respect that we get a proper sense of the attitude 
which respect embodies.
Before qettinq into the issue of freedom, I want to 
conclude my general discussion of the structure of respect 
by noting that it should be clear by now that Kant did not 
hold a formalist view of moral motivation, a view on which 
the avoidance of non-contradiction is the sole motivating 
force. The moral Interest does Indeed rely on formal 
considerations to the extent that it refers to the universal 
validity of laws. But it is generated only by going beyond 
considerations of universal validity to a deeper realization 
about human nature. We feel respect for the moral law when 
we reflect on what the formal demands of the moral law 
reveal about us--namely, that we ourselves, as the authors 
of universal law, are able fully to determine ourselves and 
are therefore free. It is freedom, then, and not the pain 
of contradiction, that is the proper object of respect.
In what sense is freedom the object of respect? Do we 
respect freedom as the capacity to legislate universal law 
or as the actual adherence to the moral law? Sometimes Kant
116
says that we respect our capacity for legislating universal
law. He calls this capacity our "personality" and says that
"the idea of personality awakens respect" (CP:87). That he
conceives of personality as a kind of freedom is clear from
the followlnq definition of personality:
It is...the freedom and independence from the mechanism 
of nature reqarded as a capacity of a beinq which is 
subject to special laws (pure practical laws given by 
its own reason), so that the person as belonglnq to the 
world of sense is subject to his own personality so far 
as he belongs to the intelligible world. (CP:87)
Freedom, in the sense of personality, is the capacity to
legislate universal laws, i.e., laws of pure practical
reason. If personality is the proper object of respect,
then the actual representation of the moral disposition is
not needed to awaken respect, since our reflection on the
mere capacity to legislate universal law--a capacity we all
have in virtue of our reason— is sufficient to awaken
respect. For other passages which confirm thi3 reading of
respect, see G:436, 439-440. These passages refer to
humanity rather than personality, but "humanity" is here
beinq used in the same sense as "personality." Thus, G:440:
"And the dignity of humanity consists just in its capacity
to legislate universal law, though with the condition of
humanity's being at the same time Itself subject to this
very same legislation." "Humanity" or "personality," in
short, signifies autonomy construed as our capacity to
legislate universal law. Since this is a property which
belongs to every rational being, every rational being is an
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object of respect, on this reading. The strenqth of this
reading is that it captures the spirit of Kant's doctrine of
humanity as an end in itself, on which every human being,
not lust those who are virtuous, is an end in Itself
(G:428). Even though we do not necessarily act on the moral
law, we are still capable of Leals la_tJjLg universal law, and
this makes us worthy of respect.aa
Other passaqes suqgest that Kant has a more exclusive
conception of the object of respect: that what we respect is
not something which automaticallv belonqs to us In virtue of
our reason, but rather, something we must eazn . These
passaqes suqqest that the proper object of respect Is the
qood will, the will which acts from a sense of duty (G:400-
1). Cons ider:
Our own will, insofar as it were to act only under the 
condition of its being able to legislate universal law 
by means of its maxims--this will, ideALly possible for 
us, is the proper object of respect. (G:440, mv 
emphas i s )
Here, the object of respect is not a property we all share 
in virtue of our reason (viz., autonomy), but rather, the 
will which intends to act only from the idea of dutv: the 
good will. To put it another wav, virtue is here the object 
of respect. That Kant conceives of virtue as a form of 
freedom, and that this type of freedom is the proper object
*sFor an llluminatlnq discussion of the meaning of human 
diqnity centerinq on the problem I have been considering and 
issuing in the reading of humanity as an end in itself that I 
just put forth, see Hardy Jones, KanJtAs. Princ iple ojE Personality 
(Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1971), pp.127-135.
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of respect, is also suggested by the following passage: "The 
law of -duty, through the positive worth which obedience to 
it makes us feel, finds easier access through the respect 
for ourselves in the consciousness of our freedom" <CP:161). 
Also: "the pure thought of virtue...is the strongest 
incentive to the good" (CP:152; also 156). These passaqes 
sugqest that the object of respect is not autonomy, but 
vi rtue.
The strenqth of the latter view of respect is that it 
makes virtue se1f-motivatlnq: we need not seek a source of 
value outside of morality, since it is morality itself which 
motivates us. This, of course, can also be seen as a source 
of weakness, for how can morality motivate those who are not 
already disposed toward it? Kant, however, thinks all of us 
are disposed toward morality. He thinks that insofar as the 
moral law confronts us at a.1.1 (and it does confront every 
rational beinq), we have a motive to act on it. He refers 
to this disposition as the "predisposition to personality" 
(R:21-3), and defines it as "the capacity for respect for 
the moral law as La itself a. sufficient lacjejLtlvs. of. the. 
wl11H (R:22-3). Kant is not naively claiming that we desire 
by nature to be virtuous. He is only maklnq room for the 
motive to moralltv, all the while leavinq open the 
possibility of Immoral choice: we are always able to choose 
against morality because we have free will or "Willkur."
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which, then, is the proper object of respect: autonomy
or morality? Is it possible to reconcile the reading of
respect on which virtue is "the strongest incentive to the
good" with the reading on which autonomy is the object of
resoect? Kant thinks so. He makes virtue the primary
object of respect, but makes humanity derivatively an object
of respect because it is the necessary condition of virtue.
Without autonomy, a qood will could not exist because a good
will must act out of respect for a self-made law. Since a
qood will is the only thinq in the world that is good
without qualification (G:393), autonomy, as the necessary
precondition of the qood will, is also an end in itself.
This, at anv rate, is Kant's reasonlnq at G:437-440, where
he seeks to connect the concept of humanity (autonomy) as an
end in itself with the concept of the qood will. He speaks
of the need to find something which is an end in itself, and
derives it by reference to the idea of "a possible
absolutely qood will":
Now this end can be nothing but the subject of all 
possible ends themselves, because the. subject is at the 
same time the subject o_f a possible ab_so.lut.ely good 
will: for such a will cannot without contradiction be 
subordinated to any other object (G:437, emphasis 
mine).
"The subject of all possible ends themselves," or the 
rational subject, is an end in Itself because it alone can 
be the subject of a qood will. That the rational subject is 
an end in itself because it Is able to leqislate universal 
law rather than because it is able to leqislate rational
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principles jn general becomes clear in the following
passage:
Now there follows incontestably from this that every 
rational being as an end in himself must be able to 
reqard himself with reference to all laws to which he 
may be subject as being at the same time the legislator 
of universal law, for just this very fitness of his 
maxims for the legislation o_f universal Law 
distinguishes him as an end in himself. (G:438, 
emphasis mine)
Humanity, or rational nature, is an end in itself because it
is able to legislate universal law. But why should the
legislation of universal law be important? For no other
reason than that it is a necessary prereouisite for the
existence of a good will. The qood will is the proper
object of respect, but humanity is derivatively an object of
respect because it is indispensable for the existence of a
qood will. That it is the good will rather than humanity
that is the primarv object of respect becomes clear in the
following passage, which we have already quoted:
Our own will, insofar as it were to act only under the 
condition of its belnq able to legislate universal law 
by means of its maxims--this will, ideally possible for 
us, is the proper object of respect. (G:440, emphasis 
mine)
Even though the good will is the proper object of respect,
humanity, as rational nature capable of legislating
universal law, is an object of respect (has "dignity")
because it has the potentlal for producing a good will:
Now morality is the condition under which alone a 
rational being can be an end in himself, for only 
thereby can he be a legislating member in the kingdom 
of ends. Hence morality and humanity, Insofar as it is
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capable of morality, alone have dLqnltv. (G-.435-6 ; see 
also C P :87)
Humanity, then, has dlqnitv Insofar as it is capable of 
morallty. It is only because it has the capacity for 
realizing a good will that humanity, or rational nature, is 
an object of respect.
It should be noted that on this arqument, any aspect of 
rational nature that is necessary for the existence of the 
qood wlll--for example, our animal belnq--is thereby an 
object of respect. This mlqht seem objectionable, since it 
appears to water down the notion of respect. Could It 
really be that our animal being deserves respect? Kant 
suqqests a positive answer to this question when, in his 
cataloque of perfect duties to oneself in The Doctrlne q £ 
Virtue, he Includes not only the duty to preserve the mental 
capacities required for the realization of a qood will, but 
also the dutv to preserve the physical substratum required 
for the existence of a qood will. This suggests that our 
animal nature, as part of the rational nature required for 
the existence of a good will, is an end in itself. The 
Inference does appear drastic, but as long as one keeps in 
mind that something is an end in Itself only because it is 
Indispensable to a good will, and not because of some other 
value it may have, the conclusion makes sense. The idea of 
a good will confers value on the necessary conditions of a 
good will.
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We have seen that the idea of virtue, or equivalently, 
the idea of a good will, is the proper object of respect.
In the next section, I will consider how this idea gives 
rise to the feeling of respect, and what thl3 process 
discloses about respect as an attitude and as a moral 
motive.
Paxt IV; Thje genesis and nature of resnect
in considering the process by which the idea of a good
will awakens respect in us. It is important to note from the 
outset that the mere idea of virtue suffices to engender the 
feeling of respect. we do not need to experience an actual 
instance of virtue--whether in ourselves or in others--in 
order to feel respect. All we need to do is to hold before 
the mind's eye the idea or image of vlrtue--to imaqine, in 
other words, a person who resolves to act for the sake of
duty. Since this is a somewhat controversial claim, I will
offer some justification for it.
If we had to experience virtue in ourselves in order to 
feel respect, it would be hard to see how the process of 
moral education could qet off the ground. For we would then 
have to be virtuous before we could cultivate the moral 
motive, and that would defeat the purpose of moral 
education. Granted, moral education could qet off the
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ground if we had to observe virtue in others (as "moral 
paragons"). But there is a separate reason to be skeptical 
about the possibility of experiencing actual cases of 
virtue, whether in ourselves or in others, and that is the 
inscrutabilltv of motives. Kant thinks we can never be sure 
that what appears to be a virtuous action was not in fact 
done from self-love. Since "we can never... completely plumb 
the depths of the secret incentives of our actions," "there 
is absolutely no possibility by means of experience to make 
out with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim 
of an action...has rested solely on moral grounds" (G:407). 
We can never point to an actual Instance of virtue. If we 
had to experience an actual case of virtue before we could 
feel respect, we could never feel respect, since there is no 
certifiable instance of virtue.
However, there are passaqes which suggest that we can 
actually know when we have acted morally and that we need to 
experience the moral disposition within us in order to feel 
respect. Thus: "the law of duty, through the positive worth 
which obedience to It makes us feel, finds easier access 
through respect for ourselves in the consciousness of our 
freedom" (CP:161). Kant goes on to suqqest that the 
awareness of one's actual moral worth (or what he here calls 
our "freedom") is "the best. Indeed the only, guard that can 
keep Ignoble and corrupting influences from burstinq in upon 
the mind" (CP:161). These passages suggest that in order to
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cultivate the moral motive, we need actually to have adopted 
duty as our Incentive--!.e ., have made a pure moral 
resolution--and that merely lmaq_lni.n_g. the moral disposition 
is not sufficient to enqender respect in us. (Note that 
this would confirm the view I arqued against in Part i--the 
view which claims that respect is the effect of moral 
wi11i nq. )
The passaqes, however, can be read another wav.
Indeed, I want to suqqest, there is only one coherent way of 
readinq them, qiven Kant's thesis of the Inscrutability of 
motives, and that is to read "the positive worth which 
obedience to [the law of duty] makes us feel" as the worth 
we feel when we imagine ourselves to be actlnq for the sake 
of duty, whether or not we actually do. We cannot know, for 
any qiven action, whether we had the moral disposition, 
i.e., adhered to the law for the sake of duty. We can, 
however, know whether our action had leqality, i.e., did not 
violate the moral law. The "positive worth" we feel in 
obeyinq the law thus refers to the neqative awareness of not 
having violated the law, and leaves open the question of 
whether the moral disposition was actually present. A 
consciousness of the legality of our action, thouqh by no 
means a sufficient condition for having moral worth, lets us 
know, at least, that we have not violated the moral law, it 
is the consciousness of leqality, then, that Kant describes 
as "the consciousness that [a person! has honored and
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preserved humanitv in his own person and in its diqnitv, so 
that he does not have to shame himself in his own eyes" 
(CP:88). So the consciousness of a "positive worth" should 
not be taken as the consciousness of moralitv--of having 
acted for the sake of duty--but only as the consciousness 
that one has not done anythinq contrary to duty, whatever 
one's motive.
Notice, however, that even thouqh we can never tell 
whether respect was our actual motive in a given action, we 
can still feel respect and strengthen it so as to make it 
easier to act from respect. And we can do this without 
thinkinq of actual acts we or others have undertaken. Since 
the process of strengthening respect mimics the qenesis of 
respect, we can learn somethinq about the nature of respect 
by considering its cultivation. The moral motive is brought 
to mind "through examples" (CP:160), where this involves 
imagining cases of virtuous acts and coming to LdeiLtity with 
the disposition of the imagined agents. It is this process 
of identification which "teaches a man to feel his own 
worth" (CP:152). What does "his own worth" involve? It 
refers not to the pupil's actual virtue but to his capacity 
for virtue: the moral disposition is presented as an idea 
which the pupil comes to value and so wants to realize. in 
thinking of the moral disposition, in short, the pupil 
envisions "the qreatness of soul to which he sees himself 
called" (CP:152). we see again that it Is the thought of
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virtue, and not actual instances of virtue, which is the 
object .of respect.
What type of attitude does respect embody? Is it a 
Droress of "qlorylnq" in our capacity for virtue, or is it 
somethlnq sliahtlv more sober? In the third Critique, Kant 
defines respect as follows: "The feellnq of our ioc.apacity 
to attain to an idea that is a law for us, is RESPECT" 
(CJ:257, emphasis mine). The awareness of an incapacity 
does not seem much of a cause for celebration. Neither does 
it seem to carry the motivating force that respect, as an 
incentive, must have. How can such a neqative feeling serve 
as an incentive to morality?
To approach an answer, and to see what incapacity Kant 
has in mind, we need to realize that the very Idea of virtue 
contains a negative element: virtue is the "moral 
disposition I.q confllet. and not holiness in the supposed 
possession of perfect purity of the intentions of the will" 
(CP:84, emphasis mine; see also 32-3, 80-1, 83). This 
element of conflict is crucial. Without it, the disposition 
in question would be not virtue but moral fanaticism--the 
attitude of those who think that virtue comes naturally to 
them and "flatter themselves with a spontaneous qoodness of 
heart" (CP:84-5). such an attitude Is always inherently 
false because It ignores the fact that we are finite 
rational creatures, creatures who have sensuous desires in
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addition to reason and so do not by nature act on the moral 
1 a w :
If a rational creature could ever attain the staqe of 
thoroughly likinq to do all moral laws, it would mean 
that there was no possibility of there beinq in him a 
desire which could tempt him to deviate from them, for 
overcoming such a desire always costs the subject some 
sacrifice and requires self-compulsion, i.e., an inner 
constraint to do what one does not quite like to do.
To such a level of moral disposition no creature can 
ever attain. For since he is a creature, and 
consequently is always dependent with respect to what 
he needs for complete satisfaction with his condition, 
he can never be wholly free from desires and 
inclinations which, because they rest on physical 
causes, do not of themselves aqree with the moral law, 
which has an entirely different source. (CP:83-4)
Because we are finite rational creatures, moral requirements
strike us as constraints, not as precepts which we qladly
follow. To deny this is to deceive ourselves about our
cond i t ion:
For men and all rational creatures, the moral necessity 
is a constraint, an obllqation. Every action based on 
it is to be considered as duty, and not as a manner of 
acting which we naturally favor or which we sometimes 
might favor. This would be tantamount to believing we 
could finally brinq it about that, without resoect for 
the law (which is always connected with fear or at 
least apprehension that we might transgress it) we, 
like the independent deity, might come into possession 
of holiness of will through irrefragable agreement of 
the will with the pure moral law becoming, as it were, 
our very nature. (CP:81)
To think we can come to act morally by nature is to think we
are God. This i3 the height of self-deception, since it
denies that we have natural desires. To act from respect
for the moral law, by contrast, is to recognize that it will
alwave- be a str.uq.qle for us inclination-bound creatures to
meet the demands of the moral law. When Kant defines
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respect as "the feellnq of our incapacity to attain to an 
idea that is a law for us," he is calllnq attention to just 
this sense of resistance. Far from beinq a super-rational 
denial of physicalitv, virtue is actually an acknowledgement 
of our physical nature. To act virtuously is to be true to 
our nature as finite rational beings.
To acknowledge the resistance we inevitably feel when 
confronted with the moral law is to accept suffering as our
station in life. For the moral law Imposes on us a
requirement that we do not like to comply with, but 
complying with it is nevertheless imperative. Now, recall 
that Kant thinks the idea of virtue is "the strongest 
incentive to the good" (CP:152). But we have just learned 
that virtue Involves suffering. Can the idea of suffering 
really become an incentive? Kant thinks so: he says that 
"morality must have more power over the human heart the more 
purely it is presented," and that "it is in suffering" that 
morality is most purely presented (CP:156, emphasis mine). 
The idea of sufferinq, then, is the stronqest incentive to 
virtue! How is this possible?
Kant's own explanation is of no qreat help. He has
just described the plight of an honest man who, in the face 
of threats to his well-beinq and even to his life, refuses 
to give false testimony aqainst Anne Boleyn. "All the 
admiration and even the endeavor to be like this character, 
he says, "rest here solely on the purity of the moral
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principle, which can be clearlv shown onlv bv removinq from 
the incentive of the action evervthlnq which men might count 
as a part of happiness" (CP:156). The incentive to moralitv 
is isolated by contrasting it with empirical lncentives-- 
throuah imagining a situation like the one above, in which 
the agent refuses to act on empirical Incentives. But a 
process of elimination discloses nothing about the nature of 
the moral incentive itself.
Kant's emphatic denial that satisfaction of anv sort-- 
whether it be sensuous or rational--ls an Incentive to 
morality (CP:116) as well as his conception of the moral law 
as a cateqorlcal imperative should make us wary of any 
deslre-fulf 1 llment view of moral motivation. Respsct l_s not 
a desire. Nevertheless, it is supposed to be able to 
motivate us. How can a feellnq motivate without beinq a 
desire? One way is to think of respect as slqnifvinq 
something about Q.yr nature: as expressing what we are rather 
than pointinq to something we want to be. Of course, this 
miqht seem to presuppose that we are satisfied with what we 
are, and so, would seem to presuppose that we desLre to be 
that wav. If so, respect, though not itself a desire, would 
reflect or confirm a desire, and so would seem to return us 
to a deslre-fulf1llment view of moral motivation. But we do 
not need to think of ourselves as havinq any particular 
attitude toward our nature. After all, it is just given to 
us: it is our essence, neither good nor bad. If we can
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connect respect for the moral law to our essence as finite 
rational creatures, we might then be able to conceive of 
respect as the only truthful attitude. As an attitude, 
respect could be distinguished from a desire, but it would 
still be capable of motivating us in the sense of confirnlng 
our complete essence.
Of course, any act could be seen as confirming what we 
are in the sense of beinq undertaken by its.. However, not 
all actions confirm our complete essence. Actlnq for the 
sake of mv own happiness, for Instance, confirms my animal 
identity as well as mv capacity for prudential reasoning.
But it neglects my capacity to act on the moral law, for it 
violates its character as an unconditional principle bv 
subordinating it to the condition of my own happiness (see 
R:31-2). Were I to subordinate my own happiness to the 
requirements of the moral law, by contrast, I would be 
confirming both my capacity for prudential reasoning and mv 
capacity for moral reasoning, for I would then seek to 
satisfy my inclinations only on the condition that the moral 
law allowed it. I would then be preserving "the original 
moral order among the incentives" (R:45-6; see also 44)--an 
ordering which incorporates the spectrum of possible 
Incentives, subordinating some to others in such a wav that 
the essence of each is preserved (for an account of these
131
incentives, see R:21-3), Only actions which heed the moral 
law preserve this order and express our full essence.23
The moral law is the suoreme law of our belnq--a law 
which does not exclude lower principles but qives them rein 
onlv on the condition that it is itself fulfilled. This 
limiting aspect of the moral law is reflected in the 
negative, painful side of respect. This side of respect has 
two aspects: the moral law "checks selfishness" and "strikes
down self-conceit" (CP:73). It checks selfishness by 
restricting the satisfaction of our desires to the condition 
of agreeing with the moral law. But It strikes down self- 
conceit. Self-conceit Is self-love "when it makes itself 
legislative and an unconditional practical principle"
(CP:74), and so might be expressed by the principle, "make 
the satisfaction of your desires your hlqhest end."2** It 
is struck down when the moral law shows itself to be the 
only objective and universally valid practical orinclple--
22For an early version of this type of argument, see Sermon 
II of Joseph Butler Sermons. reprinted in J. Schneewind, Moral 
Philosophy fxoin Mo.ntai.gne to Kant_: An Anthology. Volume II 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990), esp. pp.533-4. Butler is trying 
to show that those who are moral are "a law unto themselves" 
(Rom:2:14) in the sense that they follow their proper nature, 
where man's "proper nature" is characterized by an ordering of 
principles, with the passions at the bottom, "cool self-love" in 
the middle, and the moral conscience at the top. Failing to act 
according to one's conscience is to act "disporoportlonately to 
one's nature" in the sense that one subordinates to other 
orinciples the principle which is In fact superior.
2-*ln fhis formulation of the principle of self-conceit, I am 
following Henry Allison in K.ant.'X Theory of. Freedom, o.T24. For 
a definition of self-love as the principle of one's own 
happiness, fee CP:22.
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that is, the only qenuine law (CP:20-1). In both of these 
cases, our pathologically determined self tries to make its 
pretensions acceptable "as first and oriqinal claims, just 
as If it were our entire self" (CP:74, emphasis mine). The 
moral law strikes down these pretensions by reminding ih 
that they do not express our entire self. Again, we see 
that Kant conceives of the moral law as the most complete 
expression of our self. In reflecting on the idea of 
virtue, we realize that suffering is the inevitable uoshot 
of the way the moral law expresses Itself in the natural 
order of incentives. Sufferlnq, then, becomes part of the 
expression of our complete nature.
Morality is freedom in the sense of seJ-knowLedge. It 
has more to do with enlightenment than with liberating us 
from the fetters of nature. Morality frees us from 
dominance bv natural inclinations only to the extent that it 
confirms our capacity to r^sXst them; but that capacity, 
attributable to our ever-present freedom of choice, is 
confirmed by any choice. Still, we can never completely rid 
ourselves from our dependence on nature; neither should we 
try, for to think we can is to delude ourselves about our 
identity. Morality, at its core, is the acceptance of our 
essence as finite rational creatures, and so, is identical 
with self-knowledge. The dictum of the critical project-- 
Know your 1imits!--thus reverberates throuqh Kant's ethical 
corpus.
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Chapter 2_l
F e e l i n g s  A s s o c i a t e d  Wittl our Duties Toward Ourselves
In Kant's moral scheme, each of us has an unconditional 
value which can never diminish regardless of the morality or 
immorality of our actions. We have this value in virtue of 
our humanity, our identity as legislators of the moral law. 
Because every human being has an unconditional worth, 
morality imposes certain duties on us directing us to treat 
ourselves and others as ends-in-themselves--duties, that is, 
prohibiting others from treating us as means to their ends 
and prohibiting us from making ourselves a means to the ends 
of ourselves or others.1 Fulfilling these duties gives us 
moral worth and/or moral perfection (thereby making us 
worthy of happiness) (CPrR:61-62, 110-11).* While our 
moral perfection depends on our moral choices, the value of 
our humanity is independent of circumstance and of choice: 
it exists an end-in-itself.3
1In Chapter 5, I will consider the relation of the Formula 
of the End-In-Itself to our duties of love toward others, that 
is, as a basis for deriving a duty to not only avoid interfering 
with but also to promote the ends of others.
*While our moral worth increases only be acting from the 
motive of duty, our moral perfection can be augmented even when 
we fulfill our duties in a merely legal way.
3Kant's various claims about humanity (or rational nature) 
and why it exists as an end-in-itself have been the source of 
much speculation. At G:428-9, and 435-6, Kant suggests that 
human beings are ends-in-themselves because they are legislators 
of the moral law and are hence able to form universalizable 
maxims in response to the concept of duty. At G:437-440, he
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Humanity has this absolute value because it exists as 
the necessary condition of possibility of a good will, the 
only unconditionally valuable thing in the world. A good 
will is good unconditionally because unlike gifts of nature 
and of fortune (e.g., health and wealth) which, though they 
have a certain value in themselves, are only morally good 
under certain qualifications (wealth, for instance, is good 
only if put to a good use), a good will is good without 
qualification (G: 437; 393-94 ).'* The fact that the locus of
connects this conception of humanity with the absolute value of a 
good will, suggesting that human beings are ends-in-themselves 
because they are the potential vessels of a good will, the only 
absolutely valuable thing in the world (see G:393). At DV:387 
and 392, however, Kant thinks of humanity more generally as the 
capacity to set and to pursue ends, whether moral or not. 
Although these definitions are not strictly incompatible--in 
order to act virtuously one must, after all, not only legislate 
moral law but also be able to set and pursue ends--many 
commentators still see it as necessary to come down on one side
of the issue. Those who see humanity as the general capacity to
set and pursue ends are the majority and include Thomas Hill, Jr. 
in "Humanity as an End in Itself," Dionitv and Practical Reason 
in Kant's Moral Theory. 38-57 (see especially 38-41 or a helpful 
discussion of whether humanity refers to rational nature or more 
specifically to human nature), Christine Korsgaard in "Kant's 
Formula of Humanity," and Onora O'Neill in "Between Consenting 
Adults," Constructions of Reason. 105-25, (esp. 114-15). For a 
critical account which interprets humanity as the capacity for 
distinctively moral action, see Pepita Haezrahi, "The Concept of 
Man as an End-in-HimseIf," in Kant; A Collection of Cr itical
Essavs. 291-313. Since Kant argues for the unconditional value
of a good will in terms of its being good without Qualification 
(G:393-4), I place myself in the latter camp, since the 
structural analogy between the absolute value of a good will and 
that of humanity must be preserved and the capacity to set and 
realize ends, though good, is not good without qualification, 
since we can set and realize evil ends.
*That Kant makes the good will an unconditional value and 
humanity the mere cond it ion of poss ibi1ity of a good will should 
not be taken imply that the unconditional value of the good will 
cannot "transfer" itself to humanity. Humanity is a necessary
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humanity is the individual gives each of us, qua individual, 
a dignity which utilitarians, who use a merely contingent 
(though still intrinsic) source of value (viz. pleasure) 
have a hard time defining.
As bearers of humanity we possess dianitv (DV:462). In 
this chapter, I consider the emotional implications of this 
Kantian starting point. I show that by cultivating certain 
self-regarding emotions— in particular, those which reflect 
a dlqni fied attitude towards ourselves (e.g., pride)--we 
create good character and become better prepared to carry 
out our duties toward ourselves.
My prime concern is show that cultivating one's 
feelings--both natural and moral— in accordance with the 
idea of one's dignity not only strengthens and refines the 
feelings themselves but also helps establish good character 
in the moral sense. Among our character traits are our 
long-standing dispositions to feeling, and we shape good 
moral character partly by refining and cultivating our 
sensuous character. To this end, I will first show that 
knowing one's sensible character is a moral requirement, for 
Kant. Knowing one's own dispositions to feel certain ways 
in certain circumstances and how these dispositions figure
condition of possibility of a good will, and the condition of 
possibility for the realization of something absolutely valuable 
is, qua such a condition of possibility, also absolutely 
valuable. Kant's move should also not be taken to imply that the 
value of the good will is somehow less than, because "contingent" 
upon, that of humanity, since he derives the value of humanity 
from that of the good will rather than vice versa.
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in one's character (the way one expresses them in word, 
thought and deed) is a necessary precondition for moral 
improvement--that is, for virtue as strength of will.
The main "dignity-feelings" I plan here to discuss are 
courage, pride, and love of honor. Each of these feelings 
is bound up with a sense of dignity and is thus a means for 
cultivating other emotions in accordance with the idea of 
our dignity, thereby bringing them in line with reason. Two 
other morally significant feelings bound up with the demand 
to live up to our dignity are the pleasure and pain we feel 
when our conscience judges our actions or intentions good or 
bad, respectively. But before considering what it is to 
cultivate one's emotions in accordance with the idea of 
dignity, we need to consider just whv dignity should be a 
leading idea in our lives.
L. The Siqniiicancs slL Dignity
Why is it so important to live a dignified life? Why 
isn't it just as valuable to live a wild and natural life, 
free of the stiffness conveyed by the word "dignity"? The 
obvious but unpenetrating Kantian answer is that insofar as 
we have chosen to be moral at all, we have also chosen to 
value dignity, since heeding the dignity of our humanity is 
just what we are doing when we live up to the requirements
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of the moral law (DV:420). To ask why dignity is important 
is in this sense to ask "Why be moral?"--a question which 
Kant, being the sophisticated moral philosopher he was, 
never took seriously.
But we can also give a deeper Kantian answer to why 
dignity should be a leading idea in our lives. Although it 
is possible to have good character and still live a wild and 
natural life, living such a life without a sense of dignity 
will most likely produce a weak and compromising character. 
For without a sense of dignity, one is incapable of standing 
for anything--whether it be the truth, one's real needs, or 
one's commitments. And what is good character if it does 
not involve the ability to stand for something? We should 
therefore heed our dignity for the sake of shaping good 
character. Kant's own use of "dignity" is of course
linked up with aora1 concerns: he is not immediately 
interested in whether our sense of dignity can also further 
character in a more individualized sense (and we might have 
to look to Nietzsche for such an argument); but in Part V, I 
will give two character sketches which I hope will at least 
show that the universal commands of morality need not force 
our individual personalities into a cookie-cutter 
conformism, since the moral law actually dictates that we 
use our individual character traits--including dispositions 
to feeling which are distinctive of us--to strengthen 
morality within us.
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What, then, is a sense of dignity? To have sense of 
dignity, .according to Kant, is have a sense of one’s 
absolute vorth--a worth which stems from the fact that one 
not only faces but also places oneself under moral 
obligations. All practically rational beings, as 
legislators of the moral law, possess this worth. Some will 
certainly find this an extremely narrow definition of human 
dignity. But whether or not we agree with Kant on his 
definition the object of dignity (i.e., the capacity in 
virtue of which we possess dignity), we can agree that a 
sense of dignity is central to cultivating character in the 
moral sense, since steadfastness and resolution are 
dignified traits which are essential to the moral 
individual. In order to live up to one's dignity and 
absolute worth--an endeavor which often involves great 
personal sacrifice— one needs both pride and courage: pride 
in one's unconditional worth and the courage and 
perseverance to live up to it (L E :126-129). Pride and 
courage are in this sense necessary attributes of a morally 
steadfast character, a character disposed to virtue.
That Kant took a sense of dignity to be essential to 
the cultivation of good moral character is implicit in his 
aversion toward any form of dishonestv. Kant's close 
linkage between the notions of honesty, dignity, and good 
character is especially clear in the following passage from 
the Anthropology:
139
In short, the sole proof a man's consciousness affords 
him .that he has good character is his having made it 
his supreme maxim to be truthful, both in his 
admissions to himself and in his conduct toward every 
other man. And since having character is both the 
minimum that can be required of a reasonable man and 
the maximum of inner worth (of human dignity), to be a 
man of principles (to have a determinate character) 
must be possible for the most ordinary human reason and 
yet, according to its dignity, surpass the greatest 
talent (A:159).
Kant thus sees honesty as a precondition for preserving 
one's dignity and so, for shaping good character. Moreover, 
Kant's classification of honesty not as a duty toward others 
but as a duty toward ourselves (DV:429; LE:118) suggests 
that dishonesty injures the very core of our being.® In
*In the Lectures on Ethics. Kant also classifies 
truthfulness in social intercourse as a duty toward others 
(LE:224) primarily because the free exchange of sentiments is a 
condition of society and of the enjoyment of conversation. In 
the Doctrine of Virtue. however, it is clear that he thinks 
dishonesty does something much more insidious than that: it not 
only undermines the listener's capacity to take pleasure in the 
conversation honesty but annihilates the speaker's dignity. That 
is why lying is always a duty toward ourselves in the Doctrine of 
Virtue. My claim that honesty is important primarily for the 
purpose of shaping a strong character supports both Kant's narrow 
classification of it as a duty toward ourselves and his broader 
(and earlier) conception of honesty also as a stance we need to 
hold because of the social value of communicating our sentiments 
in word, expression and gesture. Such interaction, I shall show 
in Chapter 4, is the foremost "training ground" for shaping a 
virtuous disposition. To shape strong moral character, we need 
to be honest toward ourselves regarding our faults and 
limitations, including wicked propensities in our passions; and
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lying, man may surely do harm to others; but worse, he 
"throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a 
man" (DV:429). Kant thus sees honesty as a precondition for 
preserving our own dignity. In lying, we show a weak and 
cowardly character: we hide behind lies, not daring to 
reveal or even acknowledge who we really are. Cowardice 
makes us lose our self-respect; and the person who has no 
self-respect cannot have good moral character, since self- 
respect is the very foundation of moral self-awareness. 
Truthfulness toward oneself and others is thus a 
precondition for having good character in the moral sense.
A more detailed explanation of why honesty--and in the 
case of our duties toward ourselves, especially honesty 
toward oneself--is crucial to having good character can be 
found in the following passage, where Kant gives his 
exposition of the three vices opposed to man's duty toward 
himself only as a moral being:
The vices contrary to this duty are Ivina, avarice. and 
false humi1itv (servility). These adopt principles 
that are directly contrary to man's character as a 
moral being (in terms of its very form), that is, to 
inner freedom, the innate dignity of man, which is
since much of our knowledge about our own sentiments comes from 
what we experience in communication with others--whether as 
actor, demonstrator, friend, disputer or converser--dishonesty 
(hiding ourselves) in conversation robs us of a valuable 
opportunity for learning about our own beliefs and emotional 
tendencies, both good and bad.
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tantamount to saying that they make it one’s basic 
principle to have no basic principle and hence no 
character.* that is, to throw oneself away and make 
oneself and object of contempt. The virtue that is 
opposed to all these vices could be called love of 
frpnor (hanes-fcag Interna, iuaturo s_ui aestimium), a cast 
of mind far removed from ambition (ambitio) (which can 
be quite mean). But it will appear prominently later 
on, under this name (DV:420).'7 
The three vices which Kant names--lying, avarice, and false 
humi1ity--are all forms of deception which make it 
impossible to have good character: "they make it one's basic 
principle to have no basic principle and hence 02. character. 
that is, to throw oneself away and make oneself an object of 
contempt." Here, truthfulness becomes the main prerequisite 
for good moral character— for heeding one's sense of 
dionitv. Before going on to explore the full implications 
of the centrality of truthfulness toward oneself in Kant's 
moral philosophy, I shall briefly explain why two of the
•My emphasis.
7Kant does not discuss love of honor "later on" in the
Doctrine of Virtue. Ambition does receives short treatment in
connection with his discussion of servility, but love of honor 
remains unmentioned. This leads me to believe that "it" in the
last sentence refers not to ambition but to love of honor.
Fortunately, there is a long and interesting discussion of love 
of honor in the Lectures on Ethics. which I will have occasion to 
discuss in Section III.
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aforementioned forms of dishonesty--lying and false 
humi1ity--work directly against morally good character.
Lying to oneself or to others is an inability to stand 
for the truth. It is the basest form of deception, 
revealing a cowardice and an inability to stand for one's 
qualities and deeds which makes the liar lose his self- 
respect--"He makes himself contemptible in his own eyes and 
violates the dignity of humanity in his own person"
(DV:429)--and others lose their respect for him. The liar 
usually lies because he is afraid of the consequences of 
telling the truth. In ordinary cases, the expected 
consequences include a harsh judgment from others--a 
judgment which he expects to be well-founded and against 
which he takes himself to have no defense." But in 
expecting a harsh and justified judgment from others, the 
liar reveals a low opinion of himself. If he thought highly 
of himself, he would expect others to think likewise; he 
would not feel the need to lie. In his fearfulness of the 
opinions of others, the liar betrays his sense that he has 
less worth than they. Kant stresses the power of the 
world's judgment in correcting our own opinions: "our
•Kant himself never explains why we have a propensity to 
lie. He simply says we do: "it already belongs to the basic 
composition of a human creature and to the concept of his species 
to explore the thoughts of others but to withhold one's own— a 
nice quality that does not fail to progress gradually from 
dissimulat ion to deception and finally to lying" (A:192). In 
what follows, I try to describe the motivation for lying in terms 
of the weaknesses of character which often lead up to it.
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cognitions must stand the test of universal reason....Others 
may err as well, but it is unlikely that they would fall 
into exactly the same trap as ourselves" (LE.-190). But this 
corrective force of other people's judgment is cancelled if 
one misleads them from the outset and presumes a negative 
judgment of oneself. To do so is directly contrary to 
dignity, which gives every person an unconditional source of 
value. It is this psychological pattern of underestimating 
one's worth which characterizes the liar.
The person who has an unduly high opinion of herself 
can of course also rob herself of the corrective of others' 
opinions, but she does so not through external lies but 
through ignoring the judgment of others when they do not 
harmonize with her high opinion of herself. Such a person 
is guilty of arrogance (LE:237-8), which is a form of 
internal lying when others are judging fairly. At bottom, 
however, the arrogant person shows the same lack of self- 
respect and of self-esteem as the "ordinary" liar of the 
previous paragraph: both use others as means because they 
would find it easy to be used as means. As Kant puts it,
"an arrogant man is always mean in the depths of his soul. 
For he would not demand that others think little of 
themselves in comparison with him unless he knew that, were 
his fortune suddenly to change, he himself would not find it 
hard to grovel and to waive any claim to respect from 
others" (DV-.466).
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A person can of course also have a high opinion of 
herself which is well-founded, e.g., when most people do not 
understand her and therefore judge her unfairly. Such a 
person is not lying to herself when she ignores the opinions 
of others; she simply displays the "noble pride" which is 
the mark of good character (LE:126). Indeed, paying heed to 
such malicious judgments "is already a sign of weakness," 
unbefitting to the upright character (A:159); and that is 
why Kant holds that "a tyranny of popular mores would be 
contrary to man's duty to himself" (DV:464).
Having made these qualifications, we can safely make 
the following generalization: lying is usually motivated by 
an inadequate sense of one's own worth with respect to 
others' opinion of oneself— a weakness of character. And 
most insidiously, lying not only betrays a weakness, but 
also makes one weaker, for in erecting barriers of falsehood 
between oneself and the world, one eliminates a great source 
of strength, namely the bonds of communication and 
unconcealed affection which can exist between oneself and 
other human beings (see Chapter 5). Since strength is 
directly conducive to good character--virtue is, after all, 
strength of will, which can be facilitated by cultivating a 
willinaness to do one's duty--and lying not only signals 
lack of strength (in the form of lack of self-respect), but 
also deprives one of the strength one derives from open 
social ties, lying works directly against good character.
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False humility, finally, or servility toward other 
human beings, is perhaps the clearest example of failing to 
heed one's dignity. It involves deceiving oneself about 
one's identity as a practically rational being. Since this 
identity makes one as valuable as any other human being-- 
absolutely valuable-one has no reason to be servile towards 
others (DV:435-6). Indeed, measuring our worth by comparing 
ourselves with others instead of with the moral law is 
outright harmful because there will always be individuals 
whom we admire, and concluding that we are less worthy than 
they are ''makes us hate them and produces envy and jealousy" 
(LE:137), emotions which damage our dignity. Treating 
others in a servile way is equally harmful: it reveals 
cowardice and bad character because it involves taking the 
easy way out, choosing courses of action which appeal to 
others through flattery or aggrandizement of them rather 
than through making them, through their own accord, respect 
us. The aspiring actress who "sleeps" her way up through 
the Hollywood hierarchy to acquire acting jobs is an example 
of the servile character: she gains the favor of others not 
by proving that she has the talent and force of personality 
needed for good acting but by pleasing them in ways which 
demean her person. The servile person presumes that she has 
less worth than others, and so fails to heed her own innate 
dignity, outmatched by no other human being but only by the 
moral law (DV:436).
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Avoiding the vices of lying and servility-- each a form 
of d is. hoaesty--is then at least the first step towards 
cultivating a good character. I will now go on to show that 
Kant's requirement of honesty reaches deeper than merely 
asking us to refrain from lying, avarice and false humility. 
It also extends to knowing our particular sensuous character 
and searching our hearts for our true motives, and here 
conscience plays a key role. But before discussing 
conscience and the status of Kant's honesty-requirement-- 
which, at bottom, amounts to a requirement for self- 
knowledge-- in light of his thesis of the inscrutability of 
our motives and in light of the possibility of self- 
deception, I will consider how Kant can hold that morality 
requires us to know and to change our particular sensuous 
characters when he also suggests that our mora1 character is 
all we can really change.
Section 1 1 T h e  Moral Significance si. Individual Character
In the Anthropology. Kant distinguishes between having 
a certain type of character and having moral character 
simpliciter: "on the one hand we say that a certain man has 
this or that (physical) character or, on the other hand, 
that he has character simply (moral character). In this 
latter sense there is only one character--a man either has
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it QX_ has. H& character a£. all" (A:151, my emphasis). A man 
can be born with a certain temperament and certain emotional 
dispositions which form his sensuous character, but if he 
does not abide by moral principles--the most important of 
which is truthfulness*--he has no character at all in the 
moral sense. Kant goes on to strongly suggest that we can 
change only our moral character and not our sensuous 
constitution. He describes four types of sensuous 
character--the sanguine, the melancholy, the choleric and 
the phlegmatic (A :153-7)10--all of which exaemplify "what 
nature makes of man;" moral character, by contrast, shows 
"what man makes gjE. himself" (A:157). Throughout his 
discussion of these four temperaments, he stresses that he 
is only referring to a person's sensuous constitution and 
not to his "way of thinking" (A:157), which he freely adopts 
and which belongs to his moral character. All this might 
lead one to believe that a person's sensuous character is 
irrelevant to her moral character, since only the latter can 
be changed. But in fact, I want to argue, this is not the
•See A:159 for a list of the main principles that have to do 
with moral character. All of them are principles of uprightness 
and honesty, e.g., not to dissemble, not to lie, etc.
10While Kant classifies the sanguine and the melancholy 
temperaments under "temperaments of feeling," while the choleric 
and phlegmatic temperaments are "temperaments of activity," each 
category includes dispositions to both feel and act in certain 
ways. The ancient quadripartite division of temperaments into 
sanguine, melancholy, choleric and phlegmatic can also be found 
in the QbsecvetiPns OH the. Feeling ol_ the Beautiful and SybUJie 
(1764), where Kant describes them in a way which is slightly 
different but on the whole consistent with the present.
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case, since one can change one's sensuous character through 
one's way. of thinking.
In Chapter 1, I argued that the subjective side of 
moral improvement involves strengthening emotions favorable 
to the adoption of moral maxims and weakening those opposed 
to the same. The successful result of this process is what 
Kant calls "virtue as strength of will," a capacity measured 
by the magnitude of the obstacles (in the form of 
recalcitrant inclinations) it can overcome (DV:394). I now 
want to apply this model of moral improvement to the case of 
individual character. I want to argue that knowledge of 
one's sensuous character is a precondition for moral 
improvement because one's sensuous character holds the key 
to one's own particular strengths and weaknesses, an 
awareness of which helps increase the probability that one 
will adopt the right maxims and act from the right motives. 
Knowing and improving one's sensuous character is in this 
sense instrumental to developing a moral character.
In Part VI, I shall use two of Kant's four temperaments 
as case studies of various types of individual character, 
each with its specific strengths and weaknesses, in order to 
illustrate the ways in which one can cultivate one's 
sensuous character for the sake of moral ends. Here, I give 
the argument which must undergird such a case study--namely, 
showing whv. given Kant's sharp distinction between moral
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and sensuous character, a knowledge of the latter is at all 
relevant to the cultivation of the former.
To cultivate a moral character is, of course, morally 
incumbent on us, and it is helpful to begin with a 
consideration of this duty. The duty to increase one's 
moral perfection has two components: 1) ensuring that one's 
motive is pure, that is, ensuring that the law alone is 
one's incentive; and 2) fulfilling all one's duties —  
adopting and acting on the right naxins— and "attaining 
completely one's moral end with regard to oneself" (DV:446). 
(The quoted part of (2) presumably refers to our duties 
toward ourselves, but since Kant strongly suggests that all 
our duties are really duties towards ourselves (LE:121,
223), we can extend Kant's meaning here to encompass the 
fulfillment of all our duties.)
Suppose, then, that we have chosen the end of moral 
perfection. If we rationally intend an end, we are required 
not only to choose it but also to seek to realize it through 
action. When our end is one of the two obligatory ends —  our 
own perfection and other people's happiness-certain 
complications arise. If we were purely rational beings, we 
would have no problem realizing these ends: we would only 
have to intend them and we would always act to realize them. 
But we are finite rational beings, beings who are often 
tempted to violate moral requirements. For that reason,
Kant stresses that the although the duty to increase our
150
moral perfection is "narrow and perfect in terms of its 
qualityM--that is, in terms of what it prescribes— it can 
only be "wide and imperfect in terms of its degree, because 
of the frailty (fraqilitas) of human nature" (DV:446).
Human beings are frail because although we may intend to act 
on the right maxims, we often fail to carry out this 
intention in practice:
The frailty of human nature is expressed even in the 
complaint of an Apostle, "What I would, that I do not!" 
In other words, I adopt the good (the lav) into the
maxim of my will, but this good, which objectively, in
its ideal concept ion... is an irresistible incentive, is 
subjectively (ig hvpothesi). when the maxim is to be 
followed, the weaker (in comparison with inclination) 
(R:24-5) .
It is because we have inclinations opposed to the law that
we often fail to do what we in all earnest intend to do; and
since we can never completely rid ourselves of such 
inclinations, morality requires us to fight those emotional 
dispositions which tempt us to violate our duties and to 
cultivate those which can help us fulfill them. Our 
compliance with the duty to increase our moral perfection 
can therefore "consist only in continual progress" (DV:446). 
It is thus not reaching moral perfection which is our duty, 
but only striving for it (DV:446).
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One might ask how this conception of moral improvement 
as a gradual process can harmonize with the equally 
prevalent Kantian conception of moral improvement as a 
rebirth--a rejection of one's previous, corrupt way of 
thinking and a simultaneous adoption of a steadfast sense of 
principle. The latter model of moral improvement is 
prevalent in the Reljgion. where Kant characterizes it as a 
"revolution" in one's cast of mind (R:43). It is also found 
in the following passage from the Anthropology, where Kant 
seems to be making an outright rejection of any view of 
moral improvement as a gradual process:
Since the act of establishing character, like a kind of 
rebirth, is a certain ceremony of making a vow to 
oneself, we may also assume that the solemnity of the 
act makes it and the moment when the transformation 
took place unforgettable to him, like the beginning of 
a new epoch. Education, examples and instruction 
cannot produce this firmness and steadfastness in our 
principles gradually, but only, as it were, by an 
explosion that results from our being sick and tired of 
the precarious state of instinct.... Wanting to become 
a better man in a fragmentary way is a futile endeavor, 
since one impression dies out while we are working on 
another; the act of establishing character, however, is 
absolute unity of the inner principle of conduct 
generally (A:159).
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If the act of establishing moral character takes place 
through an absolute transformation of one's cast of mind, 
how can one's compliance with the duty to perfect oneself 
morally "consist only in continual progress" (DV:446)?
The solution to this antinomy lies, characteristically 
for Kant, in the distinction between one's intelligible and 
one's sensible character. Consider his solution to the 
closely related problem of how a man can be under duty to 
make himself good when he is "corrupt in the very ground of 
his maxims" and will, moreover, always have inclinations 
which oppose the law:
But if a man is corrupt in the very ground of his 
maxims, how can he possibly bring about this revolution 
by his own powers and by himself become a good man?
Yet duty bids us do this, and duty demands nothing of 
us which we cannot do. There is no reconciliation 
possible here except by saying that man is under the 
necessity of, and is therefore capable of, a revolution 
in his cast of mind, but o n l y  Q± 3. gradual reform ig 
his sensuous nature (which places obstacles in the way 
of the former). That is, if a man reverses, by a 
single unchangeable decision, that highest ground of 
his maxims whereby he was an evil man (and thus puts on 
a new man), he is, so far as his principle and cast of 
mind are concerned, a subject susceptible of goodness,
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but only in continuous labor and growth is. he a good 
man (R:43, emphases mine).
What becomes clear here is that although good character may 
be indicated by the presence of the firm resolution to make 
oneself good (an intention signalled by a revolution in 
one's cast of mind), the actual realization of this 
intention--that is, the process of actually becomino good-- 
can only consist in a gradual reform of one's sensuous 
character. The "gradual" and "absolute" conceptions of 
moral improvement are thus not really at odds; they only 
show the difference between intention and action.3-3-
Striving for moral perfection thus involves a gradual 
reform of our sensuous character. This process has both a 
positive and a negative side: it involves both strengthening 
our disposition to act dutifully and from duty, and 
weakening our disposition to act against duty and from
11It should be noted, however, that since willing is the 
same as intending to act. the concept of good willing contains 
analytically the concept of striving to act in certain ways. The 
objective condition of a good will, reflected in the vow to be a 
good person, is therefore not a static condition but rather a 
dynamic strivinq. Our efforts to cultivate our natural feelings, 
as efforts directed at the realization of the two obligatory 
ends, have moral worth because they are the manifestation of this 
striving of the good will. However, when we promote those ends 
from natural feelings alone, without the thought of the 
obiigatorv nature of the act. our action has no moral worth. Qua 
instance of fulfilling obligatory ends the act might have moral 
worth, as it may qua instance of cultivating morally beneficial 
feelings; but since the thought of duty is, gJS. hvpothesi. absent 
from our minds in instances of this sort, promoting obligatory 
ends and the means for realizing them cannot be the intention in 
actions done from feeling alone. Thus, actions done without an 
explicit concern for duty (for the morality of the act) can have 
no moral worth.
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impure motives. On the side of action, this involves 
disposing ourselves to adopt and act on the right maxims , 
and fighting dispositions which make us stray. For example, 
a person may have a tendency to forget appointments not 
because she wants to, but because she gets absorbed in 
conversation with others. Moral progress, for this person, 
will consist partly in avoiding social situations which are 
likely to make her forget her appointments.
As regards the purity of our motives, moral improvement 
involves striving to make duty alone the motive from which 
we act--a process which involves strengthening the motive of 
duty not just by reflecting on the moral law but also by 
cultivating the "moral" feelings which stem from our 
awareness of the law (a process I will consider in greater 
detail in Section IV of this chapter and in Chapter 5)--but 
also making an effort to strengthen their natural 
counterparts and to weaken morally harmful feelings. This 
change of feelings will be accompanied by a change of 
attitudes towards their objects, since feelings have both a 
sensible and a reflective component. A person may have a 
disposition to help others not because it is her duty to do 
so but because she enjoys feeling that they need her. To 
weaken this arrogant motive, she might, just once, refrain 
from helping someone so as to prove to herself that others 
actually do quite well on their own. Or she might reflect 
on why she needs to feel needed and discover that it is not
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so much arrogance as low self-esteem that is motivating her. 
If so, she needs to take steps to strengthen her self- 
respect .
In Sections IV and V, I will describe in greater detail 
the process of moral improvement through reform of our 
sensuous character, paying particular attention to how 
cultivating our emotional strengths might help us purify our 
moral motives. I will also emphasize that cultivating our 
dignity-feelings enables us to act on our characteristic 
emotions in a way which harmonizes with moral requirements, 
and in this sense helps us cultivate virtuous character in a 
way which is sensitive to our individual temperaments.
Here, I hope at least to have shown that knowing our 
own strengths and weaknesses is a precondition for moral 
improvement. Only with a conception of ourselves as unique 
persons with specific emotional tendencies, often quite 
different from anybody else's, can we shape our emotional 
tendencies according to the idea of the persons we ought to 
be. Since these emotional tendencies belong to our sensuous 
character, it should be clear that knowing our sensuous 
character is a precondition for developing good character in 
the moral sense and is therefore a moral requirement, for 
Kant. By perfecting and refining the sensuous dispositions 
which can help us realize moral ends, we make moral 
progress. Knowing and cultivating our sensuous character is 
therefore instrumental to virtue itself.
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Having established the relevance of individual 
character to establishing moral character, I now turn to a 
feature of our sensible life which is important for self- 
knowledge and for establishing ways in which we need to 
change ourselves, namely, the workings of conscience.
Section LULL IllS. workings q_L Conscience
Among the internal voices dissuading us from deceiving 
ourselves about our moral standing, conscience is the most 
powerful. While conscience might appear to be a capacity of 
thought and not of feeling, Kant classifies it among the 
"natural predispositions of the mind (praedisaositio) for 
being affected by concepts of duty, antecedent 
predispositions on the side of feeling" (DV:399).
Conscience is thus, at least for Kant, a capacity of 
feeling. And it fits the model of distinctively moral 
feelings which I gave in the Introduction and in Chapter 1: 
it is, at least in its healthy state, conditioned by an 
awareness of the moral law and by moral judgments, but still 
falls under the category of feeling because it signifies the 
sensible effect which such judgments have on us.
I have already observed that the pride appropriate to 
our dignity is limited only by humility before the moral 
law. This humility is not meant to make us dejected, but is
157
rather supposed to make us strive to conform to our moral 
requirements. Conscience, in its awe-inspiring presence, 
has a similar function. Kant defines conscience as 
"consciousness of an internal court in man ('before which 
his thoughts accuse or excuse one another')" (DV:438). 
Conscience is reason's judgment applied to one's own 
actions, yielding a verdict of either "guilty" or 
"innocent." This judging activity is something we cannot 
escape; we can only bring ourselves (in conditions of 
extreme depravity) no longer to heed it (DV:438). Since 
conscience is inescapable, it inspires awe in us:
Every man has a conscience and finds himself observed, 
threatened, and, in general, kept in awe (respect 
coupled with fear) by an internal judge; and this 
authority watching over the law in him is not something 
that he himself (voluntarily) makes. but something 
incorporated into his beina. It follows him like a 
shadow when he plans to escape. (DV:438)
Conscience is thus not strictly a feeling. It is rather an 
activity of judgment bound u p with the feeling of awe (fear 
coupled with respect) and followed by either relief or pain, 
depending on whether the verdict was "innocent" or "guilty" 
(DV:440). The fact that the judgments of conscience are 
bound up with the feeling of awe and in particular with 
relief or pain is the reason why Kant classifies conscience 
among our capacities for feeling: "He who has no immediate
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loathing for what is morally wicked, and finds no pleasure 
in what is morally good, has no moral feeling, and such a 
man has no conscience" (LE:130).
Since conscience is something we cannot escape but can 
only dull our senses to, we do not have a duty to acquire a 
conscience; we only have a duty to cultivate it. We do this 
by heeding its verdicts, by sharpening our attentiveness to 
its voice, and by enlightening our understanding about what 
is and what is not our duty--in short, by using "every means 
to obtain a hearing for [the voice of conscience]" (DV:401, 
my insertion).
Kant does not explain why heeding one's conscience is a 
duty to oneself (though he classifies it as a such a duty at 
DV:437), but I think it is plausible to see this duty as 
bound up with the duty to know oneself, which is the "first 
command of all duties to oneself" and tells us: "know your 
heart--whether it is good or evil, whether the source of our 
actions is pure or impure, and what can be imputed to you as 
belonging originally to the substance of man or as derived 
(acquired or developed) and belonging to your moral 
condition" (DV:441). For conscience judges not only the 
legality of our actions, but also their morality (LE:69-72). 
We have a bad conscience if someone interprets us as 
genuinely meaning to help him when in fact we are acting 
from a self-serving motive. Similarly, if we plan to act in 
a certain way, conscience judges the morality of our maxims
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long before we undertake the action (DV:438). Since our 
conscience can inform us about our long-standing 
motivations, heeding our conscience is an important aspect 
of self-knowledge.
But heeding one's conscience is not always a means to 
self-knowledge; it can also become an instrument of self- 
deception. Even though a just conscience is veridical, it 
can become corrupted by false principles, e.g., by the 
principle to hold oneself to standards more lenient than 
those to which one holds others (LE:132)1*. If we think 
of our conscience as a court of law in which the accused 
(our full-blooded, sensuo-rational self) is granted a 
defender (the voice of the inclinations, supported by 
instrumental reason in the form of the principle of self- 
love), which upholds her case before the judge, reason, and 
before the prosector, the moral law in all its purity 
(LE:132; DV:439n), we see that it is easy--human, all too 
human--to give a more careful ear to the defender than to 
the prosecutor. As Kant puts it: "Except on the death-bed,
12It is a bewildering fact that in the Doctr ine of Virtue. 
Kant calls an erring conscience "an absurdity" (DV:401), whereas 
in the Lectures on Ethics. he considers a corrupt conscience to 
be even more common than a just one (LE:132). In the Doctr ine of 
Virtue. Kant seems to forget his earlier and wiser claim that 
one's conscience can be corrupted, holding the more simplistic 
position that although one can be mistaken about what one's duty 
is, one can never be mistaken about whether one has submitted 
one's action to the judgment of one's conscience, which he 
equates, without further question, with practical reason 
(DV:401). In the latter claim, he seems to be presupposing that 
the judgment of conscience will be not only veridical but also 
just. But as we shall see, this is not always the case.
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when they listen more eagerly to the accuser, men lend a 
readier ear to their defender" (LE:132). Anyone imagining 
herself in a real court of law would probably agree with 
this claim, as would anyone--and that includes most of us-- 
who has suffered the pangs of a guilty conscience. The 
defender, who is after all a part of the court of law which 
constitutes conscience, gets the better hearing and we 
conclude that the prosecutor is being too hard. Self- 
deception is often the result: either we deceive ourselves 
about our own powers, thinking we have lived up to the 
standards of the moral law when in fact we haven’t (in which 
case we are guilty of self-conceit, the belief that we can 
actually live up to the absolute purity of the moral law; 
LE:128), or else we judge by a false standard, a garbled 
substitute for the moral law (in which case we are guilty of 
self-love, of making ourselves an exception to the rule; 
LE:132, 137). By expounding a false law--an a priori law 
which is to our own advantage or an empirical law which is 
false to the facts of human nature (in particular, to human 
frailty)--we corrupt our conscience.
Thus begins the form of self-deception which is called 
self-flattery. But there is another form of self-deception 
to which conscience is prone, embodied in what Kant calls a 
"tyrannical" or "melancholy" conscience. While the self- 
flattering conscience is underactive--insufficiently 
meticulous about the difficulty of living up to the moral
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law--the tyrannical conscience is overactive, blaming the 
agent for having failed to do her duty even when she has 
done everything that could rationally be expected of her. 
Such a conscience becomes a tormentor:
If a person is capable of reproaching himself for his 
sins, his conscience is said to be alive; but on the 
other hand, if a man searches needlessly for evidences 
of evil in his conduct, his conscience is melancholy. 
Conscience should not lord it over us like a tyrant; we
do no hurt to our conscience by proceeding on our way
cheerfully; tormenting consciences in the long run 
become dulled and ultimately cease to function (LE:134- 
5) .
In a sense, a tyrannical conscience is more dangerous than 
an underactive conscience. For even though the uncritical 
conscience is corrupt in that it employs a distorted 
conception of the agent's powers and of the moral law, it is 
still capable of being purified because it is still work ina. 
A tyrannical conscience, by contrast, is capable of 
destroying itself: by being too active, it dulls itself and, 
like a worn-out spring, "ultimately ceases £2. function."
1SA conscience is also overactive when it is employed "to
resolve problems of a quibbling nature" <LE:134). Such a 
conscience, which Kant calls "micrological," should be 
distingushed from the tyrannical conscience because the latter 
compares our actions with the moral law, while the micrological 
conscience quibbles about issues which are morally irrelevant. 
e.g., "whether it is right to tell a lie in order to make an 
April fool of a person, or whether a rite or ceremony should be 
performed in this or that manner" (LE:134).
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Striving to be moral can thus become a harmful obsession.
But how can we avoid it? The danger of acquiring a 
tyrannical conscience is alive in anyone who strives to live 
with a sense of honor. For how does one know whether one is 
searching "needlessly" for evidences of evil in one's 
conduct? The duty to know ourselves tells us to examine 
ourselves scrupulously; hence all efforts to examine our 
conduct are needful (DV:441-2; LE:128).
To keep our conscience from becoming a tormentor, it 
seems we have to restrain it. But it is hard to see how it 
is even possible to restrain it, since conscience is an 
"instinct" which passes judgment on us "against our will" 
(LE:129; cf.69, 131). This means that conscience will 
condemn us, quite beyond our control, not only for acting 
immorally, but also for failing to act on the right motives. 
A tyrannical conscience seizes onto such signs of moral 
failure and haunts us, creating a weary, melancholy 
disposition. Since acting on morally inappropriate ways and 
on inappropriate motives is something we are all prone to by 
virtue of being human, how do we avoid chronic depression?1-4
14Barbara Herman's "Rules of Moral Salience," which are 
designed to help us determine which features of situations are 
morally salient and so call for moral judgment, do not really 
help here. Although they help prevent what Kant calls a 
"micrological" conscience (one which sees its path strewn with 
duties even in morally irrelevant situations), they are of no 
help in morally salient situations, in which it is up to us to 
judge when we have done enough of what duty called for. It is 
precisely here that the threat of a tyrannical conscience arises. 
See Herman, "The Practice of Moral Judgment."
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It might be thought that since Kant characterizes the 
tyrannical conscience as one which "searches needlessly for 
evidences of evil in (a man's] conduct" (LE:134, my 
emphasis), it is primarily concerned with actions and not 
with motives, and that the way to avoid such a conscience is 
simply to stop acting against the law and stop fretting 
about our motives. If we fulfill this minimum of what can 
reasonably be expected of a finite agent who adopts morality 
as an end--if we avoid lying, cultivate some of our talents, 
help others sometimes, and treat them with respect--then 
surely conscience would stay out of the main part of our 
day-to-day business.
But this handy solution miscarries when tested against 
the facts of human nature— in particular, against facts 
about the ways in which we acquire a bad conscience. Most 
of us have emotional ties to other people, and some of those 
ties are stronger than others. It is with respect to these 
strong emotional ties that the need to attend to our motives 
becomes especially pressing. We all have a propensity to 
find faults in others--including our friends. Now while it 
is impertinent to point out a friend's faults to her, since 
she needs only examine herself to become aware of them on 
her own (LE:232), we still cannot help noticing them. And 
it is the very fact that we not ice her faults that raises a 
problem about our motives. Consider a somewhat neurotic 
friend who is often complaining about how others victimize
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her. We feel like telling her to stop seeing herself as a 
victim or to stop being servile; but as friends, we do the 
friendly thing and lend a sympathetic ear, showing we 
respect her feelings. But in fact we neither respect these 
particular feelings nor have sympathy for her in this 
regard. We are merely feigning love and respect, and this 
false display of affection gives us a bad conscience. 
Conscience is here condemning us not for our actions but for 
our motives: we feel guilty for not feeling respect and 
sympathy for her. One can imagine how a tyrannical 
conscience might develop in response to situations like 
this--situations in which there is a dissonance between what 
we feel and what we do.
The indeterminate nature of imperfect duties also opens 
up contexts in which a tyrannical conscience might develop. 
In these contexts, conscience blames us not so much for our 
motives as for our failure to act in certain ways. Take, 
first, the duty to promote the happiness of others.
Morality tells us that as long as we have the basic maxim to 
help other people sometimes. we will not incur guilt for 
failing to promote the ends of others on a particular 
occasion.1® But the fact is that many of us feel 
guilty when we decline a request for help--especially when
19For a helpful discussion of the nature of imperfect duties 
and their relation to merit and demerit in Kant, see Thomas Hill, 
Jr.'s "Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation," Dignity and 
Pract ical Reason (Cornell UP, 1992 ), pp.145-175, esp. pp.160-168.
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we do not have to go out of our way to help the other party. 
That we have the intention to help others sometimes does not 
make things better, since repeated failure to help makes us 
doubt whether we have the intention at all. Isolated 
helping actions begin to seem like token gestures designed 
to keep our conscience at bay. But the tyrannical conscience 
does not let itself be so easily fooled. Although such a 
conscience is misinformed about the requirements of 
morality, it still remains tyrannical, and it is not clear 
what we can do to allay it.
Similarly, feeling that we are not complying with the 
imperfect duty to increase our natural perfection— our 
mental, physical and pragmatic capacities— can lead to a 
tyrannical conscience. Kant stresses that deciding which 
particular talents to develop is left for man himself to 
choose "in accordance with his own rational reflection about 
what sort of life he would like to lead and whether he has 
the powers necessary for it (e.g., whether it should be 
trade, commerce, or a learned profession)" (DV:445). But 
findinq out what those talents are is often a painstaking 
and embarrassing process. Anyone who has undergone formal 
training in anything (music, sports, academics) can vouch 
for this. Sometimes we cultivate "talents" we don't 
actually have, and the fear of going through further 
embarrassments of this sort can keep us from cultivating the 
talents we do have. Finally, even when we do have a talent
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for something, the process of cultivating it requires the 
courage to risk failure and rejection by going to auditions, 
applying for competitive jobs, etc. The fear of failure can 
keep us from challenging ourselves in these ways, and the 
self-condemnation which arises in response to such inaction 
sows the seeds of a tyrannical conscience.
How, given these facts about how we get a bad 
conscience, do we keep our conscience from becoming 
tyrannical when it is at bottom an "instinct" which passes 
judgment on us "against our will" (LE:129; cf.69, 131)?
Kant has no ready answer, and I don't think there is. a 
completely satisfactory solution available to him, but I 
will offer a few suggestions of my own, drawing on what Kant 
has to say about the "operative" conscience--the conscience 
which has the strength and authority to translate its guilty 
verdicts into redemptive action. The verdict of the 
operative conscience "has validity if it is felt and 
enforced." A guilty verdict is felt if it issues in moral 
repentance; it is enforced if it leads to "action in 
accordance with the judicial verdict" (LE:131, my emphases). 
In order to act on the guilty verdict, i.e., "to give effect 
to the valid judgment," a conscience "must be strong and 
command respect" (LE:132, my emphasis). That is, the 
feeling of guilt and moral repentance incurred through moral 
failure must be strong enough to translate itself into a 
preparedness to act. and to act in a way which demonstrates
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that one is no longer choosing to act in on the maxim that 
conscience condemned at the outset. For instance, if one is 
guilty of lying, one has to refrain from lying in the 
future. By refraining from repeating one's offenses, one 
clears one's conscience step by step.
In the case of redeeming ourselves for acting on the 
wrong maxims, what we need to do is clear: if guilty of 
lying, fail to lie in the future, and so on. But what do we 
do when our conscience condemns us for having the wrong 
motives--that is, for being unable to act on respect for the 
moral law? Readers familiar with Kant's doctrine of the 
inscrutability of motives must be scratching their heads.
For I've been speaking of maxims and motives as if they are 
transparent to the agent--as if they are fully expressed in 
the conscious thought processes that issue in and accompany 
our actions. But Kant does not believe that our maxims are 
that clear to us. At least our motives, which are second- 
order components of our m a x i m s , a r e  hidden from us; so 
even if we can formulate the rest of our maxim (our end and 
the means through which we intend to realize it) fairly 
clearly, we are still missing a crucial part, namely, our 
motive for intending to act that way:
1*See footnote 15 for a defense of my interpretation of a 
motive as a second-order clause of the agent's maxim, and for a 
rejection of the commoly held view that a motive an be thought of 
as the epd of an action, signified by the (first-order) purposive 
clause of a maxim.
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For a man cannot see into the depths of his heart so as 
to be quite certain, in even a s inale action, of the 
purity of his moral intention and the sincerity of his 
disposition, even when he has no doubt about the 
legality of his action. (DV:392; see also DV:447 and 
G: 406-8)
Kant's thesis of the inscrutability of motives, and his 
own motivation for holding it, has led to some puzzlement.
It is frequently linked to his (equally puzzling and, in the 
eyes of many, wildly implausible) doctrine of transcendental 
freedom of the will (Willkur) which is the capacity of the 
human will to be a first cause (also called "spontaneity"). 
The reason why many link these two doctrines together is 
that they both involve claims to unknowabi1ity. In the case 
of transcendental freedom, the free will exists in the 
unknowable noumenal world, not in the knowable phenomenal 
world; consequently, we can have no theoretical or 
speculative knowledge of the operation of our will and our 
noumenal choices. Similarly, the inscrutability thesis 
implies that we cannot know our real motives or maxims.
But since searching one's heart is a practical rather 
than a theoretical inquiry and spontaneity is barred from 
theoretical inquiry (while from a practical point of view, 
it is a necessary part of our conception of ourseves as
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rational agents; see G:448; CPrR : 28-29 ) , 1-7 it is unlikely 
that Kant saw the inscrutability of our motives as a result 
of his transcendental idealism. The inscrutability thesis 
is meant to spur us along the road to self-knowledge and so 
plays a distinctively moral role.
The doctrine of the inscrutability of motives, though 
certainly undergirded by the doctrine of transcendental 
freedom, is not just the upshot of a bewildering 
metaphysical requirement. It is designed to remind us of 
the ever-present possibility of self-deception and of the 
fact that virtue and its first command, self-knowledge, are 
difficult for finite beings such as ourselves. Because of
1-7In this sense, searching one's heart is a practical rather 
than a theoretical inquiry, and the command "Know thyself!" urges 
us to know oneself in a practical rather than theoretical sense 
(to have Wissen as opposed to Erkenntnis of oneself). But what 
is practical knowledge with regard to oneself if we experience 
our individual selves only in space and time and hence only 
empirically? How can we come to know our empirical selves--in 
which, after all, most of our motives originate--other than 
theoretically? Kant does speak of practical knowledge (Wissen) 
in the Cr itiaue Practical Reason, where he says that the fact 
of reason, i.e., our awareness of the moral lav, enables us to 
"know f wissen1 something of (the intelligible world], namely a 
law" (CPrR:43, my emphasis and inserts. For other mentions of 
practical knowledge. embodied in our awareness of the moral law 
and the Ideas of reason, see CPrR:29, 31, and 137). Since our 
inquiry into our own motives uses the moral law as a standard 
according to which we evaluate ourselves (DV:436) and the moral 
law is an object of practical knowledge, it may seem appropriate, 
after all, to speak of practical knowledge of our motives. But 
knowledge is a matter of certainty, and certainty attaches only 
to items of pure reason (that is why the moral law and its 
necessity are objects of practical knowledge). Since we have no 
certainty about our own motives, even though they are often 
empirically based, I think it is more appropriate to speak of 
practical inquiry into our motives--inquiry guided by the ever­
present standard of the moral law--rather than of practical 
knowledge of them.
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the devilish ways in which self-interest hides its tracks, 
there always exists a possibility that we are deceiving 
ourselves about our true motives. Moreover, if we could be 
certain about our motives, we would grow either complacent 
or dejected (complacent if they were always pure; dejected 
if they were impure--most likely, of course, the latter).
The inscrutability thesis is designed to underscore the 
difficulty of knowing ourselves yet to encourage us in our 
struggle for moral improvement.1*
The Greeks spoke of fate in this context. In his 
Poetics. Aristotle observes that tragedy has a moral 
relevance, namely, to remind us that our lives are affected 
by fate, by accidental circumstance. This is not a harsh 
doctrine of predestination; it is rather a salubrious 
reminder that even if we are enjoying happiness at the 
present moment, circumstances may change; and that 
consequently, we must not contentedly gloat in our present 
well-being, but should keep a sharp eye--sharpened judgment 
of the sort embodied in the Aristotelian virtue of practical 
wisdom (phronesis)--on our condition, so as to be able to 
take every possible measure to steer away from misfortune 
(including vice--a signficant component of unhappiness, in 
Aristotle's eyes). Aristotle's lesson in the Poet ics can 
thus be captured by the following motto: "Do what you can to
1BSee Book 1 of the Religion. esp.R:32-4 for an in-depth 
discussion of how self-interest leads to self-deception.
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avoid all obstacles to happiness." A far cry from a 
doctrine of predestination, Aristotle’s thought in the 
Poetics enjoins us to do whatever is in our power to achieve 
and maintain happiness.
Kant, dissatisfied with the ambiguity of the Greek term 
"happiness" (eudaimonia. which can mean physical, mental, as 
well as moral well-being), replaces "happiness" with 
"virtue" in Aristotle's motto, and the result is his 
doctrine of the inscrutability of motives. Instead of 
reminding us of the power of fate, Kant's doctrine reminds 
us of the power of opposing inclinations: however sure we 
may be that we have acted morally, we can never be 
completely certain, since we may in fact have acted on a 
maxim of self-love (DV:392-3).
What is interesting here is not so much the attitude 
itself as the course of action it brings about. Like 
Aristotle's doctrine in the Poet ics. which does not ask us 
to give up in the face of fate but prompts us to do what we 
can to avoid situations that could bring unhappiness, Kant's 
doctrine of the inscrutability of motives does not call for 
an abject surrender to forces too powerful to overcome, but 
asks us to use what is. in our reach to find out, as best we 
can, what our true motives are, and to strive with all our 
might to make the thought of duty our motivating thought in 
every action (DV:393). The fact that we cannot be 
absolutely sure of our motives does not entail that we
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cannot increase the likelihood that our motives will be 
virtuous or at least compatible with virtue. This takes 
work, but it is not an impossible task.1*
Paying unfailing heed to the judgments of our 
conscience is perhaps the most powerful way to combat our 
tendency to deceive ourselves. As Kant himself observes, 
having a peaceful conscience is not necessarily the same as 
being virtuous: people whose actions conformed to duty 
externally might have a peaceful conscience as a result, 
even though they "did not take the law into their counsel" 
and merely happened upon the right action by luck (R :33).
The virtuous person is not satisfied with mere legality; she 
is concerned about the morality of her actions and wants to 
act for the right reasons. As I have already observed, she 
has a bad conscience not only when she suspects that in 
helping someone perhaps she didn't act from benevolence but 
from self-interested vanity (a love of being loved), but
1*My claim that the inscrutability thesis is intended 
primarily as a reminder of the strength of non-moral motives --a 
reminder designed to prompt us to strive for purity in our 
motives--finds support in Kant's explicit and repeated connection 
of human frailty (our tendency to act on non-moral motives) with 
our inability ever to know whether we have acted from a pure 
motive (DV:392-3, 446-7). Were our motives transparent to us, we 
might easily be lulled into self-flattery and moral complacency-- 
vices which Kant repeatedly warns us against (DV:430, 436;
CPrR:85). But because our motives are inscrutable to us, we are 
instead set on the course to continually strive to make ourselves 
morally better. It is for this reason that I take the 
inscrutability thesis to be essentially linked up with human 
frailty--with the fact that we are always tempted to break the 
law--and to be designed primarily to make us strive for moral 
i mprovement.
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also when she fails to have the right feelings toward 
someone. The morally concerned agent is acutely aware of 
the voice of her conscience, which is perhaps only rarely 
peaceful.
Searching one's conscience involves asking oneself 
questions of the following sort: "Did I publically reveal a 
shameful secret about this person because I was drunk and 
reckless, or did I do it out of an illegitimate sense of 
moral superiority which I have cultivated through demeaning 
people in the past?"; "Did I leave this man, causing his 
unhappiness, because I am in the grip of passion for someone 
else, or did I really try to make it work, but we simply 
aren't suited for one another— and is this a moral matter at 
all?"; "Is it a moral failure on my part not to practice my 
painting more, or is it a permissible negligence because I 
am cultivating other talents at this time? If the latter, 
then why do I still have a bad conscience for not painting 
more--is it because I am setting the goal of my own 
perfection too high or because I am really robbing myself of 
an occasion for self-realization? And what would the motive 
for the latter be, anyway: vanity or self-perfection?"; and 
so on. Sometimes, both candidate motives can be vicious 
(e.g., in the case of drunkenly betraying someone's 
confidence, in which excessive drunkenness and betrayal of 
confidence are both vices); other times, only one is; still 
other times, neither. It is important to try to pinpoint
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the operative motive(s) as exactly as possible because only 
then do we know which inclinations, if any, need to be 
changed. Conscience can thus guide us in determining 
whether a given inclination or character-trait reflects a 
moral failure.
As regards our emotions--which are after all our 
deepest and strongest motives for acting or failing to act-- 
we need to show ourselves--the primary judges of what goes 
on inside us--that we are taking steps to fight the emotions 
which prohibit us from satisfying the demands of morality.
To do this, we need to prove to ourselves that we are 
strengthening the feelings which might be able to counteract 
those which our conscience condemns. In the case of the 
fear of failure or embarrassment which prevents us from 
cultivating certain talents, for example, we need to 
cultivate courage. Building courage in one context helps us 
act courageously in others, and even though we might be 
unable to summon courage in one context--we might be too 
afraid, say, to audition for a band or play even when we 
think we have the requisite talent--we could build on our 
predispositions to courage (fearlessness in the face of 
risk) In other contexts--sav. by being more daring in our 
social lives--to help us face embarrassment in the former 
context.
But how, exactly, do we "build on" or "cultivate" our 
predispositions on the side of feeling? I now turn to this
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question, paying particular attention to what is to . 
cultivate our feelings according to the idea of our dignity.
S.e c t LttP IV: C u l t i v a t i n g  Feeling: & Definition
Although Kant often speaks of the need to our feelings 
according to moral ideas, he never actually explains what 
the process involves. Accordingly, I will give a definition 
of my own with which I believe Kant would be sympathetic.
To cultivate a feeling according to the idea of one's own 
dignity and the dignity of others, I suggest, is a bipartite 
process the first part of which involves sharpening one's 
judgment about the feeling; the second, refining the feeling 
itself. One sharpens one's judgment about the feeling for 
two purposes: first, so that one can make responsible and 
authentic decisions about whether to act on the feeling; 
and, second, so that when one does choose to act on it, one 
can do so in a way which is dignified and which harmonizes 
with one's sense of moral integrity. One refines the 
feeling for the purpose of bringing it closer to one's moral 
feelings--that is, to one's love of man, one's self-respect, 
one's conscience, and one's respect for the moral law. In 
what follows, I will clarify each part of this definition.
The first part of my definition of cultivating feeling- 
-the part about sharpening our judgment about (and
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perception of) our feelings and the way they figure in our 
character--may strike the reader as an odd component in a 
definition of cultivating feelina. For isn't it judgment 
and not feeling that we are talking about here? On Kant's 
theory of action, it is natural to assign a task to judgment 
whenever one speaks of changing oneself in some way. For 
Kant, all human action, including self-change, is mediated 
by judgment. Acting on a particular feeling, on this 
theory, is equivalent to acting on the judgment that this 
feeling is suitable (suitable in some sense--not necessarily 
morally) to act on in this situation.
Although we may feel ^5. if. we are acting directly on 
our feelings, we implicitly take responsibility for acting 
in this manner by intending, however unself-consciously, to 
act on the feeling and so being prepared to justify our 
actions (or at least explain them) if needed. We need not 
approve of the way in which we are acting; nevertheless, we 
implicitly take responsibility for acting that way through 
our choice to act on that particular feeling. This decision 
and simultaneous assumption of responsibility is an act of 
judgment, reflected in the maxim or personal principle on 
which we act. Acting on a feeling is thus always 
accompanied by an awareness of choos ina to act on it and 
also being prepared to defend or explain one's action.
When we are acting with a view to changing ourselves-- 
in this case, with a view to moral improvement--the judgment
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we make with regard to a particular feeling must take a 
special form. We must not only take responsibility for 
acting on the feeling, but must also endorse it as a feeling 
which is morally beneficial. Whether a given feeling is 
morally beneficial or not depends on the way it figures in 
our own particular character. Some people have a propensity 
to be overly sentimental; others a propensity to be 
choleric; others to be overly fearful, to feel attacked by 
or afraid of certain individuals and to let this dominate 
their consciousness and behavior. A gruff sea captain may 
benefit from a dose of sympathy; a bleeding heart from a 
dose of pride. If one knows one's own weaknesses in terms 
of acting on feelings--that is, if one knows which feelings 
tend to overtake one's personality and to affect one's 
behavior in a morally harmful way (whether harmful to others 
or to one's own dignity)--one is better able to curb them 
and to cultivate feelings which can "compensate" for those 
weaknesses.
A feeling is bad for oneself to act on when it 
undermines or fails to contribute to one's own perfection, 
moral worth, or social grace— in short, to one's dignity.
For instance, people who are sentimental can express their 
sentimentality in appealing ways, given the right situation. 
But an inappropriate display of sentimentality--when one 
displays sentimentality simply because one has a tendency to 
do so and not because it is the r ight t ime to do so--is
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always morally harmful because it reveals a presumption to 
moral superiority. In times of mourning, for instance, a 
display of pure grief may be legitimate, but never a 
prolonged, dripping reminiscence of the late one, which 
betrays pity and therefore disrespect for the latter, since 
pity is "the kind of benevolence one has toward someone 
unworthy" (DV:457).
Another feeling that can be morally harmful is 
humi1ity--even when it is genuine, not false humility. A 
humble person can be self-effacing to the degree of losing 
her own self-respect, even when her humility does not 
necessarily involve the feeling that her own worth is lower 
than that of others (the latter would be false humility). 
Such a person needs to curb her humility by cultivating her 
pride, and she can do so in a number of ways. In being 
given a compliment she deserves, she should not act on her 
humble impulse to say, "Oh, it's nothing, really," but 
should instead smile and say "Thank you." This simple 
expression of pride in her accomplishment brings with it a 
greater sense of self-worth, and so cultivates pride and 
self-respect.
Being able to judge whether a given feeling is good or 
bad for us to act on thus requires self-knowledge and self- 
control. Through judgment, we modify our actions by 
refraining from acting on feelings which are negative to our 
moral personality and acting on those which are positive.
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But VS. ffiUS-t a.l5 0 affect the feelings themselves, for vhat we 
are concerned with, after all, is changing our character: 
and when it comes to changing our feelings, what we are 
interested in cultivating are not just episodic emotions, 
nor just our long-standing dispositions to feel, but the 
aualitv 3gd depth &£ the feelings themselves. so that we can 
be proud of having these particular feelings as character- 
traits. As we gain insight into the dangers or virtues of a 
particular feeling and, more broadly, into the role it plays 
in our character, we develop and att itude toward it: we 
either approve or disapprove of it. Our attitude about the 
feeling affects our disposition to take pleasure in it, and 
so changes our propensity to indulge in it on specific 
occasions. By either indulging in it ("riding out" the 
train of thoughts and emotions which accompany it) or 
refraining from indulging in it (thinking about something 
else), we either increase or decrease our likelihood to 
express the emotion in word or deed. By reflecting on and 
adopting a certain attitude toward a given feeling, we 
change our disposition to feel it and hence our proneness to 
act on it. How this helps deepen the feeling itself is 
something I will consider in Chapters 4 and 5.
A person whose judgment is sensitive to her feelings is 
not only able to decide whether to act on a given feeling, 
but is also able, when she does decide to act on the 
feeling, to choose a course of action which is dignified,
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authentic, and harmonizes with her sense of moral integrity. 
Judgment, in this capacity, is employed to find an 
appropriate way of expressing the feeling through words, 
bodily gestures and facial expressions. Kant has the 
following to say about facial expressions:
Expression is the facial features put into play, and 
this play results from an emotional agitation of more 
or less strength, the tendency to which is one of a 
man's characteristic traits. It is hard not to betray 
the stamp of an affect by any expression. It betrays 
itself by the very pains we take to repress it in our 
manner and tone; and if a man is too weak to master his 
affects, the play of his expressions will unmask 
(against his reason's wishes) what is going on within 
him, which he would like to hide and withdraw from the 
eyes of others. But men who are masters of this art, 
if once detected, are not considered the best sort of 
men, men with whom we can deal in confidence. This is 
especially true if they are practiced in affecting 
expressions that contradict what they do (A:164-5).
Kant makes it clear here that it is morally preferable to 
show one's struggle with one's emotions than to hide it: 
people who are able to hide this struggle are not considered 
trustworthy. It is fairly clear why this is so: concealing 
one's emotions or one's struggle with them is a mark of 
dishonesty--a trait which will eventually become known the
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world through an inconsistency between one's actions and 
one's expressions. So it is better to reveal what one is 
feeling than to hide it, even if what one is feeling is 
something one is not very proud of. In giving expression to 
the emotional turbulence within oneself, one is heeding 
one's sense of honesty and moral integrity.
But Kant also makes it clear, in the paragraph just 
quoted, that the inability to master one's passions is a 
sign of weakness. It would seem, then, that the most 
desirable state to attain with regard to one's emotions is a 
state in which one does not need to struggle against them--a 
state in which one is the master of one's emotions. This is 
certainly suggested in the following passage, already 
familiar from Chapter 1:
Since virtue is based on inner freedom, it contains a 
positive command to man, namely to bring all his 
capacities and inclinations under his (reason's) 
control and so to rule over himself, which goes beyond 
forbidding him to let himself be governed by his 
feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy): for 
unless reason holds the reins of government in its own 
hands, man's feelings and inclinations play the master 
over him (DV:408).
As I stressed in Chapter 1, for reason to be master over 
one's feelings and inclinations is for reason to govern them 
without playing the tyrant (see also DV:407). Because not
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all emotions are hostile to reason's moral ends, not all 
emotions must be fought or suppressed. Only those emotions 
which are opposed to moral ends must be fought; emotions 
which are favorable to moral ends are not, in and of 
themselves, bad; quite on the contrary, Kant considers them 
to be good (R:51).
All this suggests that mastery over one's emotions is 
necessary only with regard to those emotions which are 
morally harmful. The upshot is that we do not need to 
struggle against all our emotions, but only against those 
opposed to moral ends; and, moreover, that when we are 
engaged such a struggle, we should not try to hide it.
Since success in this struggle is a strength of will, as 
measured by the magnitude of obstacles it can overcome 
(DV:394)--it is nothing we should try to hide, but should 
instead be proud of. But Kant also stresses that "men 
should not make a display of their worthiness to be happy" 
(DV:457), which suggests that it would be morally 
distasteful to advertise the successful outcome of one's 
private moral battles. A struggle against recalcitrant 
emotions, however, does not presume a successful outcome. 
Giving honest expression to the struggle itself is not in 
bad moral taste; it is only advertising one's success that 
is distasteful. Take the person who has an unduly strong 
sense of humility. If her facial expressions were to reveal 
her struggle to take a compliment in proud fashion--say, her
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saying "Thank you" with a modest smile and averted eyes--we 
wouldn't take this to be in bad taste. But if she were to 
tell ail her acquaintances about how much better she feels 
since she regained her self-respect, we would not only find 
her pathetic but would also come to doubt whether she had 
actually gained any self-esteem at all (a person sure of her 
successes does not need to advertise them).
Emotions favorable to moral ends need not be fought, 
but we do need to ensure that they receive proper expression 
so that they do not degenerate into emotions which are 
morally harmful. Proper pride in one's unconditional worth, 
for example, can degenerate into arrogance, which "demands 
from others a respect it denies them" (DV:465). This 
degeneration can take place in a number of ways, but a 
prominent one involves expressing one's proper pride in a 
way which is inappropriate--especially when others, due to 
their politeness, do not let it be shown that this 
expression is inappropriate. Since this is somewhat 
abstract, I will make it more concrete--first by considering 
how Kant himself contrasts proper pride with arrogance, and 
then by drawing some conclusions of my own concerning the 
process by which pride might degenerate into arrogance.
This will also provide an occasion to discuss the important 
dignity-feeling of proper pride.
Proper or "noble" pride, or love of honor. as Kant 
often calls it, consists in "self-esteem; man must not
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appear unworthy in his own eyes; his actions must be in 
keeping with humanity itself if he is to appear in his own 
eyes worthy of inner respect" (LE:125). In the Lectures on 
Ethics, he goes so far as to say that love of honor should 
motivate us in all our actions (LE:191). Since this 
motivating capacity is merely n e g a t i v e i t  is dictated 
merely by our desire not to become a object of contempt" 
(LE:187)--it is not surprising to see Kant, in the Doctr ine 
of Virtue. assigning love of honor the role of helping us 
avoid the indignities brought upon us by violating our 
perfect duties to ourselves (e.g., by selling our physical 
nature, by lying, by being servile, etc.) (DV:420). But it 
would seem that love of honor alone is not sufficient to 
make us carry out our imperfect duties, which leave it up to 
us to decide when and how to fulfill them. Refraining from 
helping someone at a particular occasion does not bring any 
great indignity upon us as long as we have the basic maxim 
to help some people sometimes.20 We seem therefore to 
need something more than a desire not to become an object of
contempt to motivate us to carry out our imperfect duties.
In the Groundwork. perhaps for this reason, motivation by 
love of honor is supplanted by motivation by respect for the
2°Effeetively carrying out our duties of love toward others,
in particular, might require more than sheer love of honor, even
when the latter is taken as a positively motivating feeling: it
might require love of man and not love of honor. In Chapter 4, I
will show that love of man is indeed part of the motive of duty:
it is the way that respect for the moral law manifests itself in
the morally mature agent as she carries out her duties of love.
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law. But even as late as 1797 (the year that the Doctrine 
af. Virtue was published), love of honor retains the 
negatively motivating role that Kant originally assigned it. 
Love of honor is in effect what ensures that we do not 
compromise our dignity; that we maintain self-respect in our 
own eyes and do not give up our dignity in comparison with 
others (DV:46 5).
But love of honor is not only an internal stance. It 
is always concerned with one's character before the world at 
large. Honor, says Kant, is "the goodness of conduct as. it 
appears. It is not enough that our conduct should be good: 
it must appear as good before the eyes of others" (LE:190, 
my emphasis). It is therefore not enough merely to fulfill 
our duties in order to maintain our self-respect; we must 
also do so in a way which others can approve of. We do so 
by making ourselves an example for others: "each of us must 
see to it, not merely that our actions provide a negative 
example by containing nothing evil, but that they set a 
positive example by the presence of some real good in them. 
Our actions must not only be good; they must also be set as 
examples before the eyes of others" (LE:191).
The question immediately arises as to what Kant means 
by claiming that our actions must not only contain no evil, 
but also "some real good." On Kant's mature conception of 
moral worth, the "real good" which our actions must contain 
is motivation by duty. But how can we let others know that
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our actions are motivated by duty when we cannot show others 
our motives and they are opaque even to us? The most 
obvious way to indicate that our actions have moral worth, I 
suggest (and defend more closely in Section IV), is by going 
out of our way to fulfill our duties. Helping others in 
situations where this constitutes an inconvenience for us is 
one way of showing purity of motive--or at least that we 
have the right maxim and are prepared to act on it. Another 
way to indicate purity of motive is to heed our perfect 
duties--refraining from lying, from treating others with 
contempt, etc.--in especially noble ways, e.g, by making a 
difficult confession or by forgiving an enemy whom we would 
rather treat with contempt. These, then, are ways of making 
ourselves an example for others.
We are now in a position to consider how a morally 
valuable emotion can degenerate into a morally harmful one 
if it does not receive the proper expression. Love of honor 
can degenerate into lust for honor if we express it in the 
wrong way--in particular, if we seek to compel the approval 
of others instead of trusting in our own merits and allowing 
others to judge them freely (LE:188). Kant characterizes 
the difference between love of honor (pride proper) and lust 
for honor (arrogance) as follows:
The lust for honor implies an arrogant demand to be 
noticed. We never object to the love of honor, but to 
the lust for honor we do object. The love of honor is
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modest, never becoming a lust; it is anxious for the 
respect of all and to escape contempt. Changed to a 
lust, it demands uncommon and inordinate honor. To 
gain the preference of others, the ambitious man sets 
out to force the judgments of his fellows to his own 
opinion. But since the judgments of others with 
respect to ourselves are free, the grounds for 
respecting us must be such that the judgments of others 
follow necessarily from them. A man who lusts after 
honor seeks to compel the judgment of others, by 
demanding their esteem, and in doing so he makes 
himself ridiculous. He encroaches upon our rights and 
drives us to resist him. But the man of honor whose 
sole desire is to be respected by his fellows, and not 
to be held in contempt, gains our respect; and the more 
worthy he is of it and the less arrogant, the more 
eager we are to respect him (LE:188).
There is a fine line between the proper demand to make
oneself an example and the arrogant demand to be noticed.
Our eagerness to gain the respect of others must never 
overtake a respect for the right of others to form free 
judgments about us. The love of honor demands that we make 
an example of ourselves, but if we do so in the wrong way, 
we are flirting with arrogance. If, for example, we tell 
people who are interested in our accomplishments (e.g., our
relatives) about them, we may be living up to our proper
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pride, but if we brag about them to everyone, we allow our 
pride to degenerate into arrogance. It is easy for our love 
of honor to exceed healthy bounds because others are usually 
too polite to inform us that we are bragging or that we seem 
to have too high an opinion of ourselves.
To prevent our love of honor from degenerating into 
arrogance, we have to express our desire to gain others' 
respect in the right way. Finding appropriate expression 
for our feelings is thus one way in which judgment helps us 
cultivate them and keep them within their proper bounds.
I hope, in this section, to have shed some light on 
Kant's view of what it is to cultivate one's feelings in 
accordance with the idea of one's dignity. To do so is, 
first, to develop an appropriate attitude about the feeling, 
given one's temperament and one's moral strengths and 
weaknesses. This involves attuning one's judgement to the 
workings of the feeling and to how it figures in one's 
particular character, being especially attentive to ways in 
which it sways one. It also involves finding appropriate 
express ion for feelings which can be put to a moral use.
The latter is not merely a matter of training our judgment 
and attuning our perception; it is a matter of refining the 
feeling itself through engaging in society and in culture.
In the next and final section, I will consider two 
character types sketched by Kant himself, each with 
different strengths and weaknesses, and will illustrate how
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the moral improvement of each character might unfold. These 
studies will bring home the intensely personal nature of the 
process of cultivating our feelings with an eye to moral 
ends. I will also suggest (with a moral-psychological story 
here and with more detailed textual evidence in Chapter 4) 
that although the necessity with which duty binds us is 
always stern and uncompromising, the motive of duty is not 
always experienced this way. The way in which we, as 
morally mature agents, fulfill our duties towards ourselves 
in a morally worthy way (i.e., from the motive of duty) 
differs from the way in which we would do so as moral 
novices--that is, as newly converted sinners or as morally 
inexperienced individuals (e.g., teenagers) who are just 
embarking on road to self-improvement and who must therefore 
struggle extensively with their sensible natures. The 
morally mature individual fulfills her duties toward herself 
from the reason-based feelings of proper pride, self- 
respect, and love of honor. Since these feelings are the 
ways in which the motive of duty man!fests itself in the 
morally experienced individual, acting from these reason- 
based feelings has moral worth.
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Xya Studies ol. Cultivating
For my studies, I will use two of the four character 
types which Kant discusses in the section titled "On 
Temperament" in the Anthropology. I have chosen the 
sanguine and the melancholy temperaments for this particular 
study; in Chapter 4, I discuss the choleric and phlegmatic 
temperaments. Although moral improvement in the latter two 
temperaments also involves cultivating feeling, the stories 
I will tell about them are more relevant to our duties 
toward others than to those toward ourselves; and since the 
focus of this chapter has been on dignity-feelings (which 
are helpful primarily, though not exclusively, for 
fulfilling our duties toward ourselves), I have chosen the 
two temperaments which need most acutely to cultivate their 
dignity-feelings, namely, the sanguine and the melancholy.
Kant adopts his classification of temperaments from the 
ancients, but gives them new descriptions. How are we to 
think of these temperaments? Do they exhaust the range of 
human possibilities, or are there others as well? Kant 
seems to think they represent the only four empirical 
character types there are, since he claims that "there is no 
such thing as a composite temperament" and that "if someone 
claims a mixed one, we do not know what to make of him" 
(A:156/291). But I think many of us will recognize aspects 
of ourselves in all of them. Kant may be right about others
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not knowing what to make of us in such a case--after all, we 
often don't know what to make of ourselves!
It is important to note that Kant intends to describe 
only the sensible aspects of a person's character, whatever 
their moral implications; and that it is possible for each 
of these temperaments to develop a moral character (A:151, 
154). As we will see, however, the sensible aspects of a 
person's character have moral implications: Kant takes a 
person's way of sensing to Include her attitude toward her 
moral strengths and flaws.
Since Kant's descriptions of the temperaments are rich 
in dramatic value, I quote them in full. I begin by 
considering the sanguine temperament, which Kant describes 
as follows:
Tiia Sanguine Temperament ai the Volatile Man 
A sanguine person manifests his way of sensing, and can 
be recognized, by the following traits: he is carefree 
and full of hope; he attaches great importance to each 
thing for the moment, and the next moment may not give 
it another thought. He makes promises is all honesty, 
but fails to keep his word because he has not reflected 
deeply enough beforehand whether he will be ale to keep 
it. He is good-natured enough to help others, but he 
is a bad debtor and always asks for extensions. He is 
a good companion, jocular and high-spirited, who is 
reluctant to take anything seriously (Vive la
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bagatelle!) and all men are his friends. He is, as a 
rule, not a bad fellow; but he is a sinner and hard to 
convert, who regrets something very much indeed, but 
soon forgets this regret (which never becomes an 
affliction) . Business wears him out, and yet he busies 
himself indefatigably with mere play; for play involves 
change and perseverance is not in his line (A:153-4). 
The sanguine character is obviously not the kind to fall 
prey to a tyrannical conscience, for although he may regret 
something "very much indeed," his regret "never becomes an 
affliction." A study of this character type is thus not 
likely to illustrate the struggle with a tyrannical 
conscience--but we shall have an abundance of that struggle 
in our next character type. What is most notable in the 
sanguine character is his utter disregard for principle. He 
is not evil, but he fails to see how his earnest ways, 
juxtaposed with his failure to keep his promises, make 
others think of him as an unreliable charlatan of low moral 
fiber. His ways make people lose their respect for him.
When this person finally notices he has lost the 
respect of others--when he find himself suddenly and 
inexplicably alone--he will certainly be puzzled by how this 
came to be. For he does, after all, have the morally 
beneficial traits of sociability and beneficence. Even if 
it is only through his sense of humor that he pleases 
people, he still knows he makes them happy. But why do they
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consider him a disposable entertainer? He slowly comes to 
realize that loving people or their company is not enough to 
gain their respect: one's deeds must testify to one's love 
of honor. What this person needs is a sense of pride, a 
sense of dignity. If he had pride, he would take greater 
pains to stand by his word, and people would respect him-- 
take him seriously instead of thinking of him as a good- 
natured charlatan. By cultivating his sense of pride, he 
comes to understand what it means to live up to the demands 
of morality: that it is not only something one does because 
a universal law demands it, but also something one does to 
preserve one's own dignity.
Since it is unlikely that the sanguine man will be able 
to bring himself to act from principle right away--his 
nature isn't that way; he is too swayed by the feeling of 
the moment--the feeling of pride will make him stand by his 
word not because it is his duty to do so but because it 
marks the dignity and unity of character which wins the 
respect of others. Through pride, he comes to act in 
accordance with principle. But once he has begun to 
cultivate his pride, he has already set himself on the 
course to morally worthy action. For the mode of thought 
which accompanies pride is conducive to cultivating the 
motive of duty. In what follows, I will show that by using 
his moral strengths (notably, his love of others) in
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combination with his newly won pride, the sanguine person 
cultivates the duty-motive.
Clearly not all forms of pride are compatible with the 
duty motive: arrogance, for instance, leads to immorality 
because it involves thinking of oneself as more worthy than 
others--as someone who has the right to make herself an 
exception to the rule. Proper pride, by contrast, involves 
feeling one's own unconditional worth and seeing that others 
also have this worth. Since the sanguine person lacks pride 
at the outset, he is not likely to develop an arrogant frame 
of mind. But how does even a sense of proper pride help him 
cultivate the motive of duty? Proper pride is after all 
primarily an attitude toward oneself, while the duty motive 
involves respect for the moral law and for all other moral 
agents. I suggest that by combining his newly won pride 
with his natural sociability, the sanguine person begins to 
cultivate his respect for the moral law. His pride makes 
him think of himself as an end in himself. His inclination 
to love others prepares him to put himself in their position 
and so to think of them, too, as ends in themselves. The 
result is a strengthened respect for the source of 
humanity's unconditional worth--for the moral law itself.
By thus exploiting his dispositions of feeling, the sanguine
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person increases the likelihood that he will act from the 
motive of duty.21
I now turn to the melancholy character, which Kant 
describes as follows:
Tilfi. M e l a n c h o l y  Temperament Q.L the Grave Man 
A man disposed melancholy (not one afflicted with 
melancholia, which is a state and not merely a tendency 
toward a state) attaches great importance to everything 
that has to do with himself. He finds grounds for 
apprehension everywhere and directs his attention first 
to the difficulties [an undertaking involves], just as 
the sanguine temperament, on the other hand, takes hope 
of success as its starting point. So the melancholy 
temperament thinks deeply, as the sanguine thinks only 
superficially. Such a man is slow to make promises, 
for keeping his word is dear to him but he is doubtful 
whether he can do it. Not that all this takes place 
from moral grounds (for we are speaking here of 
sensuous incentives). It is rather that the opposite 
inconveniences him, and just because of this makes him 
apprehensive, suspicious and doubtful, and thereby also 
insusceptible to gaiety. --Moreover, this cast of mind,
21It should be understood that actions from mixed motives—  
say, from both a feeling of sympathy and respect for the moral 
law--are morally worthy, since the thought of duty is present 
among the motivating influences. By strengthening feelings 
compatible with the duty motive, we train ourselves to think 
along the lines of duty and so make it more likely that the 
latter will accompany actions from those feelings.
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if it is habitual, conflicts at least in its impulse 
with a philanthropic disposition, which is rather the 
lot of the sanguine temperament; for a man who must 
himseIf do without joy will find it hard not to 
begrudge it to others (A:154).
In contrast to the sanguine character, who is courageous to 
the point of rashness, jumping into situations and promises 
which he later fails to live up to, the melancholy person 
lacks the courage required to be generous and to make 
promises. The effort involved in keeping a promise 
"inconveniences" him; and since he is at bottom an 
unsociable character, he would prefer to stay out of 
dealings with other people altogether.
He has certain dispositions which can be developed into 
moral strengths. One is his innate apprehensiveness about 
his own powers, which makes it easy for him--once he has 
adopted the basic intention to be moral--to reflect on the 
severity of moral requirements and on the difficulty of 
living up to them. His problem, of course, is that he lacks 
the courage and even the desire (because of his dislike for 
other people) to put any of his reflection into action. He 
is plagued by "the self-torturer's torment" (A:156), which 
locks him up in himself and keep him from enjoying the 
pleasure of other people. He is paralyzed not just by self­
doubt but also by a general apathy towards other people.
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This man needs courage in order to trust himself enough 
to begin to take pleasure in life through action and through 
learning to like other people. It is because he fails to 
enjoy himself that he begrudges others their pleasure and to 
feels no responsibility toward them. His failure to enjoy 
himself probably stems from a combination of fear and a 
tyrannical conscience. His conscience may be corrupt, 
judging by false moral principles (e.g., on the standard of 
whether something constitutes an inconvenience to him), but 
its main feature is that it is overactive, causing him to 
brood too much and act too little. His fear of public 
exposure not only makes him neglect his duties toward 
others, but probably also makes him neglect his talents, 
depriving himself of the challenges which constitute one of 
the greatest pleasures in life (LE:175).
As we saw in Part III, the way to combat a tyrannical 
conscience is to cultivate the feelings which dispose you to 
act in ways which redeem the actions (or inaction) through 
which you incurred your guilt. The feeling which the 
melancholy person needs to cultivate is courage. Had he the 
courage to enter society, he would learn to like people and 
would thus strengthen his love of man. He would also 
overcome the fear of failure which prevents him from 
exercising his sense of honor (which is present in him 
because "keeping his word is dear to him") and from 
cultivating his talents. There are many ways to cultivate
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courage, but the main one is simply learning to face 
embarrassment. This is certainly a great inconvenience, and 
it is therefore unlikely that the melancholy man will choose 
this course of action. But self-torture is also an 
inconvenience, and the catalyst to self-change in the 
melancholy man will be his throwing off his self-imposed 
misery.
In order to embark on the road of moral improvement, 
the melancholy man must first recognize his self-doubt and 
lack of concern for others as moral failings. He can do so 
only by adopting the basic intention to be virtuous. Once 
he has formed the basic intention to be moral, he can begin 
to identify the character traits he needs to combat within 
himself. Given the tyrannical nature of his own conscience 
(whether corrupt or not), he will readily come to recognize 
his weaknesses--for which he already condemns himself, 
whether for the right reasons or not--as moral weaknesses. 
But intention does not amount to action; and the motive of 
duty in this newly converted "ex-sinner" may not yet be 
strong enough to actually move him, in particular 
situations, to action. That is, the motive of duty may not 
yet be influential enough within his character for him to 
choose to act on it rather than on his moral failings. His 
moral failings--for example, his unfriendly disposition-- 
will lead him to stray from his intention to be virtuous, 
will lead him to nonbeneficence and neglect of his talents.
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Since he already has the power to reflect on his 
actions and their implications, assessing his character is 
for him a fairly easy task. A respect for the moral law and 
an awareness of the difficulty of living up to it are 
already present in him; what he lacks is the power to put 
his intentions into act ion. By using his moral strength-- 
his deep reflective capacities--the melancholy man can 
become more attentive to ways in which he can take an 
interest in other people and so cultivate a genuine concern 
for others, a love of man. He might do so by engaging in 
friendship and in socirty. If he is painfully shy, he might 
have to cultivate his courage, and he might do so by 
engaging in sports (personally, I've felt more courageous 
since I started Tae Kwon Do). As I will show in Chapters 4 
and 5, friendships and social contexts provide the setting 
within which we reflect on and begin to cultivate our 
morally beneficial feelings.
Conclus ion
The overarching theme of this chapter was the sense of 
dignity required for us to carry out, primarily though not 
exclusively, our duties toward ourselves. The main dignity- 
feelings I have discussed are proper pride, love of honor, 
and courage. I have tried to show how cultivating each of 
these feelings strengthens our sense of dignity and the
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motive of duty itself as it manifests itself in our duties 
toward ourselves. I have also suggested that these "moral" 
feelings are powerful tools for cultivating other emotions 
in accordance with the idea of our dignity: that by 
combining a given feeling with any of the three dignity- 
feelings, we cultivate that particular feeling in such a way 
that it stays within morally proper bounds.
I also discussed the workings of conscience and the 
problems which arise from the ever-present possibility of 
developing a tyrannical, overactive conscience. I proposed 
a solution to the problem: cultivating feelings which 
counteract the dispositions of which we disapprove helps 
clear the guilty conscience, insofar as these feelings help 
us act in ways which rectify the original vice and also 
insofar as these feelings are accompanied by attitudes which 
are morally informed.
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Chapter 4_l
Feelings Associated with Qur Duties Toward others
In this chapter, I focus on the feelings associated 
with our duties toward others. Kant divides these duties 
into two categories: duties of love (beneficence, gratitude 
and sympathy) and duties of respect (avoiding arrogance, 
defamation and ridicule). The chief difference between them 
is that "no one is wronged if duties of love are neglected; 
but a failure in the duty of respect infringes upon a man's 
lawful claim" (DV:464). Putting aside for now the question 
of why "no one is wronged" when we fail to help, to be 
grateful or to be sympathetic, I want to consider what, 
exactly, man's "lawful claim" is.
Seeing others as less worthy than ourselves, defaming 
them, and ridiculing them are ways of violating the dignity 
that each person is entitled to— ways of denying them the 
unconditional worth man is "authorized to put upon himself" 
as a bearer of humanity (DV:449).1 That is why a duty of 
respect is "a duty that is owed" (DV:448): fulfilling it is 
something we owe other people qua ends-in-themselves. Since 
a duty of respect is a duty of not encroaching on another 
person's "lawful claim," it is "analogous to the duty of 
Right not to encroach upon what belongs to anyone" (DV:449-
1For an explanation of why humanity is an end-in-itself, see 
Chapter 4, opening pages.
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50); the difference between our duties toward others in the 
Doctrine of virtue and those in the Doctrine of Right is 
that the latter can be externally enforced, while fulfilling 
our duties of respect (all duties of virtue) is largely a 
matter of developing the proper attitude toward them— an 
attitude of "not exalting oneself above others" (DV:449).
I will argue that developing a respectful attitude 
toward others involves cultivating not only feelings of 
respect toward them but also feelings of love.
Kant claims that love and respect toward others "are 
the feelings that accompany the carrying out" of our duties 
toward others (DV:448). Since he divides these duties into 
duties of love and duties of respect, one might think that 
love is needed to fulfill our duties of love but not our 
duties of respect, and respect is needed to fulfill our 
duties of respect but not our duties of love. However, it 
becomes clear that Kant thinks love and respect have to work 
in tandem for us adequately to fulfill these duties. He 
says, for instance, that we need to "throw the veil of love 
of man" over people's faults in order to soften our 
judgments of them and so to avoid the temptation to defame 
them when it might arise (DV:465). Love and respect, in 
other words, "accompany" the fulfillment of all our duties 
toward others.
This claim— that love and respect "accompany" the 
fulfillment of our duties of love and respect toward others-
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-can be interpreted in two ways. We can interpret love and 
respect as feelings which are instrumental to the 
performance of these duties. This harmonizes with the 
account of morally beneficial feelings I've given so far, 
and Kant clearly does believe that we will be better 
prepared to fulfill our duties towards others if we 
cultivate feelings of love and respect toward them. But I 
shall also show that Kant considers love and respect to be 
indispensable to the adequate fulfillment of these duties 
because they enable the duty-motive (reverence for the moral 
law) to express itself in a direct and heartfelt concern for 
the dignity and well-being of others. Love and respect, I 
shall argue, are the ways in which the duty-motive manifests 
itself in the morally mature agent— the individual who has 
had the time and occasion to cultivate the proper attitudes 
toward others through developing her social graces, engaging 
in culture, etc.
Ll. Beneficence; How Related tc Benevolence?
Kant is quick to point out that since we cannot be put 
under obligation to have feelings, we have no duty to feel 
love toward others (DV:449). Nevertheless, we have a duty 
to cultivate feelings of love and sympathy toward others 
because these feelings help us more effectively carry out
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our duties of love (DV:402, 456). The love of mankind which 
morality requires of us from the outset, however, is not a 
feeling of love or a pleasure in other people, but rather 
"the maxim of benevolence (practical love), which results in 
benificence" (DV:449, first emphasis mine). Morality 
requires that we take an interest in others' ends and be 
willing to help them whenever we are able.
Kant is actually somewhat misleading in claiming that 
there can be a maxim of benevolence. since maxims are 
"subjective principles of action" (G:422n) and benevolence 
is more an inner attitude of well-wishing than an intention 
to act in certain ways (that is why he contrasts benevolence 
with beneficence in the first place). When we are 
benevolent, we take an interest in another person's ends, 
though not necessarily an active one: it is well for us when 
things go well for others, even if we are not directly 
responsible for their well-being (DV:450, cf. 452, 460). 
While benevolence can issue in beneficence— in actively 
promoting the ends of the other (DV:450)— it is also 
possible, from a sense of duty, to do someone a favor whom 
we neither like nor wish well (DV:402). In other words, it 
is possible to be beneficent without being benevolent.
What, then, is morally required of us— benevolence, 
beneficence or both?
Beneficence— actively promoting the ends of others, 
provided these ends are morally permissible— is a duty
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(DV:450, 452). In adopting a maxim of beneficence, we 
resolve to help others through action. But what about 
benevolence, the attitude of sincerely wishing that it go 
well for others? Are we required to adopt this inner 
stance? Kant suggests we are when he says that "benevolence 
always remains a duty, even toward a misanthropist, whom one 
cannot love but to whom one can still do good" (DV:402).
But here he is not claiming that it is our duty to wish
others well whom we do not like; he is only claiming that it
is our duty to dQ them good even when we cannot love them.
So what Kant means by "benevolence" here is actually 
beneficence or active benevolence. He suggests that the 
latter is all that morality can require of us when he says 
that our duties of love involve an "active, practical 
benevolence (beneficence), making the well-being and 
happiness of others my end" (DV:452). Since ends are what 
we adopt as goals of action, it seems that acting 
benevolently, and not necessarily developing a particular 
attitude toward people, is all that morality requires of us.
But in his discussion of our other duties of love and 
of the vices directly opposed to the love of mankind, Kant 
does suggest that in addition to helping others, we are also 
required to adopt a benevolent attitude as well as loving 
feelings toward them. To wish others well, and if this 
should prove impossible (which, we shall see, would involve 
a moral failure), then at least to actively promote their
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ends, is what morality asks of us from the outset: to use 
our inner sensible dispositions to cultivate an attitude of 
wishing them well is what morality asks of us in the long 
run. This will become clear in my discussion of some of the 
aforementioned duties and vices. But first let us consider 
what morality requires of us from the crude and possibly 
unfriendly outset: benificent action.
II. The Duty of Beneficence
This is the duty "to promote according to one's means 
the happiness of others in need, without hoping for 
something in return" (DV:453). Why do we have this duty and 
to whom, exactly, does it extend— to those whom we think of 
as "the needy" or to anyone who needs a favor or a friendly 
gesture?
In the Dostfine of Virtue as well as in the Groundwork. 
Kant suggests that we have a duty to help only those who are 
in relatively dire need— that we need only be prepared to 
satisfy people's ends of dignified survival but need not 
promote whatever morally permissible ends they might have. 
This interpretation is suggested by Kant's repeated emphasis 
on the needy (Menschen in Noten) in his examples and 
derivations of the duty of beneficence (see DV:453, G:398, 
423). This suggests that Kant is referring primarily to
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people who are suffering, financially needy, or physically 
or mentally impaired. Such people are in need of fairly 
radical sorts of helping action. If this is the case, then 
the duty of beneficence could require me to be charitable—  
for instance, to take a financially strapped friend out for 
a meal once in a while— but not to support the same friend 
in whatever morally permissible projects he might have (I 
would not, for instance, be required to encourage or support 
him in his fledgling attempts at musical expression).
Onora O'Neill has interpreted the duty of beneficence 
more broadly, as asking us not only to promote people's 
basic ends of dignified survival but also to help them in 
whatever morally permissible projects they might need our 
help in completing. At least she suggests this much in her 
reconstruction of Kant's derivation of the duty, which I 
here paraphrase. As agents— that is, as setters and 
realizers of ends— we necessarily will the fulfillment of 
all our ends. But if we rationally intend an end, then we 
also intend to pursue the means by which we can realize it. 
As finite beings, however, we are not completely self- 
sufficient. Since, at some point in our lives, we will need 
the help of others to realize some of our ends (just as each 
of us has, in the past, already relied on the help and care 
of others), we cannot coherently will that others not help 
us. (Indeed, without such help from others we wouldn't even 
be here.) But the maxim of relying on the help of others is
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not universalizable unless we are also prepared to help 
them. We must, in other words, be prepared not only to 
receive the help and support of others, but also to help and 
support them when needed. Thus we have a duty to help 
others.3
O'Neill's reading suggests that we have a duty to 
promote whatever permissible ends others need help in 
achieving. The actions required under the duty thus 
interpreted would clearly extend beyond helping the 
suffering; they would also include helping whomever might 
need our help in pursuing the projects which are important 
to them. At first sight, O'Neill seems to be stretching 
Kant's intended use of "needs." Recall that Kant's own 
discussion of the duty of beneficence suggests that he is 
referring primarily to the needs of the needy— the 
suffering, the financially strapped, or the physically or 
mentally impaired. If so, then O'Neill is overextending 
Kant's use of "needs" to include needs which are less basic 
than those which Kant himself intended. Kant seems to have 
intended only those needs which must be secured for 
dignified survival; O'Neill, by contrast, seems to include 
more "luxurious" needs such as emotional needs and the need 
for support in one's personal development.3
aO'Neill, Constructions of Reason (hereafter referred to in 
the text as "O'Neill, CR"), pp.100-1, 114-15, 140-41.
3A least she suggests this much at CR, p.39, footnote 13.
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A duty to enable the needy to survive in a dignified 
way can be seen as deriving from the requirement that we 
respect their status as ends in themselves— as rational 
beings possessing an inherent dignity. But a duty to 
promote people's ends such, provided they are morally 
permissible, seems to require that we value their happiness 
and not just their rationality. What sort of reasoning lies 
behind the apparent logical leap from the duty to respect 
others as ends in themselves to the duty to promote their 
happiness? O'Neill offers the following passage from Kant: 
Now humanity could no doubt subsist if everybody 
contributed nothing to the happiness of others but at 
the same time refrained from deliberately impairing 
their happiness. This is, however, merely to agree 
negatively and not positively with humanity as an end 
in itself unless everyone endeavors also, so far as in 
him lies, to further the ends of others (G:430; I use 
O'Neill's translation from CR, p.140).
Kant is here suggesting that we would fail to respect 
people's status as ends-in-themselves if we merely refrained 
from interfering with their ends; that in addition to 
tolerating their ends, we must also promote them by adopting 
them as our own. He offers nothing by way of argument to 
support this conclusion. Indeed, the conclusion seems 
entirely unwarranted given Kant's characterization of what 
it is to be an end-in-itself. An end-in-itself, he says, is
210
"an end which should never be acted against and therefore 
one which in all willing must never be regarded merely as a 
means but must always be esteemed at the same time as an 
end" (G:437).4 The requirement that we always treat people 
as ends and never merely as means is here treated as 
equivalent to the requirement that we never act against 
people's status as ends in themselves. The obvious 
interpretation of this requirement as it bears on other 
people's ends is that we treat people as ends-in-themseIves 
by esteeming or respecting their ends. It does not 
obviously follow, however, that respecting someone's ends 
involves adopting and promoting them.
O'Neill tries to use the notion of finite rational 
agency to connect the requirement of treating humanity as an 
end-in-itself with that of promoting other people's ends. 
Finite rational agency, she says, is vulnerable and must 
above all be preserved (that much is clearly required by the 
formula of the end-in-itself). She goes on to argue:
'On Kant's view, people are ends in themselves because they 
are the potential vessels of a good will. The good or moral will 
is the only thing in the world which is unconditionally valuable or 
good (G: 393—4). Since the good will is instantiated in all willing 
that is moral and not merely legal, the good will effectively wills 
itself and therefore also its own condition of possibility, 
rational nature (distinguished from the rest of nature by its 
capacity to set itself an end). Humanity is rational nature; 
therefore, humanity is an end in itself (G:437). Since moral 
willing is characterized by respect for the moral law and for our 
capacity to legislate it, the good will constitutes "the proper 
object of respect" and humanity, insofar as it embodies a will that 
is potentially good, possesses an inherent dignity (G:440).
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Simple restraint from using other finite beings as mere 
means may not be enough to secure their agency. If 
vulnerable sorts of agency are to be developed and kept 
intact, the bearers of such fragile capacities for 
action may also need help in achieving certain 
subjective ends....Only by making the ends of others to 
some extent our own do we recognize others' agency 
fully, and acknowledge that they are initiators of 
their own projects as well as responders to our 
projects, and moreover vulnerable and non-self­
sufficient initiators of projects. That (I think) is 
the point of the idea that we should agree "positively" 
with humanity as an end-in-itself. (O'Neill, CR, p.140) 
The idea here is that we could effectively undermine 
people's agency by failing to support their projects. 
O'Neill's assumption is that people's very capacity for 
agency depends on things going well for them; that "when 
things go badly their very capacity for agency fails" (CR, 
p.139, footnote 13). If this is true, then respecting 
people's humanity does indeed entail promoting their ends.
But is it true? A person's ability to set ends is 
clearly not affected by how things are going for him— the 
most miserable pauper, despite his condition, is still able 
to set ends for himself. His ability to realize his ends, 
however, in so far as he does not possess the requisite 
financial or physical means to do so, is clearly affected by
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his condition. Even a person who is psychologically in a 
bad way (say, in a period of self-doubt or mourning) might 
find his capacity to realize ends detrimentally affected by 
his psychological state— he might find that the projects 
which were once important to him now seem meaningless. Such 
persons are clearly in need of help in pursuing their 
projects. But those persons are physically or mentally 
needy. It is not immediately apparent that we could help 
undermine a healthy person's capacity for agency if we 
failed to support her in her various projects.5 There is 
nothing in O'Neill's argument, in other words, that implies 
that we have a duty to help those who are not in a bad way.6
5What about an individual who is extremely sensitive to the 
opinions which others hold of her projects? Would not such a 
person's capacity for agency be undermined if we failed to support 
her in her projects? It seems that this is the sort of "healthy" 
person O'Neill has in mind when she says that people's very 
capacity for agency depends on things going well for them; that 
"when things go badly their very capacity for agency fails" (CR, 
p.139, footnote 13). I am not sure, however, that Kant would hold 
that we have a duty to pamper sensitive souls. His ethics is, 
after all, a hardy ethics, a doctrine that characterizes the 
healthy individual as someone who is able "te put up with the 
misfortunes of life" (DV:484). Meeting with misunderstanding or 
disapproval of even our morally permissible projects is a common 
occurrence, a "misfortune" that each of us must get used to. All 
we have a right to demand from others is that they refrain from 
actively undermining our agency, that is, that they not interfere 
with our projects; we have no right to demand that they also 
approve of them and promote them. That is why we can refrain from 
helping others without accruing moral demerit (see DV:448, 450).
6In "Universal Law, Rational Being and the Kingdom of Ends: A 
Reading of Groundwork II" (unpublished), Paul Guyer interprets the 
Formula of the End-In-Itself as providing a positive requirement to 
promote rational nature in ourselves and in others. The arguments 
he offers in favor of his interpretation are suggestive but to my 
mind not quite convincing, since they are all based on Kant's 
discussion of duties toward ourselves and not toward others (see
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Kant's own argument in the Doctrine of Virtue for 
promoting the happiness of others actually takes needs and 
not ends as placing a special moral claim on us. He says, 
"every man who finds himself in need wishes to be helped by 
others" (DV:453, ray emphasis) and then goes on to use this 
supposedly universal wish to derive the general duty of 
beneficence, construed as a duty to help the needy: "But if 
he lets his maxim of being unwilling to assist others in 
turn when they are in need become public, that is, makes 
this a universal permissive law, then everyone would 
likewise deny him assistance when he himself is in need, or 
at least would be authorized to deny it. Hence the maxim of 
self-interest would conflict with itself if it were made a 
universal law" (DV:453). This argument makes no appeal to 
the dignity of rational nature, but rather to the assumption 
that everyone who is in need wishes to be helped by others.
I take this assumption to be dubious; Kant is appealing to a 
wish that most of us may have but which can by no means be 
assumed to be universal (one can easily imagine a proud 
libertarian who would rather be self-sufficient than
esp. pp.27-31). Kant argues that we are required to develop our 
own rational nature (our capacity for choosing and realizing ends) 
because, as rational beings, we necessarily will the realization of 
our present and future ends: "as a rational being, man necessarily 
wills that all capacities in him be developed, since they can be 
useful and are given to him for all sorts of possible ends" 
(G:423). Kant's arguments for promoting the happiness of others. 
however, make no appeal to the necessary features of rational 
nature but rather to the assumption that everyone who finds himself 
in need wishes to be helped by others— an assumption which I find 
unfounded.
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humiliated by the help of others). If, however, the 
principle behind this argument is the dignity of rational 
nature and the need to preserve it, the argument gains more 
plausibility: we are required to help the needy because, 
like ouselves when we are needy, they are suffering the 
indignity of being stunted in the exercise of their rational 
capacities. Out of respect for these capacities, we are 
requied to help them back to a healthy state.
Kant therefore has an argument for why we have a duty 
to help the needy survive in a dignified way: since their 
very capacity for agency is reduced by their condition, we 
need to help them back to a state in which they are able 
again to pursue their ends on their own (a state in which 
they most strongly feel their dignity). But to make 
"healthy" people's ends our own is something we cannot be 
held to by the moral law, since, as we have seen, it only 
requires that we respect people's ends and not, in addition, 
that we promote them. In the next section, I shall consider 
quite a different reason for why we have a duty to promote 
other people's happiness. But before I do so, I want to 
consider why Kant claims that beneficence produces love of 
man.
Kant claims that we have a duty to cultivate 
benevolence because it helps us combat the harmful 
disposition of hatred of man, a disposition which "is always 
hateful. even when it takes the form merely of completely
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avoiding men" (DV:402).’ One way to combat this 
disposition is to help people. For Kant thinks that even 
when we do not love a person from the outset, we can come to 
love him by helping him:
So the saying "you ought to love your neighbor as 
yourself" does not mean that you ought immediately 
(first) love him and (afterwards) by means of this love 
do good to him. It means, rather, dfi good to your 
fellow man, and your beneficence will produce love of 
man in you (as an aptitude of the inclination to 
beneficence in general) (DV:402).
Kant's assumption is that by doing good to others, we will 
come to love them. This is of course a tenuous assumption, 
given that we seem equally prone to develop feelings of 
disdain or even disgust toward the people we help. However, 
on Kant's theory of agency, we have the capacity to curb 
such negative feelings and to cultivate the loving feelings 
which can, on Kant's assumption, equally well be produced 
through beneficent action. Kant never explains how 
beneficence is supposed to produce love of man, but his idea
7Kant's claim that hatred of man is wrong not because of its 
consequences but simply because it is "hateful" should alert us to 
how much of his discussion of our duties is driven by a certain 
vision of the good life, some elements of which follow from the 
categorical imperative, while other are present because of their 
intrinsic aesthetic appeal. Some of the duties which morality 
imposes on us can be fully justified only by appeal to these 
aesthetic elements. I shall show, in Section II, that for this 
reason we need to take these "ornamental" elements just as 
seriously as we take the categorical imperative itself.
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seems to be that our interaction with the person we help 
will give us familiarity with her, will perhaps even provide 
an occasion for exchanging pleasantries, and that tl* 2 
patient's sense of decency (assuming she has any!) will 
prompt her to show gratitude toward us. On the whole, the 
experience is likely to be amiable, and so will produce in 
us some affection for the patient, will make us "love" her.
The pleasant social dimensions of the experience will 
make us more disposed toward beneficence in the future; but 
this natural feeling of love, even when broadened to 
encompass more individuals, is not what Kant means by the 
rationally based "love of man: it is simply a pleasure in 
another person without a genuine concern for or willingness 
to take part in her ends, including a curiosity about them 
or interest in them. I think we all know the difference 
between casually uttering, "How are you doing?" (usually 
pronounced, "Howya doin'?") and sincerely being curious 
about the other person's condition (say, being genuiely 
interested in how a difficult exam went for her, etc.). The 
latter attitude the point at which natural love becomes 
tempered by a rationally based love of man ("practical 
love," humanitas practical. which involves a genuine well- 
wishing and sincere interest in her ends— and a willingness 
to promote them (DV:4 56).
We can also offer a more "technical" account of how 
beneficence produces benevolence, understood as both a
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feeling and a disposition of wishing people well. In order 
to be beneficent, we need to make another person's ends our 
own (DV:450). In acting beneficently, therefore, we satisfy 
another persons's ends as. well as our own. Since "the 
attainment of every aim rAbsicht1 is coupled with a feeling 
of pleasure" (CJ:187), beneficence will by its very nature 
be pleasant for us.* But can this pleasurable result of 
beneficent action really be what Kant means by a benevolent 
attitude? It can, if Kant thinks the feeling of pleasure in 
question is coupled with an interest in the other person's 
well-being. We can offer the following Kantian reasons for 
concluding that the pleasure produced by beneficent action 
actually involves a benevolent attitude in the subject. 
Through beneficence, we contribute to another person's 
perfection— to her happiness, in so far as it is compatible 
with morality. Now, love of man, understood as a feeling, 
is simply pleasure in another person's perfection (DV:449). 
Beneficence thus produces love of man, or pleasure in 
another person's perfection. But it would seem that the 
pleasure produced by beneficence must also involve a 
benevolent attitude. For we cannot take pleasure in seeing 
somebody thrive whom we do not at the same time wish well; 
in order to feel love toward the patient, we must also wish
•The quote I offer from the Critique q£ Judgment has "Absicht" 
(purpose or intention) rather than "Zweck." which Kant normally 
uses in reference to ends of action. But the point should hold
also in regard to ends of action.
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her well. In this sense, beneficence produces benevolence. 
Whether or not this is what Kant actually had in mind for 
how beneficence produces a heartfelt interest in other 
people's well-being, it is at least a story which harmonizes 
with his own suggestions.
In the next two sections, I will consider why morality 
requires us to cultivate a loving disposition and how we can 
do it.
IILi Why Benevolence i s  Required Us
If it is difficult to derive the duty of beneficence 
from the categorical imperative, we might expect it to be at 
least as difficult to derive a duty to cultivate benevolent 
feelings and attitudes, given that the latter seem valuable 
primarily as means to beneficent action. At least Kant says 
things which suggest that we are required to cultivate 
benevolence primarily for the purpose of using it to promote 
other people's happiness— either as a motive which 
cooperates with the duty-motive or as a feeling which alerts 
us to other people's need for help when thoughts of duty are 
not present in us.’ He says, for instance, that we should 
cultivate compassion because it is one of "the impulses that
’Barbara Herman suggests the former in "On the Value of 
Acting from the Motive of Duty," p.15; Paul Guyer suggests the 
latter in Kant and the Experience of Freedom. Ch.10, pp.389-90. I 
think Kant has both in mind, as well as a third alternative which 
I will suggest shortly.
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nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of 
duty alone could not accomplish" (DV:457), which suggests 
that compassion is valuable as a motive for beneficent 
action in cases where the motive of duty somehow fails us.
He also points out that if we ask not only what a person 
should do, but what he will do, love is an invaluable motive 
because "what a person does unwillingly he does so poorly, 
even resorting to sophistic subterfuges to evade the precept 
of duty, that this latter may not be relied on very much as 
a motive without the participation of love" (OH:338).10 
Again, Kant is stressing the power of love to move us to 
beneficence when the motive of duty should fail us.
However, as we saw in Part I— something which is also 
clear from Kant's example of the unsympathetic yet 
beneficent individual in Groundwork I— it is also possible 
to help people without loving them. Love is thus a 
sufficient but not a necessary motive for beneficent action. 
Since benevolent feelings are merely inessential means 
toward beneficent action, it would seem that a duty to 
cultivate such feelings is on even thinner justificatory 
ground than the duty of beneficence itself.
But Kant does not view benevolent dispositions as mere 
means toward beneficent action. He also sees benevolence as
10Kant, "The End of All Things," from Kant on History, trans. 
L.W. Beck, p.82 (page reference in text is to Akademie edition).
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something intrinsically valuable, something which has a 
justification independent of beneficent results. He says: 
Would it not be better for the well-being of the world 
generally if human morality were limited to duties of 
Right, fulfilled with the utmost conscientiousness, and 
benevolence were considered morally indifferent? It is 
not so easy to see what effect this would have on man's 
happiness. But at least a great moral adornment, love 
of man, would then be missing from the world. Love of 
man is, accordingly, required by itself, in order to 
present the world as a beautiful moral whole in its 
full perfection, even if no account is taken of 
advantages (of happiness) (DV:458).
Love of man, or benevolence, is not required here as a means 
to promoting the happiness of others, but is required "by 
itself." Without love of man, the world would seem less 
perfect, would lack "a great moral adornment." The 
difference between an aesthetic and a moral adornment is 
unclear; Kant could equally well have said that the world 
would lack a great adornment if it lacked love of man. His 
point is simply that love of man has an intrinsic value 
which is most aptly characterized as aesthetic: it is needed 
to "present the world as a beautiful moral whole in its full 
perfection." Since this passage appears at the end of 
Kant's discussion of the three duties of love toward others, 
which are here being contrasted with juridical duties, we
221
can infer that it is also meant to apply to the duty of 
beneficence; and that promoting the happiness of others—  
including those who are not suffering or needy— is something 
which, like benevolence, is required for its intrinsic 
beauty and nobility.
What sorts of considerations might have led Kant to 
claim that love of man is required (presumably as a duty) 
even though it is only an aesthetic desideratum? I think we 
need here to curb our impulse to deduce everything from the 
categorical imperative and, for a moment, appreciate how 
much of Kant's discussion of our duties of love is driven by 
a certain vision of the good life, an integral part of which 
involves the desire to see people wishing each other well 
and cultivating appropriate feelings toward one another.11 
Although central elements of this vision follow from the 
categorical imperative, other elements are present because 
of their intrinsic aesthetic appeal— because of their 
capacity to beautify human nature.
In his discussions of why morality requires us to 
further the beauty of human nature, Kant's romantic impulse 
joins with his youthful British sentimentalist streak to 
produce some of the most aestheticized passages in his moral 
philosophy. He insists that a cultivated moral character 
must be beautiful as well as principled, and that although 
it is not our duty to possess feelings of benevolence from
“I am grateful to Curtis Bowman for pointing this out to me.
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the outset, we are required to cultivate them because they 
beautify human nature by beautifying the moral disposition 
itself. Since beauty, for Kant, inspires primarily with a 
feeling of love— beauty "prepares us to love something, even 
nature, apart from any interest" (CJ:267)— human nature at 
its most beautiful must, for Kant, be lovely. Benevolence 
beautifies a moral character by adding to the uprightness of 
a dutiful disposition a direct feeling for others which one 
naturally comes to express in one's demeanor. Through its 
outward effects and expressions, it gives a beautiful glow 
to virtuous action which inspires others to virtue 
itself.13
That Kant locates the value of kindly dispositions 
partly in their capacity to beautify a moral character will 
become clear in the next section, where I discuss the 
connection of benevolence to the social graces.
IV. Luxury, Social Grace and the Beautiful Character
The person who fails to recognize the importance of 
beauty as well as uprightness in a moral character might be 
compared to someone who fails to appreciate the capacity of 
her palate for tasting subtle flavors and, when served a 
meal, mixes up the meat, the vegetables and the sauce
12The latter point, which is stressed in Kant's discussion of
the social graces (which I turn to next) is strongly neo-Platonic, 
and Shaftesbury might have been an influence here.
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"because it all ends up in the stomach anyway." Like the 
unrefined eater, the person who denies grace a role in 
morality expresses an attitude too base and pragmatic for 
man, given the capacity in human nature for refinement and 
beauty. Developing one's benevolence— the disposition of 
wishing people well as well as loving and respecting them—  
is the primary means for beautifying one's moral character.
The following passages on luxury are helpful in placing 
the value of benevolence as an inner disposition, for its 
beautifying power is much like that of luxury:
Riotous extravagance is active; [the] extravagance of 
self-indulgence is indolent. The former has its uses; 
it adds vitality and vigor to life; horse-riding, for 
instance, is a luxury. But all kinds of indolent 
effeminacy are very harmful; they sap the vital powers 
of man; tippling, wearing silk, driving in carriages 
are examples of this tendency. The man who is inclined 
to riotous extravagance preserves his own energy, as 
well as that of others, but he who indulges in the 
refinements of indolent comfort, though he maintains 
the energy of others, discourages his own. The former 
is, therefore, preferable to the latter (LE:173).
[Luxury] promotes the arts and sciences and develops 
man's talents; it thus seems to be the condition on 
which humanity is designed. It refines morality; for
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in morality both uprightness and refinement are to be 
looked for; the one implies ungrudging observance, the 
other adds charm to this, as, for instance, in 
hospitality. Thus luxury tends to develop to the 
utmost the beauty of human nature. We must not 
confound it with self-indulgence. Luxury consists in 
variety; self-indulgence in quantity. Intemperance is 
a sign of lack of taste. A wealthy miser who 
entertains once in a while piles up the food on his 
guests' plate, but gives no thought to variety. But 
luxury requires good taste, and is found only with 
people who possess that quality; by its variety it 
clarifies man's judgment, gives occupation to many 
people and vitalizes the entire social structure. From 
this point of view, therefore, there can be no moral 
objection to luxury, provided it is managed so as to 
keep it within the bounds of what we can afford and 
continue to afford (LE:175-6).
Even though luxuries like horse-riding develop the beauty of 
human nature and vitalize society, Kant's last sentence 
makes it clear that there is no special duty to be luxurious 
or to cultivate the good taste required for it. Luxury is 
simply permissible. Nevertheless, since "in morality both 
uprightness and refinement are to be looked for," we do need 
to take steps to add charm to our moral demeanor; and being 
luxurious (when one can afford it) is one way of doing so.
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It is clear from the first passage that the refinement which 
Kant is seeking is not a self-indulgent refinement, but 
rather one which has a vitalizing influence on the subject 
and on society as a whole. Just as luxury vitalizes subject 
and society, benevolence vitalizes a moral character by 
enabling her to use her feelings to heed the call of duty 
itself.
To be able to use one's feelings as guides to moral 
action, one has to cultivate them. Benevolence, respect, 
and love of man are the feelings we develop through the 
social graces. Through hospitality, courtesy, 
conversational ease, humor, and so forth, we naturally 
develop kindly dispositions toward others— feelings which 
enliven us to the world, alerting us to people's thoughts 
and needs. In other words, we cultivate our feelings in 
such a way that they align themselves with moral principles, 
making us more attuned to the call of duty itself.
Kant has the following to say about the power of the 
social graces to add charm to the uprightness of a moral 
cast of mind:
It is a duty to oneself as well as others not to 
isolate oneself...but to use one's moral perfections in 
social intercourse.... While making oneself a fixed 
center of one's principles, one ought to regard this 
circle drawn around one as also forming part of an all- 
inclusive circle of those who, in their disposition,
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are citizens of the world— not exactly in order to 
promote as the end what is best for the world but only 
to cultivate what leads indirectly to this end: to 
cultivate a disposition of reciprocity— agreeableness, 
tolerance, mutual love and respect (affableness and 
propriety, humanitas aesthetica et decorum). and so to 
associate the graces with virtue. To bring this about 
is itself a duty of virtue (DV:473).
Although it is our duty to cultivate a graceful cast of 
mind, Kant is quick to point out that such charming 
qualities as affability, sociability, courtesy, hospitality 
and gentleness (in disagreeing without quarreling) are "only 
externals or by-products (parerqua) [of virtue]" in that 
they must never form the basis of virtue, which always 
consists in respect for the moral law. Nevertheless, 
socially graceful behavior resembles action from a moral 
disposition, beautifully carried out: the social graces 
"give a beautiful illusion rpgpmhijng virtue that is also 
not deceptive since everyone knows how it must be taken"
(DV:473, my emphasis). The social graces, in other words, 
give us a picture of how virtue can most beautifully be 
expressed. Indeed, they provide us with numerous occasions 
for cultivating and refining our emotional dispositions to a 
level at which they conform to and even become part of a 
moral cast of mind.
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The normative rules governing hospitality, courtesy, 
and so on are of course not purely moral rules— indeed, many 
of them are not even a priori. They are rules of social 
intercourse, some of which are conditioned by the fashions
of the times but some of which also have a priori grounding
as rules of taste. By providing pleasing examples of 
principle-guided behavior, the social graces present a 
beautiful appearance of virtue which draws people in, giving 
them a "feeling" for virtue:
[The social graces] are, indeed, only tokens, yet they
promote the feeling for virtue itself by a striving to
bring this illusion as near as possible to the truth.
By all of these, which are merely the manners one is 
obliged to show in social intercourse, one binds others 
too; and so they still promote a virtuous disposition 
by at least making virtue fashionable (DV:473-4).
Even though they exemplify merely legal action (action 
conforming to the moral law but not done from the motive of 
duty), the graces are supposed to make virtue "fashionable" 
by giving beautiful and pleasing instances of action which 
is in some sense obligatory. Kant seems to be suggesting 
that the mutual obligation involved in, say, hospitality 
(the obligation on the part of the host to serve his guests; 
on the part of the guests to express admiration or 
appreciativeness) gives us the dynamics of virtue in a 
pleasant packaging: the graces "sell" virtue, showing us
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that it can be both beautiful to behold and pleasing to 
execute.
How can an illusion promote the real thing? Kant tells 
us that the social graces help us "cultivate a disposition 
of reciprocity— agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and 
respect (affableness and propriety, humanitas aesthetica 
decorum)" (DV:473). The question is whether such a 
disposition is compatible with the motive of duty and can 
join with it in a reasonably natural way. If Kant is able 
to provide a natural bridge from the disposition of 
reciprocity involved in socially graceful behavior to the 
virtuous disposition, he will have shown that the illusion 
can indeed promote the real thing— that the graces help us 
develop a virtuous disposition from which we carry out our 
duties toward others both from feelings of love and in a 
morally worthy way. If this is possible, then the social 
graces are indeed a training ground for virtue: they provide 
a context of mutual obligation which strengthens and 
develops our feelings of love and respect toward others, 
producing a disposition in which a sense of obligation 
combines with appropriate feelings towards others. In Part 
V, I shall show that it is indeed possible for the motive of 
duty to express itself as a genuine concern others (as love 
of man). First, however, let us consider how the social 
graces provide a "training ground" for virtue.
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The dynamics of mutual obligation instantiated by the 
social graces correspond most clearly to those which 
accompany the carrying out of our duties of love toward 
others. We might expect, then, that the disposition of 
reciprocity cultivated by the social graces is relevant 
primarily to our duties of love toward others. For since 
respect is something we simply owe others, carrying out our 
duties of respect toward others imposes no obligation on 
them; and in this sense, there is no mutual obligation 
involved in our duties of respect. Nevertheless, as we 
shall see, the graces do provide instances of respectful 
behavior and are in this sense conducive also to carrying 
out our duties of respect towards others.
Kant stresses that in carrying out the duty of 
beneficence, we need to show respect as well as love toward 
the patient, for only this will truly promote her happiness. 
We need to show genuine good-will without appearing 
patronizing and without making the patient feel obligated 
toward us (even though technically speaking, she does incur 
a debt of gratitude toward us). We need, in other words, to 
give her the sweets of happiness without the bitters of 
indebtedness. We show respect for the patient's dignity by 
downplaying whatever sacrifices the act might involve for us 
(DV:453) and by making sure we help her according to her 
conception of happiness rather than our own (DV:454).
Without feelings of love and respect toward others, we would
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have to decide how to do this according to principles alone- 
-not just the moral law but also a cumbersome array of 
empirical generalizations concerning human reactions and 
preferences. Although it is possible to decide how to act 
from principles alone, feelings tell us immediately. without 
extensive deliberation, how to act in a loving and 
respectful way: to do so, we simply express the love and 
respect we feel toward the person at the moment.13 
Feelings of love and respect can help us decide not only 
when to act on moral requirements (as the case of compassion 
suggests) but also how to do it.
Through the social graces, we are trained to express 
our feelings of love and respect toward others in a graceful 
way. Take, for instance, the case of making a joke in order 
to ease the tension in a social gathering. Even though the
“Analogously, Paul Guyer argues that according to Kant, 
feelings of closeness toward others "can be used to delimit the 
sphere of otherwise infinite, and therefore impractical, imperfect 
duties," i.e., to bring the total sum of occasions for beneficence 
to a humanly manageable quantity (Kant and the Experience of 
Freedom. Ch.10, p.390). Although I agree that feelings can be used 
to this end, I believe Guyer is stretching the evidence he cites 
from the Critique of. Judgment in support of his claim. At CJ:169, 
Kant is attempting to characterize the principle which 
distinguishes the faculty of judgment from other faculties and 
makes it autonomous. He says this principle must be a rule of 
reflection and not a concept for determinant judgment because for 
the latter, "another faculty of judgment would again be required to 
enable us to decide whether the case was one for the application of 
the rule or not." Kant is here envisioning a regress of faculties 
of judgment which can be avoided only by assigning a principle of 
reflection to the faculty of judgment itself. It is thus a 
principle and not a feeling which is supposed to put and end to the 
regress. Although this passage might suggest something about the 
role of judgment in moral deliberation, I don't think it implies 
anything about the role of feeling in moral life.
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art of making jokes has "no seriousness in its presentation" 
and thus belongs to agreeable rather than to fine art— and 
should be estimated accordingly, i.e., not according to 
rules of taste, which demand seriousness of presentation, 
but according to principles of gratification, which do not 
(CJ:336)— jokes still have the aim of pleasing others and 
do, in so far as pleasure is an end of others, promote the 
happiness of others. In making the joke, the agent might be 
moved by sympathy for the uncomfortable and tongue-tied 
condition of those who are present. But it would be 
insulting to express this sympathy as sympathy: it would 
underscore the embarrassing aspects of the situation and 
would thus constitute a violation of social etiquette. 
Through respect for the others present, the agent chooses to 
express her sympathy by means of a joke, relieving the 
tension in a way which appears effortless and hence imposes 
no sense of obligation on the others. Those who are present 
are relieved by the joke without at the same time feeling 
indebted toward the agent. The social occasion for making a 
joke thus illustrates the way in which feelings can show us 
how to be beneficent without appearing patronizing.
By providing a setting in which we express our feelings 
in response to a sense of obligation, the social graces 
train us to execute our moral requirements in a graceful and 
heartfelt way.
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V. Love of Man and the Good Will
But have we really done anything more than show that 
the social graces help us conform to moral requirements? We
still need to show that the graceful and aesthetic aspects
of social life are conducive to a virtuous disposition or a 
good will, and hence to action which not only conforms to 
moral requirements but which is also morally worthy. We 
need, in other words, to show that the disposition of 
reciprocity cultivated through the social graces can become 
part of the virtuous disposition itself. In order for this 
to be possible, kindly dispositions must be able to "merge" 
with the motive of duty (or reverence for the moral law), 
not simply be present along with it, and even become part of
the motive of duty itself. This, I shall argue, is indeed
possible, given a certain view of the motive of duty as it 
manifests itself in the morally mature individual.
s morally mature agents, we fulfill our duties towards 
ourselves in a morally worthy way (i.e., from the motive of 
duty) differs from the way in which we do so as moral 
novices— that is, as newly converted sinners or as morally 
inexperienced individuals (e.g., teenagers) who are just 
embarking on road to self-improvement. In order to fulfill 
our duties towards ourselves in a morally worthy a way, the 
motive of duty must be effective in the sense that if 
cooperating natural motives were absent, we would still have
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acted that way by the force of duty alone. The force of 
duty is certainly stern and uncompromising; but the motive 
of duty, I shall show, is not.
The motive of duty is captured at its most basic level 
(in moral novices) by reverence or respect for the moral 
law— a feeling of constraint in the face of moral 
obligations, accompanied by an awareness of the rightness 
and reasonability in fulfilling them as well as by a 
knowledge that we is not exempt from them because we are 
able to fulfill them (See Chapter 2 for a detailed 
discussion of respect for the moral law). As we strive to 
become better individuals, however, our moral perception 
improves in such a way that the motive of duty— a direct 
concern for the rightness of our actions— can directly 
manifest itself in terms of feelings other than respect for 
the moral law (though a basic regard for principle and use 
of it as a limiting condition is never abandoned). In the 
case of fulfilling our duties toward ourselves in a morally 
worthy way, the motive of duty manifests itself in reason- 
based feelings such as proper pride, self-respect and love 
of honor.
The morally mature agent is someone who has not only 
adopted the end of moral perfection but has also had the 
time to reflect on her moral requirements and the occasion 
to cultivate her feelings to conform to them. She is able 
to appreciate the structural analogies between natural
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feelings which are morally beneficial and "moral" feelings 
which arise from her awareness of the moral law. Because 
she has strengthened her moral feelings by refining their 
natural counterparts and vice versa, she is able to express 
a direct concern for the morality of her actions in such a 
way that it manifests itself in different feelings in 
different situations (i.e., she fulfills her duties toward 
others from love of man— from a genuine interest in others 
and in their well-being— while she fulfills her duties 
toward herself from a sense of proper pride). In Chapter 3, 
I suggested that this "staggered" conception of the motive 
of duty (as enriching itself through a person's moral life) 
fits Kant's general model of moral improvement; here, I 
shall show that he must have had something like what I am 
suggesting in mind.
In the following passage from the Lectures on Ethics. 
Kant claims that all cultivation of feeling— he is 
discussing specifically its refinement through literature—  
helps us feel the "driving force of virtuous principles":
Even though [books] may overdo the charms and passions 
of which they treat, yet they refine our sentiments, by 
turning the object of animal inclination into an object 
of refined inclination. They awaken a capacity to be 
moved by kindly impulses, and render the indirect 
service of making us more civilized, through the 
training of inclination. The more we refine the crude
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elements in our nature, the more we improve our 
humanity and the more capable it grows of feeling the 
driving force of virtuous principles (LE:237).
If cultivated feelings make us more capable of "feeling the 
driving force of virtuous principles," then they must be 
part and parcel of a responsiveness to principle itself— at 
least part and parcel of the sense of duty as it manifests 
itself in the morally mature agent, who has had the time and 
the occasion to cultivate her feelings in this way. On this 
view, which I accept and which I believe Kant also accepted 
throughout his ethical writings, feelings which help us 
carry out our duties can be cultivated in such a way that 
they become part of the motive of duty itself.14
The Kant of Groundwork X can of course be taken to have 
changed his mind about this. In his examples of morally 
worthy action, he sharply contrasts the motive of duty with 
other motives, including sympathy, which he himself later 
claimed to be conducive to the execution of our duties 
(DV:457). In particular, his sketches of the two beneficent 
characters— one who is naturally sympathetic but, when 
suddenly deadened emotionally by his own troubles, still 
helps others from a sense of duty; the other who is not 
naturally sympathetic but helps others because it is his 
duty to do so— seem to suggest that when our concern is
14I am grateful to Cynthia Schossberger for helping me settle 
on this conception of the motive of duty in the mature moral agent.
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moral worth, kindly feelings, however valuable, are 
irrelevant; and that even though such feelings may accompany 
the motive of duty in the performance of a morally worthy 
action, they are idle in determining the action's moral 
worth and the goodness of the agent's will. This certainly 
suggests that sympathetic feelings can never be part of the 
motive of duty itself, let alone be relevant to the goodness 
of an agent's will.
In the Groundwork and throughout his mature ethical 
theory, Kant clearly holds that actions have moral worth 
only when the motive of duty is effective. But the fact 
that helping actions can have moral worth even when kindly 
feelings are absent does not imply that such feelings cannot 
become part of the motive of duty itself.18 In his 
discussion of gratitude in the Doctrine of Virtue. Kant says 
that benevolent dispositions are present "in one's thought 
of duty" (DV:456, my emphasis), thus clearly suggesting that 
kindly feelings can— and possibly even must— be present in 
the motive of duty itself. This passage appears in the 
context of a discussion of the obligation on the part of the 
recipient to repay beneficence with an equivalent favor to 
the benefactor or to someone else. Kant observes that even
“Barbara Herman suggests that this is impossible when she says 
that in order for an action to have moral worth, the motive of duty 
must be the "primary" motive and kindly feelings, if present, must 
be present as "secondary motives" ("On the Value of Acting from the 
Motive of Duty," The Practice q£ Moral Judgment, p.***). Herman 
thus seems to believe that feelings can never become part of the 
motive of duty itself. As I will show, they can.
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though a debt of gratitude can never be fully repaid, it 
must be accepted not as a burden but "as a moral kindness, 
that is, as an opportunity given one to unite the virtue of 
gratitude with love of man, to combine the cordiality of a 
benevolent disposition with sensitivity to benevolence 
(attentiveness to the smallest degree of this disposition in 
one's thought of duty), and so to cultivate one's love of 
man" (DV:456, last emphasis mine).
This is a dense and obscure passage, and I think it is 
best interpreted in light of what Kant says about love of 
man in his introduction to the Doctrine to Virtue. There, 
he classifies love of man among the "subjective conditions 
of receptiveness to the concept of duty," which he 
characterizes as follows:
All of them are natural predispositions of the mind 
(praedispositio) for being affected by concepts of 
duty, antecedent predispositions on the side of feeling 
r aestetischl. To have these predispositions cannot be 
considered a duty; rather, every man has them, and it 
is by virtue of them that he can be put under 
obligation at all. Consciousness of them is not of 
empirical origin; it can, instead, only follow from 
consciousness of a moral law, as the effect this has on 
the mind (DV:399).
Love of man is an effect of our consciousness of the moral 
law only if it is part of our responsiveness to duty itself.
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4This clarifies our obscure passage to some degree: at least 
we know that a benevolent disposition is present "in one's 
thought of duty" as a natural predisposition enabling us to 
be affected by thoughts of duty. Since love and respect are 
the feelings that "accompany" (beqleiten) the carrying out 
of our duties toward others (DV:448), love and respect are 
the ways in which reverence for the moral law manifests 
itself in the case of our duties toward others: they are the 
ways in which we feel the call of our duties toward 
others.16 To cultivate benevolence, as love and respect 
for others, is in this sense to cultivate the motive of duty 
itself.
I have claimed that love of man is a predisposition 
"for being affected by concepts of duty" in the sense that 
it enables reverence for the moral law to express itself in 
a direct concern for the dignity and well-being of others. 
But didn't the examples from Groundwork I imply that the 
motive of duty is in principle independent of benevolent 
dispositions? If so, how can love of man be a condition of
16Note Kant's distinction between respect for persons and 
reverence for the moral law at DV:467-8. There, he claims that 
although reverence for the moral law (Achtuna vor dem Gesetz 
uberhaupt) is our duty, it is not our duty to revere other men in 
general (anflere Menschen uberhaupt ZU verehren). but only to 
respect them. However, he also says that "to revere the law...is 
man's universal and unconditional duty toward others, which each of 
them can require as the respect originally owed others" (DV:468), 
which clearly suggests that respect for the moral law, in our 
awareness of our duties of respect toward others, expresses itself 
as a feeling of respect for others. We can infer that the same 
holds for love in the case of our awareness of our duties of love 
toward others.
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possibility of our very responsiveness to duty? For that is 
what Kant suggests it is when he says that it is in virtue 
of love of man (among other subjective preconditions on the 
part of feelings) that we "can be put under obligation at 
all" (DV:3 9 9).
Let us remind ourselves, first, that love of man as a 
precondition for acting on duty is "not of empirical origin" 
at all, but follows instead from our consciousness of the 
moral law. Love of man must therefore be distinguished from 
the natural endowment of a sympathetic character with which 
Kant contrasts the motive of duty in Groundwork I. What 
Kant argues in the Groundwork is that action from motives of 
natural origin— that is, from motives which are not part of 
a responsiveness to the moral law— has no moral worth. But 
if certain feelings are produced by our awareness of the 
moral law, then they are part of the motive of duty itself,
and action from them has moral worth.
Love and respect for others are such feelings. Even 
though it is possible to love someone apart from any moral 
considerations, the structure of love as a natural feeling 
is such that it can combine with the love of man which, 
however weakly felt, is part of every person's moral
consciousness. That is why Kant says that sexual love, even
though it is sui generis. can still "enter into close union" 
with moral love once it is placed under the limiting 
conditions of practical reason (DV:426). Natural feelings
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of love can, in other words, "combine" with the love of man 
which is of moral origin.
This "combination" can take place in two ways: natural 
feelings can be deepened through thoughts of duty, or the 
motive of duty can itself be deepened by comparing it to 
structurally analogous natural feelings. How are natural 
feelings deepened by thoughts of duty? A love which we 
initially enter into from desire matures, with time and 
through reflection and self-criticism, into a rational love- 
-a love involving a genuine interest in the ends of the 
other person as well as a sense of responsibility toward the 
beloved. This mature love is characterized by a sense of 
humility (tempering one's pride), patience (not being so 
quick to react defensively) and an acceptance of the other 
person even on his less glorious days. These qualities—  
which are all aspects of the motive of duty itself, as it 
manifests itself in that particular relationship— deepen the 
love itself. Principles are thus not only factors which 
condition our emotions— they also change and deepen them.
This claim, that acting from duty towards a loved one 
deepens our love, can be considered a corollary to Kant's 
claim that practicing beneficence towards someone we do not 
necessarily love produces love in us toward the recipient 
(DV:402). Acting on principle not only brings to life 
certain latent emotions, but also deepens and stabilizes 
existing ones. It is because of the fact that they are
241
judgment-infused that cultivated emotions are morally worthy 
motives. Acting from a mature love— a love cultivated 
through judgment and reflection— involves an awareness of 
the rightness in so acting— a matter moral conviction as 
well as of emotion. A sense of duty is thus intrinsic to 
acting from reflectively cultivated emotions. Since 
cultivated emotions themselves involve a sense of duty, 
acting from such emotions has moral worth.17
17My account of how moral worth can attach to certain 
emotionally motivated actions differs from Paul Guyer's account in 
Kant and the Experience q £  Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and
Morality. Chapter 10, pp.380-1. Guyer uses the idea of different 
levels of motivation to explain how an agent can act from emotion 
while still being morally worthy in his intentions. Since the 
motive of duty, according to Guyer, is a wsecond-order intention 
governing one's conduct rather than...a specific or first-order 
intention in every action" (p.380), an agent can be considered 
morally worthy for intending to do what duty requires even when 
acting from feeling on specific occasions. If the motive of 
sympathy should be more effective on a given occasion, the agent 
can allow himself to be motivated by it and still be considered 
morally worthy because he has the general (second-order) intention 
to do what duty requires of him. Although I find Guyer's idea of 
levels of motivation attractive, I do not take it to be a plausible 
explanation of how moral worth attaches to emotionally motivated 
actions. If the motive of duty is not even strong enough to move 
the agent to action on a given occasion, how can the agent be 
considered to be sincere in his dutiful intention? A closer 
connection between duty and feeling is required. I have tried to 
supply that connection through my claim that cultivated feelings 
themselves involve a sense of duty, and that the duty-feelings can 
be strengthened through reflection on and refinement of their 
natural counterparts. On my account, cultivated feelings are 
themselves morally worthy motives because a sense of duty is, as it 
were, built into them. Guyer, by contrast, sees feeling as "a 
fallback for those situations in which one knows that as a human 
rather than holy will one might not be able to act out of the 
thought of duty alone" (p.381). This claim not only rests on a 
misinterpretation of Kant's idea of a holy will, which, because it 
always acts on the moral law, does not experience the law as 
constraining and so has no sense of duty (DV:396-7, 405, CPrR:32, 
83-4), but also leaves us wondering how an agent can be said to be 
sincere in his dutiful intention when he needs an emotional
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Secondly, the motive of duty can itself be deepened by 
aligning it with natural feelings. But why, first of all, 
do we need to deepen our sense of duty if the motive of duty 
is ubiquitous? The motive of duty is ubiquitous in the 
sense that it is always available as a motive for us to act 
on, regardless our emotional state. Insofar as love of 
man is a subjective precondition for being responsive to 
moral requirements, it too is ubiquitous in this sense. As 
I showed in Chapter 1, however, Kant knows that even though 
we may have adopted the basic intention to be moral, we are 
often tempted to neglect and even violate our moral 
requirements and are, moreover prone to deceive ourselves 
about our real motives. In order to counteract these 
tendencies, we must take steps to make our awareness of duty 
as compelling and heartfelt as possible so that, when
"fallback'* to carry out his duty. Only if the emotions themselves 
admit of a sense of duty, and so, can be elevated to play a nobler 
and purer role than being mere "fallbacks," can we explain how 
moral worth can attach to emotionally motivated actions. I also 
wish to supplement Guyer's account of why moral perfection (purity 
of motive) is a wide or imperfect duty. Guyer attributes it to our 
moral frailty, claiming that "complete moral purity is unobtainable 
for us" because we do not have holy wills (p.381), and so, that 
moral perfection can only remain an unattainable ideal for us. But 
Kant does not deny us the possibility becoming morally pure. He 
only denies that we could know that we are morally pure (see DV:447 
for his claim that we could be "complete" in our virtues though we 
could ever know that we were). Since we cannot be under duty to do 
something of which we are incapable, we cannot have a duty to know 
ourselves completely, but only to submit ourselves to relentless 
scrutiny and to strive for purity in our motives (DV:392-3). 
Kant's classification of the duty to moral perfection (self- 
knowledge and self-perfection) among imperfect duties thus rests on 
the thesis of the inscrutability of our motives at least as much as 
it rests on the idea of human frailty.
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presented with a temptation to stray, we will see our sense 
of duty as so intimately bound up with our cultivated 
sensuous character that acting immorally would be contrary 
to our very identity.
It is here that natural feelings enter the picture. 
Under the guidance of practical reason, we align our natural 
dispositions with feelings which have their basis in the 
moral law (e.g., love of man). Given their a priori origin, 
these "moral" feelings are likely to be less vibrant or 
heartfelt than feelings which have a natural origin (e.g., 
sexual love). But because of their analogous structure to 
that of certain kinds of natural feelings, moral feelings 
can be strengthened by means of refining their natural 
counterparts. Since moral feelings are part of our very 
responsiveness to moral requirements, strengthening them 
amounts to strengthening the motive of duty itself. We 
strengthen the motive of duty by cultivating moral feelings, 
and we do so by refining their natural counterparts under 
the guidance of practical reason. In the final section, I 
will consider the choleric temperament to show how this 
might take place (TO BE FILLED OUT IN FINAL VERSION].
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VI. Cultivating Moral Feelings
I begin with Kant's sketch of the choleric person.
The Choleric Temperament ol the Hot-Blooded Man 
We say of the choleric man: he is fiery burns up 
quickly like straw-fire, and can be readily appeased if 
others give in to him; there is no hatred in his anger, 
and in fact he loves someone all the more for promptly 
giving in to him. — His activity is swift, but not 
persistent. — He is active, but reluctant to undertake 
business just because he is not persistent in it; so he 
likes to be the chief who merely presides over it, but 
does not want to carry it out himself. So his ruling 
passion is ambition: he likes to take part in public 
affairs and wants to be loudly praised. Accordingly he 
loves the show and pomp of ceremony: he gladly takes 
others under his wing and seems to be generous— not 
from love, however, but from pride, since he loves 
himself most of all. — He lays stress upon good order 
and so seems to be more clever than he really is. He 
is acquisitive so that he need not be stingy; he is 
courteous but ceremonious, stiff and stilted in social 
relationships; he likes to have some flatterer at hand 
to be the butt of his wit. When someone stands up to 
his proud pretensions he suffers even more than a miser 
who meets with opposition to his avaricious claims; for
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a little caustic wit quite blows away the nimbus of his 
importance, whereas the miser is compensated for his by 
what he gains. — In short, the choleric is the least 
fortunate of all the temperaments, since it is the one 
that arouses most opposition to itself (A:154-5).
The moral strength of this character is his pride. Since it 
does not amount to "proper" pride (love of honor) but rather 
to arrogance or lust for honor— manifest in his need to have 
people praise and flatter him— it is clearly a strength that 
has been turned into a vice. Nevertheless, given a morsel 
of humility, he would have little difficulty converting his 
arrogance into an attitude of "proper" pride or self- 
respect, since pride is already a highly developed 
disposition in him. He might do so by reflecting on the 
moral law and realizing that it, not his wealth or social 
standing, is what gives him his unconditional worth. The 
respect he will feel for the moral law will humble him, and 
that will help tone down his arrogance into a proper pride.
The main moral weaknesses in this character, however, 
is his inability to balance his love of others with respect 
for them. He certainly loves people, even though he does so 
for the wrong reasons— for loving him— but he can hardly be 
said to respect them at all, since he sees himself as being 
more important than they. How can he change this? He is 
not even fully aware of the viciousness of his disrespect
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for others unless he has already adopted the basic intention 
to be moral, which alerts him to the vice and makes him 
strive to avoid it in the future. He therefore begins by 
adopting a negative attitude toward his disrespect— knowing 
it is a vicious tendency— and must continue by attending to 
the ways in which his disrespect crops up in his treatment 
of other people.
Given his flair for pomp and celebration, he is likely 
to be active in society; however, his disrespect for others 
makes him fail in the social graces. He hosts dinners not 
in order to entertain but to glorify himself, and he is 
likely to dominate the discussion and ridicule other 
people's views. Simply engaging in society will therefore 
not change him unless he attends to the ways in which the 
rules of social etiquette require respectful behavior— e.g., 
disagreeing without quarreling and being grateful toward 
one's hosts (for gratitude, as Kant sees it, is primarily a 
stance of respect rather than love toward the benefactor; 
DV:454).ia Attending to and improving his manners is one 
way of cultivating his respect toward others.
He can also use his choleric temperament in favor of 
morality. Because his activity is swift (though not 
persistent), he is more likely than, say, the melancholy man 
to have the power to act on his moral resolutions. He can
iaI thus disagree with Paul Guyer's claim that gratitude is a 
stance of love toward the benefactor; see Guyer's discussion of 
gratitude in Ch.10, Kant and the Experience of Freedom.
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use his swiftness to help others when he feels the call of 
duty. But given his lack of respect for others, he is 
likely to be patronizing in carrying out his duty of 
beneficence, and he is likely to fail to fulfill his duties 
of respect toward others altogether. To combat these 
tendencies, he might develop feelings of respect for others 
by using his active powers elsewhere (in situations in which 
moral concerns are the not primary concern). He might, for 
example, engage in martial arts— which require both 
swiftness and respect for one's opponent— to align his 
undeveloped moral predisposition to respect others (a 
disposition which exists in him through his awareness of 
humanity as an end in itself) with natural feelings of 
respect for his instructors and opponents. With time, these 
natural feelings will strengthen his moral feeling of 
respect for others to extend to humanity in general.
Moral progress, for this person, will be difficult in 
the beginning. Because he is a moral novice, the moral law 
will from the outset strike him as a stern requirement; and 
the motive of duty, since it is undeveloped in him, will 
from the outset be felt as purely constraining. However, as 
he begins to change his ways— to be sure a difficult 
process— his feelings will begin to fall in line with the 
motive of duty in the ways I have described above, and he 
will begin to enjoy doing his duty. The sensible aspects of 
the motive of duty itself— its "subjective preconditions"
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such as love of man— will become more developed and will 
eventually allow the duty-motive to express itself in a 
heartfelt disposition: a genuine love and respect for 
mankind.
Sanglusion
I have attempted to show that in the morally mature 
agent who has had time and occasion to cultivate her 
emotions for moral ends, the motive of duty in regard to 
other people expresses itself in a direct and heartfelt 
concern for the dignity and well-being of others, i.e., in 
love and respect for mankind. The motive of duty can 
express itself in this way because it incorporates the moral 
feelings which in turn can be strengthened by cultivating 
their natural analogues. Actions which are undertaken from 
cultivated feelings thus have moral worth not because of the 
overarching intention to be moral— for intention does not 
amount to action; and even if the act of cultivating the 
emotions for moral ends has moral worth, acting from such 
emotions can have no moral worth unless those emotions are 
themselves part of the motive of duty— but rather because 
the cultivated feelings have been incorporated into the 
motive of duty itself, enabling it to express itself in a
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direct and heartfelt concern for the morality of our 
actions.19
We are finally in a position to understand Kant's claim 
in the Religion that the temperament or "aesthetic 
character" of virtue is not "fear-ridden and dejected" but 
rather "courageous and hence joyous" (R:l9n)— a claim that 
at first glance strikes the reader as overly optimistic, 
given the feeling of constraint involved in the thought of 
duty. A person with a developed virtuous disposition will 
not experience the constraint involved in the thought of 
duty as oppressive, but will have cultivated the feelings 
which attend it and will therefore take pleasure not only in 
fulfilling her duties but also in acting from the motive of 
duty itself.
Kant therefore sells himself short when he says, 
earlier in the same passage, that "by the very reason of the 
dignity of the idea of duty I am unable to associate grace
iaWhile I am basically sympathetic with Paul Guyer's attempt 
to show that acting from cultivated feelings has moral worth, I 
differ from him when I claim that the motive of duty incorporates 
cultivated feelings. Guyer's account of duty as a second-order 
intention directing us to cultivate feelings and to use them in 
particular situations "when the motive of duty fails us" (Guyer, 
Ch.10, my emphasis) can only explain how the cultivation of feeling 
takes on moral worth. It obviously does not explain how acting 
from cultivated feelings on particular occasions can have moral 
worth, since Guyer himself describes those situations as cases in 
which the motive of duty "fails us." Since I believe that Kant's 
account of good willing in the Groundwork commits him to a case-by- 
case conception of good willing— a conception of moral worth as 
something which is instantiated in particular actions— it is not 
enough to derive moral worth from a basic intention to act morally. 
(I here differ from Barbara Herman in "Integrity and Impartiality," 
footnote??, The Practice of Moral Judgment).
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with it. For the idea of duty involves absolute necessity, 
to which grace stands in direct contradiction" (R:19n). He 
goes on to say that the graces do indeed have a place in the 
moral life— beneficence, for instance, has beautiful results 
and can thus accompany the thought of duty in the developed 
virtuous disposition, but only as attendants and not as part 
of the thought of duty itself:
Virtue. also, i.e.. the firmly grounded disposition to 
fulfil our duty, is also beneficent in its results, 
beyond all that nature and art can accomplish in the 
world; and the august picture of humanity, as portrayed 
in this character, does indeed allow the attendance of 
the graces. But when duty alone is the theme, they 
keep a respectful distance.
Kant seems here to forget about the moral feelings of his 
Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue. These feelings, we 
have seen, provide the bridge between dignity and grace: 
cultivating them enables the motive of duty to express 
itself in a heartfelt concern for both the morality of our 
actions and for the dignity and well-being of other people—  
a stance which is possible only if the motive of duty admits 
of the graces themselves.
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Chapter 5_L 
Kant fin Personal Attachments
Kant has often been criticized for failing to appreciate the 
importance of personal commitments in moral decision-making. The 
criticism is aimed primarily at Kant's conception of moral 
judgments and actions as impartial. as reflecting maxims or 
principles to which any other rational agent could assent. When 
I make a moral judgment, on Kant's view, I am supposed to 
abstract from my personal biases and attachments, since these 
factors might otherwise color my judgment, making it reflect my 
own idiosyncratic conception of the good rather than a principle 
to which any rational agent could assent. This requirement of 
impartiality, the criticism goes, disregards the fact that in 
order to the right thing, we often need to be sensitive to the 
special demands of the relationships in which we find ourselves. 
Kant seems to be asking us to disregard personal ties in our 
moral decisions; but since morality often demands responses 
tailored to just those types of relations, Kantian ethics blinds 
us to a— perhaps even the— key aspect of moral life.1 I want to
'See, for instance, Stuart Hampshire, "Public and Private 
Morality," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1978), p.40; and Bernard Williams,
"Persons, Character, and Morality," Moral Luck (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1981), pp.18-19. See Williams, "Morality and the 
Emotions," Problems The Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), pp.209-29 for criticisms aimed at Kant's purported 
neglect of the emotions and for a sanguine presentation of the 
claim that sensitivity to the emotions is in fact the key to moral 
perception and judgment.
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show that Kantian morality is not in fact blind to the 
requirements of the personal. The moral law is, to be sure, 
impartially conceived, but personal attachments give rise to 
special claims and duties even within that impartial frame.
Moral concerns manifest themselves in a specific way within 
our personal relations: we are either aware of or concerned about 
the rightness of our actions and the appropriateness of our 
feelings to that particular relationship. Interpersonal 
relations such as love and friendship thus have moral dimensions- 
-specific duties and attitudes appropriate to hold toward the 
loved one— which define what it is to be a good friend, 
girlfriend, wife, etc. in the first place. To disregard these 
moral dimensions is to fail to appreciate what true love and 
friendship are. Good performance within the personal realm, I 
want to show, is defined by essentially moral considerations.
Those who associate the Kantian concept of duty with 
basically impersonal considerations will be skeptical about my 
claim that there are special duties toward special persons. For 
if acting from duty involves taking up a standpoint which any 
rational agent could in principle adopt, how can duty penetrate 
into the subtleties of personal relations?
To answer this question, I will first show that moral 
decision-making, as Kant conceives of it, can at least 
accommodate personal considerations. I then move on to the 
question of the types of personal considerations duty can 
accommodate in order to determine whether they are subtle enough
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to satisfy Kant's critics. In particular, I consider the extent 
to which duty is a desirable motive for the actions we undertake 
in our personal relationships, and ask how it relates to other 
motives (e.g., love) which are also desirable within those 
relations. I then consider three criticisms which Williams 
levels against various claims that Kant makes about the emotions. 
I show that these claims do not in fact have the consequences for 
Kantian morality that Williams takes them to have. I conclude 
with a discussion of friendship, which for Kant sets an emotional 
paradigm toward which we should strive in all moral relations. 
This explains why we have a duty to form and to cultivate 
friendships.
i*. Bhy it is permissible fayor friends
I begin by showing that moral decision-making, as Kant 
thinks of it, can at least accommodate personal considerations. 
Before we make any moral decision, on Kant's view, we need to 
identify the maxim which our proposed course of action will 
reflect (G:399-400). Even though the maxim is formed in response 
to the situation at hand, it also embodies a personal policy 
which describes more generally how we are prepared to act in 
situations of that sort. In order to be morally permissible, our 
maxim or "subjective principle of action" (G:422n) must conform 
to an objective (universally valid) principle of action— the 
categorical imperative: "So act that the maxim of your action
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could become a universal law" (DV:389, G:421).2 In testing our 
maxim against the requirements of the categorical imperative, we 
impose a formal condition on our maxim, namely, that it be a 
policy to which every other rational agent could in principle 
consent. To determine whether our maxim meets this condition, we 
ask ourselves what the world would be like if everybody acted on 
the maxim, taking into account the empirical conditions which 
would have to obtain in this world for everybody to realize the 
maxim.3 If I could act on my maxim in such a world, the maxim 
is morally permissible.4
2The categorical imperative is distinguished from the moral 
law by its form. The moral law is a description of all rational 
willing; the categorical imperative is a command. Because human 
beings do not by nature conform to the moral law (G:413), reason 
presents it to us not as a description of the way we £fi act (as it 
does to God), but rather as a command for how we should act.
3The clause, "in this world" is important. Only with a 
background of empirical facts are our intentions determinate enough 
for us to work out whether there exist feasible means for executing 
our intentions and what the predictable results of this would be. 
See Onora O'Neill, (then Onora Nell), Acting on Principle, pp.62- 
77. Her account of what it is to rationally intend an end also 
shows how the categorical imperative test can require an 
explication of the empirical means necessary for realizing and end 
as well as a consideration of the results of doing so while 
entailing neither empiricism nor consequentialism.
4There are actually two types of maxims— permissible and 
obligatory— which satisfy the condition that we be able to act on 
the maxim in a world in which everybody acted on it. The 
difference between permissible maxims (e.g., "I will always eat 
white rather than red meat") and obligatory ones (e.g., "I will 
strive to cultivate my talents") lies in the formal implications of 
their negations. The negations of obligatory maxims yield
contradictions when universalized; those of permissible maxims do 
not. There are two types of obligatory maxims: maxims
instantiating perfect duties (duties which one must under no 
circumstances refrain from adhering to) and maxims instantiating 
imperfect duties (duties which require the basic intention to 
fulfill them but which leave us some latitude in deciding when to
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This universality test is eminently impartial in that it 
requires us to test our maxims against common human reason. But 
this does not prevent personal considerations from figuring in 
our maxims. Since we form them in response to the particulars of 
a situation, our maxims can accommodate whatever considerations 
we take to be morally relevant in that situation, including ties 
of loyalty to particular persons. The fact that our maxims must 
then pass the universalizability test does not entail that 
morality leaves no room for personal considerations, as long as 
those considerations are morally permissible.8
Does this mean that it permissible to choose to help a 
friend rather than a stranger? Let us first consider why we have 
a duty to help others at all. As agents— that is, as setters and
do so). The negation of a maxim instantiating a perfect duty 
contradicts its universalized counterpart in the sense that it 
would be impossible to carry out the maxim in a world reflecting 
the latter. For instance, I could not make a false promise in a 
world in which everyone knows promises to be false, since no one 
would believe me (G:422). The negation of a maxim instantiating an 
imperfect duty contradicts not its universalized counterpart as 
such, but the means necessary for carrying out the maxim. For 
instance, I cannot will a maxim of non-beneficence because I am not 
self-sufficient, and will therefore need the help of others to 
carry out some of my ends. In a world in which everyone acted on 
a maxim of non-beneficence, the means toward the fulfillment of 
some of my ends would be unavailable; but as an agent, I 
necessarily will the fulfillment of all my ends. Since I will 
sometimes depend on others to help me realize my ends, I cannot 
coherently will that I not help others and that others not help me. 
For a helpful discussion of these examples and, in general, of the 
nature of universalizability in Kant, see Onora O'Neill (then Onora 
Nell), Acting on Principle. Chapter 5. For Kant's own 
characterization of the difference between permissible, obligatory 
and forbidden maxims, see MM:221-8.
“See Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," Monist (2), 
1983, pp.247-8 for a clear statement of this point.
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realizers of ends— we necessarily will the fulfillment of all our 
ends. But if we rationally intend an end, then we also intend to 
pursue the means by which we can realize it.6 As finite beings, 
however, we are not completely self-sufficient. Since, at some 
point in our lives, we will need the help of others to realize 
some of our ends, we cannot coherently will that others not help 
us. But the maxim of relying on the help of others is not 
universalizable unless we are also prepared to let others rely on 
our help. We must, in other words, be prepared not only to 
receive the help of others, but also to help them when needed. 
Thus we have a duty to help others.7
Now Kant makes it clear that we have a considerable latitude 
in deciding whom to help and when. This latitude is the mark of 
ail imperfect duties, including our duties of love toward others 
(DV:390). Kant stresses that even though our duties of love 
extend to the ends of others in general, we are most likely to 
carry them out with regard to our loved ones: "in wishing I can 
be equally benevolent to everyone, whereas in acting I can, 
without violating the universality of the maxim, vary the degree 
greatly in accordance with the different objects of my love (one
6In this paragraph, I am following Onora O'Neill's 
interpretation of Kant's reasoning behind our duty to help others. 
See Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason. pp.114-15, 140-1.
7I am here disregarding the problems I raised with this 
argument in Part II, Chapter 4. Since I am, at this point, 
undecided about whether humanity as an end in itself imposes on us 
a positive requirement to promote the ends of others, I am here 
assuming that it does and that Kant's argument for the duty to 
promote other people's happiness is sound.
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of whom concerns me more closely than another)" (DV:452). As 
long as we have the basic intention to help other people 
sometimes, we are permitted to favor friends over strangers in 
realizing this intention. The maxim of favoring friends, in 
other words, is itself fully universalizable. If we were faced 
with the choice of helping a friend or helping a stranger, the 
stranger could consent to our maxim of favoring our friends 
because the stranger realizes not only that it is humanly 
impossible to help everyone, but also that, as finite beings, we 
are not self-sufficient and will therefore need the help of our 
nearest and dearest in carrying out some of our projects. There 
is nothing morally wrong, then, in giving primacy to our friends 
in carrying out our duties of love. As imperfect duties, they 
give us just the degree of flexibility we need in order 
effectively to promote other people's happiness.
Moral decision-making, as Kant conceives of it, can thus at 
least accommodate personal considerations. I now move on to the 
question of the types of personal considerations duty can 
accommodate in order to determine whether these considerations 
are subtle enough to satisfy Kant's critics.
II, Williams' first objection
There is at least one critic who would not be satisfied with 
the response we have given so far, and that is Bernard Williams. 
We have shown that according to the categorical imperative test, 
maxims paying special heed to the needs of our loved ones are
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permissible. But Williams complains that the very requirement 
that we test our maxims against the categorical imperative 
compromises our personal integrity and our commitment to the 
relationships in which we are involved. In his adaptation of 
Charles Fried's example of the shipwrecked couple, he identifies 
a case of right action which he believes can neither be justified 
nor properly motivated by the considerations inherent in the 
categorical imperative test.
In the example, a man is facing a shipwreck in which several 
people are drowning, including his wife. Williams objects to the 
idea that morality should not allow the agent to act directly out 
of love for his wife and save her without second thought; that it 
should require him first to determine whether it is permissible 
to save her rather than someone else. Says Williams,
...this construction provides the agent with one thought too 
many: it might have been hoped (for instance, by his wife) 
that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the 
thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and 
that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save 
one's wife.*
If the agent sets aside his feelings for his wife and decides to 
save her according to the impartial procedure prescribed by the 
moral law, he acts not from affection for her but from the 
thought that it is permissible to save someone he is attached to. 
For Williams, this motive involves "one thought too many," since
‘Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality," p.18.
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it "signals a willingness not to save her if that were morally 
necessary."9 In asking the agent to disregard his immediate 
inclination to save his wife, Kantian morality denies the agent 
any direct expression of his deepest emotional attachments. This 
alienates the agent from those attachments and thereby 
compromises his personal integrity.
It is important to appreciate the force of this objection. 
Williams is claiming that if morality is to make any legitimate 
claims on us at all, then those claims must be compatible from 
the outset with the requirements of the personal. Kantian 
morality fails in this regard because it misconstrues the 
personal commitments on which we must be prepared to act. To be 
committed to a relationship is to be prepared to treat the other 
person in special ways; but Kant, apparently overlooking the 
emotional basis of such commitments, gets their structure wrong. 
For Kant, the ultimate sanction for acting on personal 
commitments must come from the categorical imperative. But since 
our personal commitments have grown out of feelings for the other 
person and not from universalistic concerns, the categorical 
imperative test distorts our motives for acting on those 
commitments. For Kant, the shipwrecked husband's motivating 
thought, in order to be morally acceptable, has to be "She is my 
wife, and in situations of this kind it is permissible to save 
one's wife." But according to Williams, the only truly proper
’Barbara Herman, paraphrasing Williams in "Integrity and 
Impartiality," p.245 (emphasis mine).
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motive in the scenario in question is "She is my wife, and 
therefore I will save her." Whether or not it is accompanied by 
actual feelings of love, this thought signifies a commitment 
which gives the agent a direct reason to act without introducing 
any need for impartial considerations. To allow the thought of 
duty to intrude on our personal lives alienates us from our 
commitments by forcing us to disregard the natural motives to 
which those commitments give rise.
Now there is certainly something deep and important in the 
idea that preserving our personal integrity involves letting 
ourselves be "swept up" by the feelings our relationships 
engender, and that an acceptable morality must allow us to act on 
those feelings. However, our moral convictions sometimes run 
against the tide of our feelings. Imagine the shipwrecked 
husband tempted to throw an infant overboard in order to reach 
his drowning wife,10 or a situation in which the other person's 
end is morally unacceptable— say, the case of deciding whether to 
help a friend who is planning to rob a bank. In cases like this, 
it would be wrong to neglect to ask whether the proposed action 
is permissible before undertaking it. A moral agent knows this, 
and will therefore see her personal commitments as constrained by 
the requirements of the moral law. As we saw in Part I, this 
does not mean that she must disregard her personal commitments in 
deciding what to do. It only means that she must see them as
“Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," p.246. See pp.247-8 
for her version of the response I give in this paragraph.
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conditioned by a respect for humanity. Since it is the mark of a 
morally responsible person to know whether it is right or wrong, 
in a given situation, to act on her immediate inclinations, it is 
only reasonable that morality should require us to check our 
maxims for their permissibility.
Is the Kantian agent alienated from her attachments? Does 
her regard for the moral law distort her immediate inclination to 
help her loved ones? Williams thinks so because he believes that 
the only motive which is morally acceptable to the Kantian agent 
is the thought that it is morally permissible to help one's loved 
ones. In what follows, I hope to show that Kantian morality in 
fact gives her other motives to act on. This will also involve 
distancing myself from the conventional Kantian line of response 
to Williams which I have been pursuing so far. The conventional 
line, perhaps most famously made by Barbara Herman, is to stress 
that it is not unreasonable— not one thought too many— to have 
morality place limiting conditions on our immediate inclinations. 
That's fine as far as it goes, but I want to develop the stronger 
position that morality actually generates specific duties toward 
our loved ones. These duties require us to cultivate feelings 
which can help preserve the relationship and which yield motives 
more desirable within the relationship than sheer respect for the 
moral law. In Section IV, I will ask whether Kant's conception 
of special commitments allows for the specific motivational 
structure sought by Williams. But first I want to show that
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according to Kant it is not only permissible but also obligatory 
to treat special persons in special ways.
IXLj. Why personal ties give rise tfi special duties
It is somewhat ironic that Williams should illustrate his 
criticism of Kant with a case in which an agent faces a conflict 
between the demands of marriage and the claims which other human
beings have on him. Marriage is one of Kant's favorite examples
of how entering into close relationships imposes special duties 
on us. I will use the case of marriage to illustrate how special
claims can grow out of emotional bonds, but my illustration holds
for any type of committed relationship.
As early as 1764, in the Observations q £  the Feeling at the 
Beautiful and suhlime. Kant notes that the virtuous husband does 
not merely say, "I love and treasure my wife, for she is 
beautiful, affectionate, and clever," since old age and 
familiarity will surely alter that image of her; he says, 
instead, "I will treat this person lovingly and with respect, for 
she is my wife." In the latter attitude, Kant says, "the noble 
ground remains and is not so much subject to the inconstancy of 
external things" (OBS:65).“ When the initial passion fades, 
only the latter attitude can preserve the relationship. Kant 
expresses the same view in the Lectures on Ethics. where he says 
that "a man may act kindly towards his wife from love, but if his
“Nothing in Kant's discussion precludes the virtuous husband 
from holding both attitudes towards his wife, as long as the former 
is subordinated to the latter.
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inclination has evaporated he ought to do so from obligation" 
(LE:193). Love must be tempered by principles lest it turn 
fickle and insubstantial.13 Kant thus seems to hold that 
personal relations— at least those which are characterized by 
some sort of commitment— have a special value which imposes 
duties on us to keep them going even in the face of hardships.
Before I explain why Kant takes personal relations to have a 
special value, I want to turn to the question of how natural 
emotional ties can give rise to a set of special duties which is 
most aptly characterized as moral.
We usually seek to enter into a relationship because we like 
or desire the other person. When these feelings are mutual, 
natural ties develop and the relationship is underway. It is 
important to note, however, that even in this early stage, the 
relationship is characterized not only by natural feelings but 
also by mutual consent: we do not form emotional bonds with 
people for whom we have no affection. If we decide, again by 
mutual consent, to continue the relationship to the point where 
we become dependent on each other— sometimes even indispensable 
to each other— and therefore vulnerable to the actions of the 
other, we have effectively entered into a mutual nmrnnitmant to 
preserve the relationship. Because this commitment is implicitly
“Paul Guyer makes essentially this point with regard to 
Williams' drowning scenario, and concludes: "Not only in friendship 
but in marriage and every other personal relation our feelings are 
fragile and liable to interruption, and must always be governed as 
well as cultivated in accordance with principle" See Guyer, Kant 
and the Experience q £  Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality. 
Chapter 10, p.393.
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moral in nature, it gives rise to special duties toward the other 
person. These duties include not committing breaches of trust, 
actively promoting the ends of the other, and cultivating the 
emotions needed to preserve the relationship (see DV:452, 470-2). 
The increased mutual dependence of persons involved in a 
relationship thus gives rise to certain expectations regarding 
how they should act toward one another, and these expectations 
form the basis for special claims which are moral in nature.
The special claims which relationships impose on us are of 
course defeasible in nature. Relationships impose on us neither 
unconditional not permanent obligations: their requirements can 
be waived if the friend or lover turns our to place unreasonable 
or even immoral demands on us, or if, by mutual agreement, the 
relationship is broken off. Nevertheless, when the relationship 
is something that both parties want to preserve, it creates a 
unique set of ends. ends which can only be promoted by the friend 
or lover and not by anyone else. This unique set of ends makes 
it easier to violate the demands of the relationship than it is 
to violate the claims which a stranger may have on us. Because 
the claims which a loved one has on us can be satisfied only by 
how treat him or her, it is easier for us to undermine the 
ends of a friend or lover than it is to undermine those of a 
stranger. It is easier for us, in other words, to contribute 
actively to the friend's unhappiness by misbehaving or by simply 
neglecting the special claims which that person has on us.
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In the drowning scenario, the primary end which the agent 
can undermine, through inaction, is the survival of the drowners. 
Since this end is held in common by all the drowners, it does not 
give the agent a criterion for deciding whom to help. But the 
agent holds a special relation to his wife— a relation which 
imposes special duties on him. In helping a stranger rather than 
his wife, the agent would violate the demands of loyalty and 
commitment which marriage imposes on him. He would, in other 
words, undermine ends which only he could satisfy. The death of 
someone cannot be prevented, but in allowing his wife to die, the 
agent would undermine not only her end of survival, but also her 
hope of loyalty and support from her husband. The latter is an 
end which the wife, but not the strangers, has in relation to the 
agent. Because the moral law requires first and foremost that we 
avoid violating our duties and avoid undermining other people's 
ends (G:437; D:384), it directs the agent to save his wife rather 
than a stranger, since, in a situation where undermining some 
ends is inevitable, it is best to promote those ends which are 
also bound up with other obligations.13
“Note also that Kantian morality leaves room for an agent who 
is prepared, from a sense of duty, to help another person, to defer 
the helping action to someone who is prepared to help the agent 
because he has certain feelings for the patient. For a more 
detailed discussion of this sort of scenario, see Barbara Herman, 
"Integrity and Impartiality," pp.239-40.
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IYj. Motivation within personal commitments
Having shown how emotional bonds can give rise to special 
obligations, I now turn to the question of whether acting on such 
obligations can satisfy the specific motivational requirements 
that relationships impose on us. In particular, does it satisfy 
the need of our nearest and dearest to sometimes see us 
expressing our love for them without thinking of duty? My 
discussion of the preceding section might seem to have gotten me 
into deeper trouble with Williams in this regard. Williams, we 
recall, wants to avoid moralizing the personal by bringing duty 
into it. Unlike Barbara Herman and others who suggest that 
morality merely constrains us in our personal relations, I have 
argued that morality actually imposes special duties on us within 
those relations. If Williams thinks it one thought too many to 
help a loved one because it is morally permissible, then he 
certainly thinks it two thoughts too many to do so because it is 
not just permissible but actually required.
Acting from a sense of obligation, in Williams' eyes, is 
always less desirable from the patient's point of view than 
acting from love or some equivalent emotion. He asks,
is it certain that one who receives good treatment from 
another more appreciates it, thinks the better of the giver, 
if he knows it to be the result of the application of 
principle, rather than the product of an emotional response?
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He may have needed, not the benefits of universal law, but 
some human gesture.1'
When the agent and the patient are involved in a close 
relationship, the desire for an emotional response becomes 
especially urgent. Persons involved in such relationships place 
special demands on each other, a significant one being the 
expectation of emotional support. It is natural, especially when 
one is in a weak or insecure state, to expect one's friends to 
act from feelings of solidarity or support and not from a sense 
of obligation. The shipwrecked wife, Williams is right to point 
out, would clear prefer that her husband save her from love 
rather than from a sense of personal obligation.
The question then becomes: Do the special duties we have 
toward our loved ones leave us any scope for choosing motives 
other than a sense of obligation— for instance, feelings of love- 
-to motivate us as we carry out these duties? Kant thinks they 
do. Being committed to a relationship involves making the other 
person's happiness an end (DV:469). Since the relationship 
itself is an end which the other person has, we are required to 
pursue the means necessary for preserving the relationship. This 
includes cultivating and acting on emotions which help keep the 
relationship alive. Love— the original, natural basis for the 
relationship— is an especially important emotion in this regard. 
Since the other person's happiness depends, to a great extent, on
“Williams, "Morality and the Emotions," Problems of the Self 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1973), p.227.
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our love for him or her, we are obligated to cultivate those 
feelings of love and to strive to act on them (DV:470-472).
So rather than preventing us from acting on our feelings of 
love, Kantian morality actually encourages us to do so: 
cultivating and acting on feelings which help keep the 
relationship alive is one of the special duties which personal 
ties impose on us. In acting from love for his wife, the 
shipwrecked husband is fulfilling one of the special claims his 
wife has on him. Insofar as the feelings of love from which he 
acts carry the motive of duty along with them (as an awareness of 
the rightness and appropriateness of acting from emotion within 
this particular relationship), acting from these feelings— which 
are, after all, partly rationally based— has moral worth.
Williams would surely object here that on Kant's view of 
moral motivation, love can never serve as a direct motive because 
we are always required to ask whether our maxim is morally 
permissible, and this procedure distorts the motive of love 
itself. But this not only underestimates the moral perceiver 
(who knows when actions are morally right and when they are 
morally irrelevant though permissible), but also conflates maxims 
and motives. The maxim-directed categorical imperative test does 
not necessarily affect our motives. The same maxim of helping 
someone we are committed to can be carried out from a number of 
different motives— say, from love or from a sense of obligation. 
Maxims, in other words, are distinct and separable from motives. 
Testing our maxims against the categorical imperative test does
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not necessarily distort the motives from which we choose to act.
A pure and devoted love can serve as our motive for acting even 
when our maxim has been tested against the categorical 
imperative, should we need to do so. Of course, on Kant's view 
neither love nor any other motive can directly move us in the way 
Williams is envisioning, simply because Kant has a different view 
of moral motivation than Williams. On Williams' view, we act 
directly on rationally conditioned dispositions or character 
traits. On Kant's view, we act on a motive only after having 
incorporated it into our maxim (R:19), that is, after having 
endorsed a given policy. Because we choose our motive after 
making our judgment, moral motivation will always be conditioned 
by moral judgment. This, however, does not entail that our moral 
judgments distort our motives.
So far, I have been claiming that our special duties given 
us room for acting on love. But how is love, on Kant's view, 
related to the duty-motive which is also present in committed 
relationships? What, in other words, is the relation is between 
the motive to act from a special duty toward a loved one and more 
natural motives such as love or sympathy? To answer this 
question, we need to get clearer on the nature of the duty-motive 
as it manifests itself in personal relations.
To be committed to another person is to have a sense of 
obligation toward that person: a preparedness to act for the sake 
of that person even when we do not feel like it. Even though the 
other person prefers that we act from our feelings of love, this
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is not always possible. This has perhaps most clearly been 
illustrated by Paul Guyer, who shows that a slight variation on 
the shipwreck example would make duty a highly desirable motive 
for the wife to expect from her husband. Consider the husband 
faced with the choice of saving his aging wife or the young, 
beautiful woman he had been eyeing throughout the cruise. The 
wife might realize that, given the circumstances, it would be 
unreasonable of her to expect her husband to save her out of 
love. Surely she would prefer to have her husband save her from 
duty rather than letting her drown!15
Because the motive of duty arises in response to our 
principles and commitments, the duty-motive will always be 
available for us to act on even when we are not immediately 
inclined to honor our commitments. This does not mean that we 
always have to adopt it as our motive. The motive of love has a 
legitimate place within Kant's framework and need not always 
defer to the duty-motive. It is in situations of the sort Guyer 
considers that it becomes necessary to act from the duty-motive 
simply because natural feelings of love are not available. This 
does not mean that personally committed agents will need frequent 
use of the duty-motive. The committed agent will recognize the 
importance of acting from love within a relationship: love is 
valuable because it preserves the relationship itself and is the 
motive preferred by the patient. Recognizing this, he will have
lsSee Guyer, Kant and the Experience q£ Freedom: Essays an 
Aesthetics and Morality. Chapter 10, p.393.
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cultivated his feelings of love toward his wife, and the feeling 
will therefore be available for him to act on on given occasions.
Insofar as the particular actions he undertakes from love 
stem from natrual love alone— that is, without any awareness of 
his commtment to the other person— his actions will not have any 
moral worth. since moral worth attaches only to actions done from 
duty (G:396-401). But he will still gain in moral perfection 
because he is more effectively carrying out his duty to promote 
the happiness of his wife. Moral perfection has two components—  
fulfilling all our duties and striving to do so from respect for 
the moral law (D:446)— and an agent increases his moral 
perfection whenever he fulfills a duty, even if he is not acting 
from a sense of duty. Natural love at least helps him 
effectively promote her happiness, and this increases his moral 
perfection if not his moral worth.
Vx. On the special value of. personal relations
I conclude by considering why personal relations have a 
special value within Kant's moral scheme. Although Kant himself 
does not explain why personal relations have a special value, or 
what that value consists in, we can venture an educated guess. A 
clue is provided in a somewhat obscure passage from Kant's 
interleaved notes on the Observations of the Feeling of the 
Beautiful and SuhlimR:
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A married man acquires and deserves more respect than a 
bachelor or a man who will have nothing to do with women.16 
A woman1’ [is] more than a girl. A widow [is] also more 
than a girl. The reason for this is that the purpose is 
fulfilled at that moment, and also that the other people 
appear needy, that is, a girl wants to have a man (without 
any trouble), but a woman never wants to be a girl. 
Furthermore, an encounter with a woman is regarded as 
[having] double [worth], and at the same time [an encounter] 
with a man, by the same token.1*
Kant says that a married man or woman deserves more respect than 
a bachelor or young girl because "the purpose is fulfilled" in 
the case of the former but not in case of the latter. People 
involved in committed relationships have more worth in the sense 
of having more completely fulfilled a human purpose. But what 
sort of purpose? The purpose of which Kant is speaking can of
16The German word for the last type of man is "Haaestoltze." 
which can also mean "misogynist."
^Throughout the passage, I translate "Frau" as "woman," but 
"wife" (in proper German, "Ehefrau" ) may be more fitting, since 
Kant draws a direct comparison between the married man and the 
woman, attributing more worth to them than to those who have not 
entered into committed relationships. By "woman," therefore, I 
take Kant to mean someone who has entered into a long-term relation 
with a man.
iaThe passage is my translation from Marie Rischmuller's 
edition of Kant's interleaved notes on his Observations of the 
Feeling the Beautiful and Sublime. See Rischmuller, Benerkungen 
in den "Beobachtunaen ber das Gefuhl des Schonen und Erhabenen" 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1991), p.106. Rischmuller's reference is 
the following: page inserted after B 86, [113] front page, II 245, 
15-30.
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course be interpreted as a natural purpose— the purpose of 
perpetuating the species, which is at least potentially furthered 
by entering into relations with the other sex. However, I do not 
think Kant has a natural purpose in mind. If he did, the girl 
who enters into a relation with a man without wanting any of the 
trouble which at some time or other inevitably arises in long­
term relationships would also hold a special value, but Kant 
clearly implies that she has less worth than a woman.
Instead, I suggest, Kant has a moral or rational purpose in 
mind. The reason why people who have entered into committed 
relationships deserve more respect than those who live a life 
without commitments is that they have more fully developed their 
rational and emotional natures than the uncommitted. The process 
of learning to trust another person by having the courage to 
reveal our innermost thoughts and feelings to him or her, for 
example, helps us overcome the barriers which we sometimes 
unnecessarily erect against other people. Friendship is "an aid 
in overcoming the constraint and the distrust man feels in his 
intercourse with others, by revealing himself to them without 
reserve" (LE:206). This trustful attitude has a moral value 
because it helps us form an ever-widening circle of friends and 
so, to become a "friend of man” who is engaged with the world 
(see DV:472-4). Such a person is more likely to carry out her 
duties not only toward friends but toward others in general.
In taking the ends of another as their own, people who are 
involved in committed relationships show a maturity and
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responsibility lacking in those who live only for themselves. In 
cultivating the emotions required to keep the relationship alive, 
they strive for greater moral keenness and deeper emotional 
resonance than those who do not at any point in their lives risk 
emotional attachment. And those who strive to be more keenly 
seeing and more deeply feeling— in short, those who strive to 
perfect themselves in morally relevant ways— have greater moral 
worth and so deserve more respect than those who do not.1* 
Entering into personal relations, then, is valuable because it 
makes us strive to be morally better beings.
VI. xtl£ Moral Structure Friendship
Lm. Why the moral is not impersonal
On a careless reading of a crucial passage in Kant's 
Lectures on Ethics. Kant appears to equate the moral standpoint
l*Kant's claim that those who engage in committed personal 
relations have more worth than those who do not is of course
difficult to reconcile with his claim that humanity is an end in
itself, and so, that everyone has equal and absolute value (G:428- 
9). The two claims are compatible, however, if we distinguish, as 
Kant does, between a person's humanity and a person's moral stature 
(LE:196—7, 214-15, 227). Everyone has, in virtue of his ability to 
set and to realize ends, an absolute value which prohibits others 
from treating him as a mere means. But he also has, in virtue of
the same capacity, various duties the fulfillment of which
increases his moral worth and/or his moral perfection (the latter 
of which is also increased by the execution of his duties, not 
necessarily from the motive of duty) and so makes him worthy of 
happiness (see CPrR:61-2, 110-11). While persons cannot vary in 
the former type of value, they can in the latter; and it is the 
latter sort of value which acrues through engaging in friendships.
275
with the impersonal. He defines friendship as a relation 
involving special ties, and constrasts it with the aim of the 
civilized person— a "universal friendship" free of the 
restrictions of special ties:
If men complain of the lack of friendship, it is becaue they 
themselves have no friendly disposition and no friendly 
heart. They accuse others of being unfriendly, but it is 
they themselves who, by demands and importunities, turn 
their friends from them. We shun those who, under the cloak 
of friendship, make a convenience of us. But to make a 
general complaint about the lack of friends is like making a 
general complaint about the lack of money. The more 
civilized man becomes, the broader his outlook and the less 
room there is for special friendships; civilized man seeks 
universal pleasures and a universal friendship, unrestricted 
by special ties... (LE:207)
The passage might seem to suggest that the universal friendship 
is the properly moral relation, and that the special friendship 
is a mere matter of personal taste— not a genuinely moral 
relation at all. To dismiss the friendship of special ties as 
morally irrelevant, however, is to disregard the remarks which 
precede the contrast between personal and universal friendships. 
In these remarks, Kant suggests that special friendships serve as 
means toward broadening one's outlook with an eye to eventually 
becoming a "friend of man": special friendships are like money in 
that they serve as means toward obtaining something valuable.
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But if they serve as means toward realizing a moral relation, 
then personal friendships must themselves contain at least some 
of the elements of morality, if only in rudimentary form.
In fact, there is no reason to claim, on the basis of the 
passage, that personal friendships are not themselves moral 
relations. In the passage, Kant groups neither the "universal" 
nor the "special" friendship explicitly with the moral. And 
elsewhere, he clearly indicates that there is a common core of 
morality running through both relations— a core which is 
broadened as civilization progresses, but which does not alter 
its basic structure (LE:201-3, 209). If so, the difference 
between the two is simply that the universal friendship is 
directed at a greater number of individuals, not that it alone 
contains a moral element.
In the Doctrine of Virtue. Kant defines the moral element 
which both types of friendship instantiate as a relation of 
"equal mutual love and respect" (DV:469). This balanced relation 
is the essence of friendship. It is a relation of intimacy 
tempered by respectful distance. Love draws people closer; 
respect keeps them at a dignified distance from each other 
(DV:449, 470). Love is attractive in the sense that it breaks 
down the boundaries between individuals. When I love someone, I 
desire his happiness: I desire for him what he desires. This is 
neither a passionate, possessive sort of love nor the mere act of 
wishing someone well, but rather an active sort of love which 
consists of striving to realize the ends of the loved one: Kant
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thus defines love as taking the ends of another as one's own 
(DV: 449, 452). Love breaks down boundaries between individuals 
in the sense that it effaces the distinction between my desires 
and yours; when I love you, your desires become mine. Respect, 
by contrast, preserves the boundaries between individuals. Kant 
defines respect as the principle of limiting one's self-esteem by 
the dignity of humanity in another (DV:449-50). Respect involves 
the recognition that the other person has as much worth as I do; 
that even when I do her a favor and she becomes indebted toward 
me, her freedom and independence do not diminish. Respect thus 
requires that I make no claims on the loved one: that I avoid 
seeing her as dependent on me; that I avoid expecting favors in 
return for mine. Since she remains free no matter how many 
favors I do for her, the matter of how she should relate to me 
must be left up to her own free choice (see LE:204).
Equal amounts of love and respect are important for a 
friendship to survive. If I love someone too much, I not only 
compromise my own integrity in the sense that the other may lose 
her respect for me (DV:450); I also put the other in a debt of 
gratitude toward me, which forces her to consider herself a step 
lower than me (DV:450). Too much respect, by contrast, puts the 
other in the cold, forfeiting the intimacy of the relation of 
friendship altogether (DV:470). An equal relation of mutual love 
and respect, in which neither party is compromised and both 
receive the comforts of love, is therefore necessary for the 
friendship to survive. Kant stresses that we can never tell
278
whether such an equal relation obtains; that in reality, the 
exchange of favors and the compromise of integrity that these 
favors entail keeps the relation of love and respect in continual 
flux (DV:450). It is in this sense that the emotional structure 
of friendship is an ideal which we strive to realize even though 
we can never know whether we have actually succeeded (LE:202-3). 
(Because it is inscrutable, friendship sets an ideal similar to 
morally worthy motivation; see Part II of this chapter.)
Note, however, that Kant thinks that one type of friendship, 
namely, the "moral" friendship (DV:471-3)— not to be confused 
with the "ideal" friendship of equal mutual love and respect 
discussed in the previous paragraph— has actually been realized 
in the world. In section I.ii, I consider his reasons for saying 
this, and also for distinguishing between "ideal" and "moral" 
friendship even though the former is also a moral relation.
First, however, I want to explain why "ideal" friendship is a 
moral relation.
It is fairly easy to see why ideal friendship is a moral 
relation. It is defined as a relation of equal mutual love and 
respect. Now, respect is the central moral emotion, for Kant. 
When I respect someone's humanity, I respect, most broadly, her 
capacity to set and to realize ends and, more narrowly, her 
ability to grasp the concept of duty and to act on it.” It is
”Kant's various claims about humanity and why it exists as an 
end in itself have been the source of much speculation. At G:428-9 
and 437-9, Kant suggests that human beings are ends in themselves 
because they are able to form universalizable maxims in response to 
the concept of duty. At DV:387 and 392, however, he thinks of
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these capacities which make her an end in herself and require me 
to think of her as a free individual rather than a means to my 
ends. But duty imposes other requirements on us than merely 
respecting each other. Given that each of us desires our own 
happiness, it is inconsistent with duty not to promote or desire 
the happiness of others as well (G:399, 423; DV:387-8, 393-4; 
451). Friendship, as a relation in which we both respect another 
person and love her in the sense of promoting her ends, 
instantiates the two primary moral attitudes.
More importantly, friendship instantiates love and respect 
in their ideal relation, since neither is allowed to take 
precedence over the other. This balance is desirable in all 
moral relations, but is not so easy to attain. For instance, in 
doing someone— whether friend or not— a favor, one can show love 
but not a sufficient degree of respect toward the recipient by 
acting as if the favor is a great effort, or showing pride in 
one's benevolence, rather than acting as if it is simply right
humanity more generally as the capacity to set and to pursue ends, 
whether moral or not. The two definitions are not strictly 
incompatible— in order to act virtuously, one must, after all, be 
able to set and pursue ends. Many commentators nevertheless see it 
as necessary to come down on one side of the issue. Commentators 
who see humanity as the general capacity to set and pursue ends are 
the majority, and include Thomas Hill, Jr. in "Humanity as an End 
in Itself," in Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory, 
pp.38-57 (see especially pp.38-41 for a helpful discussion of 
whether humanity refers to rational nature or more specifically to 
human nature) and Onora O'Neill in "Between Consenting Adults," in 
Constructions of. Reason. pp.105-25, (especially pp.114-15). For 
a critical account which interprets humanity as the capacity for 
distinctively moral action, see Pepita Haezrahi, "The Concept of 
Man as an End-in-Himself," in Kant: A Collection Critical
Essays, ed. Robert Paul Wolff, pp.291-313.
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and nothing meritorious. Beneficent actions always put the 
recipient in a debt of gratitude toward the benefactor (DV:450), 
which wounds the recipient's pride (DV:456). This can easily 
tilt the balance of respect in favor of the benefactor unless the 
recipient feels as if the action was his simple due (DV:473).
Now, if one makes the recipient feel indebted and humble, one 
counteracts the original intent of the action, which was to 
promote his happiness (DV:453); and so, one's action is 
inconsistent with the intended end and hence impermissible.31 
We have, then, a duty to promote the ends of strangers who are in 
need (DV:453), and this can be carried out only by showing equal 
love and respect. By embodying just that balance of equal love 
and respect, friendship constitutes the ideal for all moral 
relations.
We see, then, that contrary to Herman and Williams's 
assumption that Kantian morality is impersonal, and that the 
moral and the personal must therefore define distinct spheres of 
human relations, Kant actually sees the personal as setting a 
standard for more broadly directed, "impersonal" relations. The 
personal relation of friendship is, for Kant, a paradigmatically 
moral relation: it instantiates the balance of love and respect 
which we should strive for in all moral relations. Through 
intimacy with another, we become better moral creatures. Kantian 
morality is thus by no means impersonal.
“See Onora O'Neill, CR, pp.91-2 for Kantian rationality- 
requirements on means-end relations; especially the third one.
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This still leaves a lingering worry about the motive for 
entering into friendships. If one engages in friendships out of 
a desire for moral improvement, and not out of a desire to know 
someone on her own account, does not this remove the personal 
essence of friendship? If this is the case, then Williams' 
objection still holds. For while we have found a place for the 
personal within the moral, we have done so only at the cost of 
reducing the personal to a mere means for moral improvement, 
disowning it of any value it might have in itself. And this, 
Williams would surely say, is just the problem with an 
"impersonally" conceived moral system. We need, therefore, to 
turn to this objection.
ii. A Motivational Dilemma
So far, we have considered the basic structure of friendship 
without going into the motivation for entering into friendships. 
In the Lectures on Ethics. Kant considers two conflicting motives 
which exist in each of us: our concern for our own happiness, and 
our concern for our own moral worth. The former tells us to look 
out for our own happiness first; the latter, to look out for that 
of others first. The solution to this dilemma, Kant claims, is 
to engage in friendships, since in doing so, we fulfill our duty 
to promote another person's happiness while at the same time 
being guarantees that our own happiness will be promoted by our 
friend. Friendship thus satisfies both motives (LE:201-3).
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This solution, however, immediately raises the worry noted 
at the end of Section I.i. If my motive for engaging in 
friendships is partly moral and partly selfish, does this not 
threaten the authenticity of my friendships? If I make friends 
because it is my duty to do so, and also because I know it will 
satisfy my self-love, does this not prevent me from being a real 
friend— someone who appreciates the other person on her own 
account and not for her capacity to help me thrive in both moral 
and selfish terms?
I believe that Kant has an answer to this worry, though he 
does not explicitly address it. The answer is to distinguish 
between the types of needs that are fulfilled through friendship. 
The "friendship of need," in which friends are there to help one 
another, is not a truly moral one because it always involves an 
imbalance of love and respect owing to the indebtedness that is 
- brought about through mutual aid (DV:472). This does not,
however, mean that there exist no truly moral friendships in the 
world. There exists a "moral" type of friendship which 
instantiates the basic structure of equal mutual love and 
respect, but which is distinctive in that its love-aspect seeks 
to satisfy not all of the other person's desires, but only her 
need to confide in another person: "Moral friendship (as 
distinguished from friendship based on feeling)," Kant says, "is 
the complete confidence of two persons in revealing their secret 
judgments and feelings to each other, as far as such disclosures 
are consistent with mutual respect" (DV:471). When I fulfil my
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need to confide in another, I do not become indebted to the other 
person, since confiding in her was something I did myself. The 
other person was simply a good listener; she did not perform a 
special favor for which I am now indebted. I fulfilled my own 
need; she was simply there as a means to fulfilling it. Unlike 
the friendship of need, the "moral" friendship incurs no 
debts.23
The question remains, however, regarding our motive for 
engaging in moral friendships. Is not my need to confide in 
another person a selfish need, and if so, does not that reduce my 
friend to a mere "ear," a mere means to my ends? I think Kant 
would grant that this self-interested element exists. He takes a 
skeptical attitude towards the idea that our motive for engaging 
in friendships is utterly disinterested. We do not stand back 
and admire our friends in the way we admire objects of art. Our 
friends fulfill real needs. To grant that we do seek to fulfill 
a personal need when we engage in friendships, however, is not to 
claim that the motive for friendship is selfish. The need which 
we fulfill at least in "moral" friendships is distinctively 
social: it is a need to "communicate our whole self" (LE:206).
In its distinctively social capacity, the need for self­
33In his otherwise helpful article on Kant's notion of 
friendship, H.J. Paton neglects this difference between the 
friendship of need and the moral friendship, and so remains unable 
to explain why Kant denies that a truly moral friendship can 
involve excessive concern with the ends of others (DV:472). See 
Paton, "Kant on Friendship," Dawes Hicks Lecture on Philosophy, 
Proceeds O L the British Academy. Vol.XLII (1956), pp.45-66. The 
passage in question is on p.55.
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revelation resembles the Hutchesonian and Humean basis for 
morality, namely, sympathy backed a desire for others' approval, 
which is similarly social in essence.33 Friendship can thus 
fulfill a need which is both personal and social in character.
The social motive for moral friendship also explains how 
Kant can claim that it is our duty to engage in friendships while 
at the same time avoiding the repellent notion that we engage in 
friendships out &£ a sense of duty. When we confide in another 
person, we demonstrate our trust in her. This trust has a 
distinctively moral role: it helps us cultivate a sense of trust 
toward the world in general. As Kant puts it, friendship is "an 
aid in overcoming the constraint and the distrust man feels in 
his intercourse with others, by revealing himself to them without 
reserve" (LE:206). The moral function of friendship is thus 
indirectly played out: it is realized not in the direct promotion 
of our friend's ends, but in our overcoming the barriers which we 
sometimes unnecessarily erect against the world a large. This 
trustful attitude has a moral value because it helps us form an 
ever-widening circle of friends, and so helps us along the path 
of becoming a "friend of man” (see DV:472-4). This final state 
is the goal of civilization (LE:206-7), and forming particular 
friendships is the best way to advance that goal. We are thus 
back at the passage with which we began Section I, the passage
33The difference between Kant and the two British philosophers 
is, of course, that while Hutcheson and Hume base all moral 
relations on feelings, Kant bases moral relations on the moral law 
and allows feelings to motivate actions only on the condition that 
their maxims are either permissible or obligatory (see Chapter 1).
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which contrasts special friendships with a universal friendship. 
The continuity between the two should by now be clear: they both 
contain a core of mutual confidence, which can be widened to 
include an increasing number of persons.
In defining the moral core of friendship as a relation of 
mutual trust, I am diverging from Kant's initial definition of 
the love involved in friendship as an acceptance of the other 
person's ends as one's own. Granted, the latter form of love is 
expressed in an ideal friendship. But as soon as we try to 
express it in the real world, we make the friend indebted to us, 
and this in effect ruins the friendship. Kant saw this: "A 
friend who bears my losses becomes my benefactor and puts me in 
his debt. I feel shy in his presence and cannot look him boldly 
in the face. The true relationship is cancelled and friendship 
ceases1 (LE:204-5, my emphasis). Even when it is tempered by 
respect, the friend's display of love still puts the other in 
debt and so threatens to cancel the equality required for the 
friendship to survive. I believe it is for this reason that Kant 
redefines the conception of love manifested in real-life "moral" 
friendships as a love of mutual confidence rather than one of 
beneficence. It is possible to realize mutual confidence without 
engendering debts; hence the friendship of mutual confidence can 
survive. The love expressed in the purest friendships, then, 
removes barriers between individuals not in the sense of their 
accepting each other's ends, but in the sense of their revealing 
their innermost thoughts to each other. True friends do not
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desire the same things; rather, they understand each another 
because they gaze into each other's souls.
It is important to notice however, that the friendship of 
mutual confidence, while more robust than the friendship of 
mutual love, also contains a fragile element. Kant puts it as 
follows: "we have certain natural frailties which ought to be 
concealed for the sake of decency, lest humanity be outraged.
Even to our best friend we must not reveal ourselves, in our 
natural state as we know it ourselves. To do so would be 
loathsome" (LE:206). Not everything should be shared among best 
friends. Each of us has wishes and tendencies which can only be 
interpreted as vile or stupid, and to force them upon a friend 
endangers the friendship, either by producing shock or disgust in 
the friend, or, more likely, by making the friend despise one for 
insisting on imparting unsavory trivialities. In order to 
deflect such damage, one must, out of pride in oneself and out of 
respect for one's friend, refrain from imparting details which 
could provoke these reactions. The friend, in turn, has a duty 
to try as far as possible to refrain from judging while listening 
to what one needs to say. All this is done for the sake of 
preserving the friendship; and preserving one's friendships is a 
duty because friendship is a paradigm toward which one should 
strive in all moral relations: taking an interest in the ends of 
others, respecting them, and confiding in them.
Even though both the moral and the ideal types of friendship 
are fragile, a failure in friendship imparts valuable lessons.
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These are lessons in moral judgment? and it is for this reason, I 
believe, that Kant makes friendship a duty even though part of 
its motivation is selfish and even though friendships can fail. 
For even when a friendship fails, one walks away as a better 
moral perceiver. Having failed in the friendship of mutual love 
and respect, one learns, as the violating beneficiary, not to 
appear patronizing— which helps one better to carry out one's 
duties of love towards others in general— or, as the patient, not 
to resent, not to interpret acts of good will as insults, and so, 
to cultivate a less suspicious, more generous frame of mind, 
which is essential to one's sense of dignity. A failure in the 
friendship of mutual confidence similarly hones one's practical 
judgment: either one learns that one needs more discretion in 
selecting what to reveal about oneself— one needs, so to speak, 
to "tighten one's filter" out of respect for one's own dignity as 
well as the listener's— or one learns that the friend was perhaps 
not such a close friend after all (for if she were, she might not 
have reacted so violently to the confidence), in which case one 
learns to pick one's friends more carefully. The latter 
increases one's moral self-knowledge by helping one see, through 
conflict and difference with another, what one's real character 
is.
These considerations help us answer the Williamsesque 
objection that Kantian friendship, because of its moral benefits, 
is an impersonal relation in which we engage as good soldiers in 
the army of duty rather than as creatures with specific tastes.
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loyalties and attachments. The key is to deemphasize the motive 
for engaging in friendships and to focus instead on its effects. 
Friendship, or even failure in friendship, has morally beneficial 
effects which need not be part of the motive from which we engage 
friendships. We can engage in friendships from various motives: 
a need to confide in another, a desire to augment our happiness, 
a desire to feel needed, or simply an interest in a specific 
individual. But as the friendship develops, situations arise 
which give us occasion to reflect on the broader moral 
implications of the friendship. What prompts us to reflect is, 
of course, our concern for the friend— but the friend's 
expectations are at the same time an instance of the way people 
In general expect or desire to be treated, and this becomes clear 
once we compare the friendship with our other relations. Indeed, 
it is not uncommon that we treat our friends worse than we treat 
mere acquaintances, taking friends for granted and burdening them 
with worries, often unfounded, with we would not burden others; 
and such comparisons make us better friends as well as more 
sensitive moral creatures. Reflection on our actions toward our 
friends thus gives rise to reflection on the general claims of 
humanity, which leads in turn to an increased sensitivity and 
adeptness in dealing with people in general. These effects come 
naturally, in the same way feelings of love come naturally when 
we perform beneficent acts towards those whom we do not love; for 
the improvisation required in friendship is analogous to the 
improvisation required in all moral relations.
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We see,then, that even though the motive for engaging in 
friendships need not be that of duty, the care taken to preserve 
the friendship is of a distinctively moral nature. This does not 
make the friendship "impersonal"; it only confirms the fact that 
people are not wholly unlike in their desires. Since to be loyal 
toward our friends is to treat them in the way anyone would 
expect to be treated in a similar situation, the maxim of 
loyalty towards our friends can be universalized without losing 
its personal touch. Far from being "impersonal," Kantian 
friendship instantiates the way every human being wants to be 
treated, and so increases our readiness to treat others as we 
would our friends. That this is perfectly compatible with 
showing special care towards should by now be clear.
Section VII; Williams' Criticisms Kant on the Emotions
ij. The emotions are capricious
Williams first considers Kant's observation that the 
emotions are too capricious to provide, on their own, a stable 
basis for moral response. Paraphrasing Kant, he writes:
I may feel benevolent towards this man, not towards that, 
for all sorts of causes or reasons, some lying in my own 
changing moods. To act in accordance with these promptings
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is to act irrationally and (possibly) unjustly; but moral 
action is consistent action, done on principle (ME, 226).24 
Williams levels two criticisms against Kant's claim that the 
emotions are capricious. First, he takes the claim to suggest 
that "there is no way of adjusting one's emotional response in 
the light of other considerations, of applying some sense of 
proportion, without abandoning emotional motivation altogether" 
(ME, 226). This, he continues, is a crude view of the emotions, 
since we obviously can and do distance ourselves from our 
emotions and seek to comprehend them in all sorts of situations. 
I have already traced, in Chapter 1, the development of Kant's 
view that the emotions are too capricious to serve as a stable 
foundation for moral principles. In this chapter, we saw that 
even though the emotions cannot found moral principles, they can 
be tempered by principles— cultivated— and in this guise serve 
various indispensable functions in the moral life. To answer 
Williams' first criticism, then, we need only note that Kant, 
contrary to Williams' assumption, does believe that we are able 
to apply a "sense of proportion" to our emotions, as his claim 
that we can cultivate and so modify our emotional response 
clearly implies. Williams' first criticism therefore does not 
apply to Kant.
In his second criticism of Kant's claim that the emotions 
are too capricious to serve as a basis for consistent moral
“Here and hereafter, I use "ME" to refer to Williams 
"Morality and the Emotions," in Problems of the Self (Cambridge 
Cambridge UP, 1973), pp.207-29.
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action, Williams questions the value of consistency as a moral 
guideline, associating Kant's regard for consistency with "the 
Principle of Equal Unfairness," a principle which says that if 
you cannot do good to everybody in a certain situation, you 
should not do it to anybody. He complains:
There are indeed human activities and relations in which 
impartiality and consistency are very much the point. But 
to raise on these notions a model of all moral relations 
is...to make each of us into a Supreme Legislator; a fantasy 
which represents, not the moral ideal, but the deification 
of man (ME, 226).”
This passage exemplifies two common misreadings of Kant. The 
first is that Kant's regard for consistency— for the 
universalizability of our maxims— entails that he held something 
like the Principle of Equal Unfairness. In fact, Kant makes it 
clear that we have a considerable latitude in deciding whom to 
help and when; this latitude is the mark of all imperfect duties, 
including our duties of love toward others (see DV:390). I have 
already shown that the impartial requirements of the categorical 
imperative are fully compatible with personal commitments.
The second misreading of Kant is found in Williams' 
contention that to raise a model of all moral relations on the 
notions of impartiality and consistency is "to make each of us 
into a Supreme Legislator; a fantasy which represents, not the
”See Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality," Moral Luck. 
p.18 for a similar objection.
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moral ideal, but the deification of man" (HE, 226).36 Setting 
consistency-constraints on our actions, I take it, represents the 
deification of man only if it places implausible demands on us, 
such as the demand to be completely impartial in selecting whom 
we ought to help and when. But contrary to Williams' claim, the 
moral law does not require strict impartiality in selecting the 
objects of our actions; it only requires a consistency between 
the maxim and its universalized counterpart, and between our ends 
(e.g., the happiness of others) and the means through which we 
propose to realize them. We have just seen that it is possible 
to universalize a maxim which selects specific recipients of our 
favors. A human regard for our nearest and dearest is thus 
compatible with the demand for consistency which the moral law 
sets on us. Our identity as "Supreme Legislators" who are able 
to form maxims which can at the same time serve as universal 
laws, does not, then, impose inhuman or unattainable requirements 
on us; it does not "deify" man.
It is fruitful to elaborate briefly on the reasons behind 
this, since they are anchored in our finitude— in our 
specifically human nature— to which Williams mistakenly takes 
Kant to pay insufficient heed. The moral law applies to us as 
beings who are not purely, but finitely. rational: beings who are
^Williams' term "Supreme Legislators” is in any case a 
misnomer, since most human beings being are only legislators in the 
kingdom of ends, not sovereigns or "supreme legislators." The 
sovereign in the kingdom of ends, Kant says, is a legislator who is 
"subject to the will of no other" (G:433). This, I take it, refers 
either to God or to the benevolent monarch— in any case, not to 
every human being.
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embodied, who have emotional needs, who engage in specific and 
often socially defined relations, who live in a world of 
scarcity, and who are unable to perform miracles. These 
conditions place specific rationality-requirements on us. In 
order to form universalizable maxims, we must not only seek to 
realize our ends through the means available £a us, but must also 
heed the frailty of human agency by refraining from undermining 
the projects of others.27 Since virtue requires first and 
foremost that we not violate the moral law (DV:384), our first 
concern in the case of other people's happiness is to ensure that 
we do not actively promote their unhappiness by undermining their 
projects. When one is involved in a close relationship, it is 
easy to undermine at least one project of the other person—  
namely, the relationship itself— by failing to show the cares and 
emotions which keep the relationship alive. To preserve the 
relationship, then, it is necessary to extrude emotions which 
threaten it and to cultivate emotions which tend to preserve it. 
The moral law can in this way be seen to prescribe that we 
cultivate and act on emotions which keep our close relationships 
alive.28 Far from devaluing emotional ties, our identity as
27For some illustrations of the frailty of human agency, 
including examples of how human agency can be undermined, and the 
specific rational ity-requirements which this frailty imposes on us, 
see Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason. pp.101, 114-15, 118, 
125, and 140-41; also Onora O'Neill (then Nell), Acting on 
Principle. Chapter 6.
“This has been convincingly shown by Paul Guyer in Kant and 
the Experience oL Freedom; Essavs on Aesthetics and Morality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), Chapter 10.
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legislators of universal law imposes on us the duty to preserve 
the relationships and commitments which we enter into as finite 
rational beings.
ii» The emotions are passively experienced
Williams next criticizes Kant for claiming that the emotions 
are passively experienced. The dire consequence he takes this 
claim to have for Kantian morality is that it excludes 
emotionally motivated actions from having moral worth, when in 
fact they do have a moral or at least "human" value. He 
attributes to Kant the claim that "moral worth can attach only to 
what we freely do, to those respects in which we are rationally 
active" (ME, 227). Since, according to Kant, the emotions are 
neither rationally nor actively willed, moral worth cannot, 
Williams infers, attach to emotionally motivated actions, for 
Kant.
Williams first makes what he considers to be a minor 
objection, namely, that "emotionally motivated action can itself 
be free" (ME, 227). He takes Kant's claim that the emotions are 
passively experienced to imply that acting from emotions is also 
a passive, unfree affair. This reveals a deep misunderstanding 
of Kant's view of human agency. The passivity of the emotions 
does not entail, within Kant's system, that emotionally motivated 
actions are not free. All human actions are free, for Kant, 
including those motivated by emotions. Freedom of the will
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consists in the ability to form maxims— reasons for acting— which 
are based on incentives, including emotions and desires, but not 
determined by them. As Kant famously puts it,
...freedom of the will is of a wholly unique nature in that 
an incentive can determine the will to an action only so far 
as the individual has incorporated it into his. maxim (has 
made it the general rule in accordance with which he will 
conduct himself); only thus can an incentive, whatever it 
may be, co-exist with the absolute spontaneity of the will 
(i.e., freedom) (R:19).
Human actions are not brute responses to incentives; they stem 
instead from the freely formed intention to act on a given 
incentive and in the way described by the maxim. In order to act 
from an emotion— say, love— one must first, then, form the maxim 
that one will act from love in situations of that sort. This 
intention-forming process is what makes us rational agents: 
without it, we would neither deliberate nor control ourselves; we 
would simply act on— or react to— our strongest desire. Since an 
emotionally motivated action stems not directly from the emotion 
itself, but from the freely formed maxim to act on the emotion at 
hand, the action is Itself free. Contrary to Williams' 
assumption, emotionally motivated actions— like all human 
actions— are free, for Kant.
The main thrust of Williams' criticism, however, concerns 
not the freedom, but the moral value, of acting on emotions. 
Williams takes Kant to hold that moral worth can never attach to
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emotionally motivated actions because emotions are passively 
experienced, and moral worth can attach only to those respects in 
which we are "rationally active." Before going into the specific 
criticisms which Williams levels against Kant on this issue, we 
should note that Kant did not deny that some emotionally 
motivated actions have moral worth. As we saw earlier in this 
chapter, moral worth can attach to emotionally motivated actions 
in the following ways: actions motivated either by emotions which 
have been cultivated out of a sense of duty or by emotions which 
are recognized to be appropriate motives for fulfilling what duty 
requires, da have moral worth, for Kant, since the motivating 
emotions are in these cases not uncontrolled, but tempered by 
principles.
Williams has two deep objections to the idea that moral 
worth attaches only to what we actively do, to those respects in 
which we act on freely adopted principles, and not to "passive" 
emotional responses. Since moral worth, for Kant, attaches to 
emotionally motivated actions only if they are at the same time 
governed by principles, these objections strike directly at Kant.
In his first objection, Williams questions the idea that 
freely adopted principles can reflect one's sincere moral 
convictions. He points out an important resemblance between 
moral and factual convictions: both are passively adopted in the 
sense that they are impressed on us. If an agent claims that he 
has simply decided to adopt a moral principle, we have reason to 
doubt the sincerity of his principle. For moral convictions are
297
impressed on us; and a great degree of moral sincerity depends on 
our acknowledgement of this passivity, on our awareness that our 
moral convictions are not simply adopted at will. As Williams 
somewhat obscurely puts it:
We see a man's genuine convictions as coming from somewhere 
deeper in him than that; and, by what is only an apparent 
paradox, what we see as coming from deeper in him, he— that 
is, the deciding 'he'— may see as coming from outside him.
So it is with the emotions (ME, 227).
Williams seems to be making the following argument. Since we 
experience the emotions as being impressed on us— as coming from 
"outside" us— and since this passivity is essential to moral 
sincerity, acting from emotions is a prime instance of moral 
sincerity. To claim, as Kant does, that moral worth can attach 
only to what we freely decide to do, is to neglect the extent to 
which passively experienced phenomena, e.g., emotions, determine 
moral sincerity.
Now, there is certainly something deep and important in the 
idea that moral sincerity is intimately connected with the sense 
of being "swept up" by a situation and by the feelings it 
engenders, and that acting on such feelings is one way of showing 
moral sincerity. However, our moral convictions often run 
against the tide of our feelings. It is altogether unclear how 
Williams would characterize such conflicted situations. Would 
they be examples of moral insincerity, for him? Since he seems 
in the above passage to equate feelings with moral convictions.
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or at least to see moral convictions as being bound up with 
feelings, he appears unable even to characterize situations in 
which we know that we should not act on our emotions; in which we 
know that it would be morally wrong to do so (think of a 
situation in which the other person's end is morally 
unacceptable, e.g., the case of deciding whether to help a friend 
planning to rob a bank). Perhaps Williams would describe such 
cases as involving a conflict of feelings, e.g., a conflict 
between loyalty to a friend and the feeling that helping him 
would be wrong in this situation. But the awareness that an 
action is morally wrong need not be bound up with any particular 
feeling. It is therefore misleading to characterize moral 
conflict as conflict between feelings. But that seems to be the 
only description available to Williams.
In any case, there is more to moral sincerity than simply 
doing what one is moved to do in a given situation. Moral 
sincerity requires also a commitment to one's convictions, a 
readiness to act on one's principles even when one does not feel 
like it; and that is precisely why Kant distinguishes between 
feelings and principles. Now, Williams might in fact concede 
that feelings are not the same as principles, and that it is 
possible (though he does not describe how) for a conflict to 
arise between one's feelings and one's sincere moral convictions. 
He would still, however, make the following objection to Kant's 
construal of how we adopt our moral convictions. Kant holds that 
we freely adopt the maxims on which we act, but Williams thinks
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our principles are "impressed" on us, from outside, as it were. 
What appears to others to come from deep within a man is 
experienced by him, the moral subject, as coming from outside 
him. This is the element of passivity that Williams feels is so 
important to moral sincerity, and which he takes Kant to 
overlook.
But Kant would agree that we experience our moral 
convictions as being, in a sense, impressed on us. The moral 
law, he says, is a "fact of reason," an inescapable principle 
which "forces itself upon us" (Cprr:31). It belongs to the very 
structure of reason. It is not something we can decide to adopt 
as morally right, for it sets the standard of rightness itself. 
As finite rational beings, we can surely choose to violate the 
law. But we can never ignore the fact that it sets the paradigm 
for how we should act. We experience the moral law as being 
impressed on us "from outside," to use Williams' terms, because 
pure reason— with which we certainly identify, but which can 
never completely characterize us, since we are capable of 
violating its laws— imposes the moral law on us with a necessity 
which precludes decisions about whether to accept the law as 
morally right or not (Cprr:20). Our awareness of the moral thus 
has the "passive" element which Williams takes to characterize 
our awareness of our sincerely held moral con^ ctions.
The "passive" phenomenology of our experience of the moral 
law, however, does not prevent us from freely adopting our 
maxims. Maxims are subjective principles of reason, principles
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which describe how we propose to act in specific situations 
(G:422n). Since our maxims can either violate or conform to the 
dictates of the moral law, they do not necessarily reflect our 
sincere moral convictions, which, because of the inescapability 
of pure reason, always conform to the moral law even if we should 
deceive ourselves to think otherwise (R:33, 37). Since Williams 
fails to distinguish between freely chosen (and in this sense 
contingent) maxims and the moral law, which imposes itself on us 
with inescapable necessity, his complaint that we do not simply 
decide to adopt our moral convictions is not only vague, but also 
misplaced. Kant can thus answer all of Williams' objections.
Conclusion
I have shown that far from asking us to sacrifice personal 
commitments and enlist in an impersonal army of duty, Kant 
recognizes that when we engage in friendships, we cultivate a 
moral disposition by cultivating the moral feelings themselves 
(in particular, mutual love and respect). In this sense, 
personal commitments serve as a paradigm for all moral relations.
Within intimate relationships, moral concerns manifest 
themselves in a specific way. The concern for (or awareness of) 
the rightness of our actions characteristic of the motive of duty 
formulates itself, in personal relations, in an especially urgent 
command to tend to the appropriateness of our feelings within the 
relationship— urgent because the relationship is based on natural 
feelings of love and these need to be tended to secure the
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survival of the relationship. There is usually a harmony between 
our natural desires and the requirements of reason as they 
manifest themselves within the relationship; nevertheless, every 
day is not a sunny day, and we often consciously prepare for the 
storms which eventually tear at the seams of the relationship. 
This is an act of will and indeed a moral act, given Kant's 
requirement that we actively engage in friendships in order to 
learn how to attend to and care about the thoughts, needs and 
feelings of other people in general and so to cultivate our love 
of man.
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